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"I believe that the major advances in the next 
decade will not be in the direction of adding to the 
stockpile of techniques that universities can teach, 
but insights into how to make the analysis procedure 
simple. If we can make it simple enough for any 
intelligent, logical person to understand and use 
for himself or herself, the products of our 
research will be easy to sell(18, p.6)
"Modelling systems, identifying objectives and 
solving programs are tough enough, but the awesome 
problem in public investment is the decision making 
process. We know so little about decision makers, 
about how the decision making process works, about 
the institutions which control decisions and about 
how these institutions react. If the analyst is 
really going to affect decision making he must have 
more knowledge about the process." (25, p.15)
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1. INTRODUCTION
Most important investment decisions involve 
several criteria or dimensions, e.g. a weapon system 
could be judged by cost, portability, reliability and 
firepower. Moreover, the values of these dimensions 
that alternative courses of action will produce is 
rarely known for certain, because they will occur 
in the future or because analysis to obtain the 
information would be too expensive or too time- 
consuming. These comments apply to public sector 
investment particularly, because the market does not 
provide a price that incorporates several dimensions 
for public goods, and because much public investment 
is one-off, having rarely been done before, e.g., 
Medibank.
1.1 Aim
The aim of this thesis is to investigate the 
application of multidimensional decision analysis (MDA) 
in public investment analysis, based on a study of 
its theory and procedures.
1.2 Outline
The outline of the thesis is as follows.
Chapter 1 is an introduction, with a summary of the 
terms and notation used. Chapter 2 notes that the thesis 
is limited to the analysis of decisions which have 
dimensions that can be traded off against each other.
Any decision analysis should start with a consideration 
of all alternatives and so this investigation of decision
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analysis then reviews various alternatives to MDA 
for public investment analysis and finds that MDA is 
apparently worthy of further study (Chapter 3).
Chapter 4 then reviews the theory and practice of MDA 
when dimension levels for each alternative are known 
with certainty, or more succintly, MDA under certainty. 
Next, Chapter 5 treats MDA under uncertainty by outlining 
the basics of utility theory and its application in 
MDA. The next six chapters elaborate on Chapter 5 by 
treating probability and the various kinds of utility 
models that have been developed.
Chapter 12 discusses some published 
applications of the theory, concentrating on MDA 
under uncertainty, and then a case study of public 
investment analysis, that of deciding types of truck 
for a military fleet, is presented. Based on the 
theory and practice of MDA in public investment analysis 
covered up to this point, Chapter 13 then makes a 
preliminary evaluation of the usefulness of MDA and 
finds that simple models appear to be the more useful 
for most public investment analysis. The thesis concludes 
with some suggestions on how to simplify and hence 
improve the applicability of MDA,
1.3 Terms and Notation
Some of the terms used in this thesis should 
be clarified at this stage. The most important are 
underlined in the following brief, introductory 
description of the elements of MDA.
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MDA decomposes a decision into its dimensions 
and considers each dimension separately. Then the 
units on each dimension, e. g., miles/gallon, are 
transformed into value units if the MDA is done with the 
value of each alternative known for each dimension 
known with certainty or into utility units if the MDA 
is done under uncertainty. This transformation allows 
for non-linear preferences of the decision-maker$ as in 
Figure 1.1. These transformations are value and utility 
functions, respectively.
1
utility 
units
o\ The dimension of dollars 
Fig. 1.1 An example of a utility function
After each dimension has been transformed, 
levels attained by an alternative course of action on 
each of the dimensions are combined into a total value 
or expected utility figure for the alternative by using 
a model; often an additive mpdel is used but the model 
used should be justified for each decision. The 
alternative with the highest total value or utility 
figure indicates the most preferred alternative.
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The notation used in the thesis refers to the
consequences of alternative courses of action. Each
consequence is measured on criteria, or dimensions, or
attributes. Let X = X1 x X- x X, ... X be1 2 3 n
the consequence space, where X^ is the ith dimension.
A specific alternative x will be referred to as (x., 
x2* ••• xn) where x., i = 1, ... n refers to the level 
of the ith dimension. An uncertain alternative will 
sometimes be referred to as x. x» refers to non-i 
dimensions and St. refers to a certainty equivalent of 
the ith dimension. The most preferred level of the 
x^s on each dimension will be x^*, the least preferred 
will be x.*. Sometimes, so that subscripts will not 
be needed, a two dimensional consequence will be (y, z). 
w^ will refer to the weighting of the ith dimension. 
Value preferences v(x^) will refer to dimensions of 
riskless or certain alternatives, while utility 
preferences u(x.) will refer to dimensions of risky or 
uncertain alternatives. Preference relations are: 
is preferred to (>), is less preferred than (<), and is 
indifferent to (^).
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2.______ THE TWO MAJOR APPROACHES TO MULTIDIMENSIONAL
DECISIONS
There are two major approaches to multi­
dimensional problems, the non-compensatory and the 
compensatory, which can be put (a little imprecisely) 
in the more familiar terms of satisficing and optimising. 
Ackoff (1) suggests another approach,that of adaptivising, 
but others (30; 54) have pointed out that this third 
approach is really just an approach to the quality of 
decision making, rather than an alternative to the 
two major approaches above.
The first approach is the (apparently) non­
compensatory approach, where levels in one dimension 
are not compensated for by levels in another dimension, 
that is, there are no rates of substitution or indifference 
curves. One example of this approach is linear 
programming, where one dimension alone is optimised 
subject to constraints on others. Another example 
is lexicographic ordering, where alternatives are 
judged on dimensions in priority orderings, and lower 
dimensions are considered only if alternatives are 
tied on prior dimensions. A third example is satisficing 
where a "cut-off" level is nominated on priority 
ordered dimensions, and further dimensions are considered 
only if two or more alternatives are acceptable in 
prior dimensions.
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However, this non-compensatory approach does 
imply a comparison of dimensions. For instance, 
shadow prices indicate the marginal value of the 
constraints in linear programming, which are implicitly 
traded off if the linear programming solution is 
accepted. Lexicographic ordering implies that the rate 
of substitution is zero, not that it does not exist. 
Satisficing implies the rate of substitution goes from 
zero to unity at the "cut-off" point, not that it does 
not exist. That lexicographic ordering does exist is 
shown by the example of martyrs who would not trade the 
dimension of faith against life, and satisficing is 
apparently evident in some subsistence farming where 
alternatives must meet a "survival" test before they 
will be assessed further. Certainly, these approaches 
are valid if they reflect the decision maker's beliefs.
But their assumption that the rate of substitution is 
zero is too often made for convenience rather than 
realism and the added benefits from exploring the decision 
space by relaxing this assumption are overlooked when 
deciding that the expected cost in divergence from the 
compensatory optimum is less than the cost of the analysis 
required to reach the compensatory optimum. If decision 
analysis could be facilitated, the necessity for the non­
compensatory approach might decline.
The second approach to multidimensional decisions 
is the compensatory one. Here the rates of substitution 
are made explicit, and the levels attained by alterntiives 
on each dimension are combined in one way or another.
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The simplest way of combining them is the additive 
model (this and other models are discussed later).
The additive model is used by benefit-cost analysts, 
for instance, when they add the benefits of time-saving 
and increased production, each of these having been 
determined from market values.
The compensatory approach is the one usually taken 
in micro-economics (which is based on either indifference 
or "utility" curves). Psychological testing has 
verified that it is a realistic one (61). Because of 
this, and because of its widespread use, this thesis 
will concentrate on compensatory decision analysis.
If the rate of substitution is zero for the range of 
dimension values in a decision problem so that a 
non-compensatory analysis is required, then lexicographic 
ordering or satisficing can certainly be carried out.
The procedures are simple, and can even be carried 
out when outcomes are uncertain, as MacCrimmon has 
shown. (140) (However, MacCrimmon's procedure is 
based solely on endpoints of a subjective probability 
distribution which is assumed to be uniform, so that 
not even the modal value of the PERT formula is used.) 
This thesis takes up the decision problem when the 
simple non-compensatory procedures have been used, 
if they are applicable, and more than one alternative
remains.
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3_.______ DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO PUBLIC INVESTMENT
ANALYSIS
There are approaches to public investment analysis 
which are different to MDA. Before investigating 
MDA further, it would be wise to investigate whether 
MDA is different to these other approaches, and 
whether these differences are important. A brief 
review of most of the possible approaches to project 
evaluation is in Perry and Dillon's article (169); 
here only the major approaches of cost-benefit analysis 
(CBA), cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA), mathematical 
programming, simulation and unaided intuition are 
covered. The aim is merely to discover differences 
to MDA and evaluate their possible importance, it is 
not to dismiss the other approaches.
3.1 Cost-benefit Analysis and Cost-Effectiveness Analysis
CBA and CEA are methods of project appraisal
which are very widely used. Their differences to MDA 
can be grouped under the headings of generality, 
treatment of risk, and coverage. It will be argued 
that MDA does not replace CBA/CEA, but it does appear to 
be a useful development of them.
3.1.1 Generality
The usual goal of CBA/CEA is a potential Pareto 
gain in efficiency. Underlying this goal are seven, 
often unstated, assumptions or value judgments:
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(i) Individual preferences count. However, 
public decisionmaking is in reality 
the result of bargaining by a few 
informed groups who have stakes in 
the area involved (126). "Under the 
specialized structure of contemporary 
societies most individuals are not 
directly or actively engaged in policy 
making, rather they delegate their 
rights in this regard to representatives 
and abide by consensus policy decisions." 
(179, p* 438) Without this apparent 
irrationality, the "rational" individualistic 
bases of CBA would make it difficult to 
provide a social welfare function, as 
Arrow has shown (10).
(ii) The market measures individual preferences.
V—However, this assumes that the market is 
perfectly competitive, which is probably 
not the case in Australia, with its quite 
high concentration ratios. Nor is this 
assumption valid if the project is not a 
marginal one.
(iii) Market prices are derived from an optimal 
income distribution - even if the CBA/CEA 
analyst assigns no weights to market prices, 
the absence of weights merely means that the 
present income distribution is considered 
optimal.
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(iv) A potential Pareto gain is satisfactory, 
or will become actual by redistribution 
measures of the government. However, 
this is uncertain.
(v) Public goods and intangibles with which CBA/CEA 
often deals and which are not traded
on the market can be priced by some 
"objective" method. However, this is 
dubious.
(vi) Value functions are linear with money.
(vii) The additive model can be used to aggregate
benefits and costs. The additive model 
assumes independence of value functions, 
which has been quite controversial in 
CBA literature, e.g. (93; 146).
In brief, the basis of CBA and CEA is not free 
of value judgments. If these judgments did characterise 
the decisionmaker, then MDA would produce the same results 
as CBA and CEA. But if other value judgments applied, 
then CBA and CEA would be largely irrelevant but MDA 
could still be used, incorporating the decisionmakers 
own value judgments. That is, MDA appears to be more
general than CBA.
3.1.2 Treatment of Uncertainty
CBA and CEA usually have an objective function 
of maximising discounted benefits or minimizing discounted 
costs. However, this objective function relies on 
necessarily uncertain forecasts of the discount rate, 
the benefits and costs, and the duration of the project 
(165). Each of these can be important.
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For instance, the selection of a discount rate 
can be crucial. If Corps of Engineers’ projects had 
been discounted at 4, 6 or 8 percent, instead of 2.75 
percent, then 9, 64 and 80 percent of them would have 
had a benefit-cost ratio of less than unity (218). An 
initial Australian study (166) found that discount 
rates could vary from 3.2 to 10.5 percent, depending on 
which controversial basis the discount rate was derived. 
Indeed, the adequacy of a discount rate rather than a 
discount algorithm is arguable (60).
Moreover, procedures to incorporate uncertainty 
about benefits, costs and project duration into CBA 
and CEA are crude. One method is to add a risk premium 
to the (uncertain) discount rate or to costs. Dasgupta 
and Pearce (33) aver that this is inadequate, because 
this only allows for overestimates of benefits, while 
estimates may be under as well as over. However, they 
are confusing sensitivity testing with allowing for 
uncertainty. The principle of a risk premium is to 
reduce an uncertain amount to a certainty equivalent, 
which can then be compared to other certain amounts.
The calculation of certainty equivalents requires two 
things: the probability distribution of uncertain
outcomes, and the attitude of the decisionmaker to this 
uncertainty. That is, a risk premium to the discount 
rate or to costs cannot be calculated without the 
decisionmaker's attitude being assessed. Perhaps this 
attitude could be linear, if the project being considered 
is one of many, but there may be public projects when this 
will not be so, e.g., a large project in a small region.
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Thus, "it seems generally agreed that any valuation of net 
benefits in which uncertainty plays a major part can 
only proceed if information is available on the attitude 
of the political decisionmaker to uncertain outcomes."
(165, p.21)
Another method of allowing for risk in CBA/CEA 
is to cut off analysis at an early date, which amounts 
to changing the discount rate arbitrarily at the cut-off 
date, and hence suffers from the criticism made in the 
previous paragraph.
A third reaction to the existence of uncertainty 
is sensitivity testing. However, it is often a piecemeal 
approach, with the sensitivity testing of an uncertain 
variable being done with other variables held at
their most likely levels with little thought given to 
probabilistic dependence among variables. Full joint 
distributions of all variables would provide a more complete 
picture. Moreover, if testing does show results are 
sensitive to an uncertain variable, CBA/CEA offers no 
good guide for further analysis.
There have been attempts to incorporate probability 
distributions into CEA, e.g. (73; 176), but there is 
no doubt that such methods have hardly ever been used 
(176)
In brief, the treatment of uncertainty in CBA/CEA 
is not "objective" or developed. On the other hand, MDA 
purports to handle uncertainty in a thorough manner by 
making explicit the subjective probability distributions 
of the decisionmaker and his attitudes to the risks they
show.
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3.1.3 Completeness
The third area where MDA and CBA/CEA differ is 
in completeness. The objectives in a micro-economic 
policy decision can be far more numerous than the single 
efficiency one of most CBA/CEA. For instance, the 
objectives or benefits from a dam could be (based on 
(84)),
1. irrigation for increased agricultural 
output;
2. municipal needs;
3. industrial needs;
4. fishing (professional);
5. recreation;
6. improved navigation;
7. improved flood control;
8. hydro-electric power;
9. maintain water quality;
10. - a buffer for drought years and groundwater
recharge;
11. prevention of run-off damage;
12. enhance regional development;
13. travel time alterations from changing roads;
14. political effect; and
15. implementation effects, e.g. on the 
bureaucracy involved, which are themselves 
multidimensional (30).
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Items 5, 9, 13, 14 and 15 will be difficult to measure 
on a monetary, market-derived scale, and items 7, 10 
12 and 15 will be very uncertain. CBA/CEA would tend to 
ignore these objectives, and yet these eight objectives 
are more than half of those listed and could be valid 
objectives of the investment decision.
But it must be admitted that some CBA/CEA 
does attempt to incorporate multiple objectives. The 
objective of distribution can be added to the objective of 
equity by constraining one and optimising the other 
(139; 145).. This can be extended to several objectives 
and a mathematical programming formulation used (41). .
The problems with this non-compensatory approach have been 
mentioned in Chapter 2.
Another development in CBA/CEA to handle multiple 
objectives is to display scores (or ranges of scores) 
on each objective for each alternative, and assist the 
decisionmaker to come to an informed decision in a 
discussion. This approach can include many objectives, 
even non-quantifiable ones, and allows the decisionmaker 
to use an (implicit) compensatory or non-compensatory 
approach as he feels is appropriate. It is undoubtedly a 
very successful approach^ e.g. (138; 177). However, all it 
does is provide the information to the decisionmaker, 
it does not help him process it. It will be shown in 
Section 3.4 that relying on unaided intuition in this 
manner is not wise, because unaided intuition cannot 
process multidimensional and uncertain information in an 
adequate fashion. Moreover, the scoring approach evades 
the issue of uncertainty.
-15-
A third development in CBA/CEA for handling 
multiple objectives is a weighted model to add scores 
on objectives. This has been recommended for the 
simple equity-distribution problem, with various 
methods of finding weights proposed (72; 82; 139; 214).
And it has also been suggested for more than two objectives 
(91). This development is actually just an application 
of MDA under certainty using an additive model, without 
the rigorous treatment of assumptions, value functions, 
weights and models that occurs in MDA. This lack of 
rigour has led many writers to express reservations 
about this development, e.g. (138; 157; 176), which may 
not have been expressed if more had been known about 
MDA.
In brief, MDA appears to provide a more thorough 
method of incorporating all objectives into public 
investment analysis than CBA/CEA.
3.1.4 Examples
Two examples will illuminate how MDA is different 
to CBA/CEA, and how it offers more promise in public 
investment analysis. The first example refers to a 
CEA done by the writer for the Department of Defence 
which foundered because the conventional CEA structure 
was not able to handle multiple objectives and uncertainty. 
The second example is a comparison of CBA and MDA in a 
decision about a second airport at a major city. It 
bears repeating that the aim of this discussion is not
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to dismiss CBA/CEA, but merely to demonstrate that 
MDA is a development that may be used in conjunction 
with some CBA/CEA principles to assist public sector 
decisionmakers.
The CEA example was of two alternative weapons; 
details of the analysis are classified but its basic 
principles are not. CEA usually fixes cost or 
effectiveness at some level and selects the alternative 
with the highest level of the unfixed variable. At 
first, the decision makers in this case arbitrarily 
fixed the level of effectiveness at, say, 66.7 percent 
damage to a target, and this was initially used in 
the study. But it soon became apparent that the validity 
of this level of 66.7 percent dependedon the total 
number of targets, the lethality of the weapons, and the 
enemy's repair capability; moreover, the cost of 
changing the effectiveness level from 66.7 to 80 percent, 
say, could have differed for each weapon and may have 
been important to the decisionmakers. That is, "evidently 
cost-effectiveness is not a simple parameter but a 
function relationship" (12, p.176). Furthermore, the 
debate over this correct criterion for effectiveness 
was then clouded by the other criteria or objectives 
which became obvious. In addition to cost, these were; 
the number of sorties required to damage 66.7 percent 
of the target, with fewer sorties presenting the 
attacking aircraft fewer times to anti-aircraft defences; 
the difference in vulnerability to defences on each 
pass caused by different release heights for the two 
weapons; and where the weapons were manufactured. To
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add to the complexity the valuation of vulnerability 
is not linear with the number of sorties, for a bomb 
which requires one sortie to achieve a fixed level of 
effectiveness is more than twice as valuable as one 
which requires' two sorties, because the element of surprise 
is lacking in the second sortie. Nor is the valuation 
of cost linear, for it turned out to be kinked because 
a budget level cut-off for costs soon surfaced, but 
this budget level was for reserve stocks, not for 
lifetime usage, and so was not completely binding on 
the CEA (if it had been binding, fixing costs rather 
than effectiveness could have been attempted). Thus 
non-linear valuations for cost existed, as they did 
for the many other dimensions in the decision, and 
conventional CEA was inadequate in this situation.
Moreover, it was difficult to incorporate the 
uncertainty existing in the decision into the CEA.
The complex model used to calculate sortie numbers 
required to produce the fixed level of effectiveness 
did not provide a variance about average values; the 
costs were uncertain for a weapon which had not been 
produced; and estimates of vulnerability in a future 
air defence environment were difficult. Of course, 
some sensitivity testing of cost and vulnerability was 
carried out, but interactions of uncertainties are difficult 
in such sensitivity analyses,'and attitudes to risk 
are not incorporated.
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In brief, while the cost-effectiveness analysis 
of the two alternative bombs did help to clarify some 
of the issues involved, the analysis was not general, or 
complete, nor did it treat uncertainty well. As proof 
of this, the decision: makers’ judgment had to supplement 
the analytical results quite heavily, and the decision 
makers considered the analysis "inconclusive".
The second example of the inadequacy of CBA is 
the study of the second Sydney airport (130). It found 
the discounted added social costs of 15 different sites 
with various runway layouts, with costs including costs 
of travel time, noise and urbanisation. Dynamic 
programming was used to find the optimum site development 
and air traffic management sequence over thirty years. 
Sensitivity testing of various uncertain parameters was 
carried out - these parameters included traffic forecasts, 
political constraints on noise at the existing Sydney 
airport, and the cost of noise. The first five sites 
selected were found to be reasonably robust to these 
tests. The whole study took 24 professionals one year to 
complete.
This CBA was without doubt a well done analysis 
and achieved the requirements of a CBA in illuminating the 
usual costs and benefits involved. And yet the government 
did not accept any of the recommendations. The government 
did not develop the first Sydney airport further, and its 
choice of the second airport was not one of the five 
most preferred in the study. Obviously political factors
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were more important than the factors involved in the 
CBA (as they were in the third London Airport study (71)). 
This does not mean that the CBA was valueless, for the 
economic aspects had to be known; however, it does 
indicate that a more complete aid to public investment 
analysis is required.
Compare the second Sydney airport CBA with a 
MDA of the decision on the development of a second 
Mexico City airport (113; 159). This analysis was 
requested after two previous studies had arrived at 
opposite conclusions. The site of the second airport 
had been determined, but the phasing of its development 
was not - about 100 alternative sequences of development 
were available. Probability distributions of six 
dimensions were elicited, as were attitudes to uncertainty, 
and the conditions for a multiplicative utility model 
verified, all with the staff of the department involved 
in the decisions. Dimensions of safety and capacity 
were added to those of the second Sydney airport 
CBA above. Then a further analysis was carried out, 
which included flexibility, political effects, externalities, 
and effectiveness. The total time spent by consultants 
on the project was 50 man-days. Unlike the CBA, the 
MDA appears to have had an important influence on the final 
decision (159).
4
3.1.5 Conclusions
CBA is based on several value judgments while 
MDA's explicit recognition of the decisionmaker’s values
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makes it more general than CBA. MDA's treatment of 
uncertainty is more systematic than CBA's. And MDA's 
coverage of relevant dimensions is greater than CBA's.
Not that CBA in unnecessary. When its implicit value 
judgments agree with the decisionmaker's, CBA is 
identical to MDA. However, MDA does appear to go 
beyond CBA in itsapplicability. It is a procedure for 
those who agree that "Economists would serve their 
profession better by seeing themselves as efficient 
management consultants rather than by deluding themselves 
that they will be publicly acclaimed as 'philosopher 
kings'" (165, p.29), and so offers a structure for 
those who see the analyst/decisionmaker relationship 
as an interactive one (30).
3.2 Mathematical Programming
It has been found that mathematical programming 
enables a decisionmaker to explore in depth a far 
greater range of alternatives than he would using 
conventional project analysis, e.g. (130; 182). There 
are two simple methods of using mathematical programming 
for the multiple objective decisions that concern this 
thesis. The first method is goal programming, e.g.
(133)-where weighted deviations from stated goals are 
minimized, and lexicographic ordering of some dimensions 
can be achieved through pre-emptive priority weightings. 
The second method is to adjust linear programming for 
multiple goals (21). In this method weights are given
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as coefficients to the appropriate dimensions in the 
objective function. After an initial run, the decision 
maker may vary the weights to feel his way towards an 
optimal solution.
However, there are four important assumptions 
underlying most of these mathematical programming 
approaches:
(i) valuations of the dimensions are linear;
(ii) the additive model is applicable (and 
hence it is used in the objective function);
(iii) the dimensions are continuous, not discrete 
(so that alternatives can be at any level 
on any dimension); and
(iv) certainty exists (so that alternatives 
will reach levels on each dimension for 
sure).
The first assumption, that of linear valuations, 
is evaded in several forms of inter-active goal 
programming (43;76;155). Here the decision maker is 
asked to provide weights to each dimension, i.e. trade-offs 
of their importance, and the program run. Results of 
this are plotted and the decision maker chooses a step 
size where weights are closer to what he really feels 
they are. This is repeated until the solution is 
satisfactory to the decision maker. Essentially, this 
procedure uses local linear approximations to the curved 
value function until the slope of these approximations 
equals that of the value function.
-22-
Once goal programming becomes inter-active 
it is essentially (although not computationally) 
the same as inter-active "linear" programming approaches 
to multidimensional decisions. These approaches also 
evade the first assumption above of linear valuations, 
by considering trade-offs between dimensions at the 
margin of non-inferior solutions. Because these trade­
offs are made at the margin they incorporate the decision 
maker's preferences over a small interval, and hence 
linearity is assumed only over that interval. Dyer 
(44) computerised the process so that the decision maker 
need only make ordinal choices between holistic, 
multidimensional choices, and found that his subjects 
(who were students) had more confidence in the method 
than in their own ad hoc, often unstructured search.
But another researcher (212) has found that unstructured 
searches were more popular than Dyei's program or a 
similar one.
Another process somewhat similar to Dyer's is Haimes's 
surrogate worth trade-off method'"(84) where decision 
makers assess ordinally the relative worth of small 
changes on just two dimensions. Yet another similar 
approach by Wallenius and Zionts (213; 227) has been 
tested, though not actually used, with operational managers 
in a company. Mention should also be made of STEM (16), 
in which the decision maker interacts with the program 
until a "best compromise" result is obtained.
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Insofar as all the above approaches require 
ordinal rather than cardinal answers, they are both 
simple and accurate (44, p.204). However, the answers 
require an evaluation of trade-offs between several 
dimensions at the same time (except for the surrogate 
worth trade-off method which requires trade-offs between 
two dimensions only) and this can be difficult if there 
are many dimensions in the decision problem, nor does it 
provide the concentration on one or two dimensions at a 
time allowed in MDA. Moreover, decision makers often 
desire to answer a previous question differently in the 
light of new knowledge aroused in the decision process 
(25; 213) and this can be difficult to incorporate in 
a program.
All the above extensions of multi-objective 
mathematical programming may have overcome the first 
restrictive assumption above - linear valuations - but 
the others - of continuity, additivity and certainty - 
still remain. One of these assumptions, of continuity, 
can be overcome by a mixed integer program, but this is 
still very much an undeveloped research area (155). This 
is a severe restriction; for instance, investment in a 
truck is restricted to the discrete levels of payload 
which manufacturers provide, and it is significant that 
in the only application of multi-objective mathematical 
programming which has actually influenced decision makers 
- the Rio Colorado study (25) - a mixed integer program
was necessary.
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Because none of these assumptions are in theory 
necessary for MDA, it seemed worthwhile to investigate 
MDA further in this thesis. The investigation will show 
the assumptions in the better mathematical programming 
approaches - the surrogate worth trade-off method for 
instance - are not restrictive, but this could not be fore­
seen when this research began.
3.3 Simulation
Faced with multiple goals, integer dimensions and 
constraints, complex interrelationships, and uncertainty, 
many researchers have preferred simulation to mathematical 
programming. For example, Johnsen (103), after reviewing 
most approaches to multidimensional decisions, fell back 
on a compl-x simulation model. However, the model had not 
been completed when his book was written, and^so had not 
proved to be valid, or more useful than other approaches. 
Legasto (134) used simulation to explore the multiple objec­
tive results of economic policies in the Phillipines, but 
concluded that the optimum policy had to be found by other 
means. And Fromm and Taubman (75) used the Brookings Insti­
tute economietric model of the U.S. economy to derive multi­
dimensional results of policy alternatives, with the results 
combined in various models using weights that had been almost 
arbitrarily chosen, e.g. , where dimensions were concerned 
with expenditure their weights were simply their proportion 
of GNP. No guide to which model was appropriate was given, 
nor were weights varied in a sensitivity analysis. That is, 
Fromm arid Taubman1s research, although it did use some optim­
ising heuristics, did little to find the "best" policy
alternative.
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These words sum up simulation as an aid
to multidimensional decision making:
’’The Monte Carlo algorithm can handle 
large numbers of objectives with little extra 
effort, so that its role becomes less that 
of an optimum seeker and more a portrayer of 
the significant relationships present in 
the system under study. The emphasis on an 
optimum is thus replaced by emphasis on 
a *'road map" from which a decision maker may 
judge the consequences of different courses 
of action." (206, p.241)
This is excellent if that is all the decision maker 
requires, and sometimes that is all he requires (212). 
But, as noted when discussing the score card development 
of CBA/CEA, man's unaided intuition is an inadequate 
processor of multidimensional, uncertain, information, 
and so something more may be required. If it is,
MDA appears to offer thorough optimising heuristics 
with which to process theresults of simulation studies.
3.4 Unaided Intuition
The above methods, then, appear to be somewhat 
inadequate. Why not use unaided managerial judgment 
or intuition? The answer is that unaided intuition 
is also inadequate for multidimensional decisions, 
especially when made under uncertainty, as several 
psychological studies have found.
Studies of human perception in multidimensional 
situations have found that people usually collapse 
every dimension onto one scale, and that this collapsing 
is not done in an optimising fashion. This also applies 
to human judgment as well as perception. For instance,
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Lindblom (135) found that public service administrators 
avoided taking all dimensions into account by using 
a "method of successive limited comparisons". In this, 
only alternatives which differ slightly in a few 
dimensions from existing policies are considered, and the 
full range of available alternatives is ignored. This 
would explain why "budgeting is incremental, not 
comprehensive" (217, p.15) with the last year’s 
expenditure being the most important determinant of 
this year’s. And Slovic and Lichtenstein (190, pp.49-57), 
in a review of psychological research on human judgment, 
list several studies that indicate that the use of a 
dimension varies with the method of its presentation 
(e.g. the scale used, its relationship to other 
dimensions, the order in which it is presented, and 
the total number of dimensions). Examples of this 
inadequate processing of multiple dimensions abound.
For example, sixteen professional financial services 
which made 7,500 recommendations on individual stocks 
from 1928 to 1932 had an average return 1.4 percent less 
than the market average (192). And experienced 
analysts’ predictions of yearly earnings are no better 
than simple projections of past earnings. (192)
The reasons for this inadequate processing of 
multiple dimensions are provided in Simon and Newell’s 
"Human problem solving: the state of the theory in 
1970" (187). After reviewing computer simulations of 
problem solving, they conclude that the human mind,
-27-
faced with the complexity of solving a multidimensional 
problem, for instance, uses simple heuristic methods 
to carry out highly selective searches of the decision 
space, with simple serial processing of information 
and a short-term memory.
This inadequate processing of multidimensional 
information is reflected in the results of research 
into how people weight dimensions. This research shows 
that humans usually weight only a few dimensions when 
they make holistic, intuitive judgments and it is 
only when each dimension is weighted separately and 
explicitly that weights are more uniform. For example,.
Hoepl and Huber (94),using regression analysis, found 
weights implicitly used in holistic judgments of teachers 
by students. When the students then provided direct 
weights for each of the dimensions, the weights were 
found to be more uniform. Slovic (189) found stock­
brokers did the same when rating stocks on eleven dimensions. 
O'Connor (163) and Slovic and Lichtenstein (190) review 
nearly all such studies, and the conclusion is virtually 
uncontested: humans make intuitive holistic judgments
of multidimensional problems in a manner which produces 
results which do an injustice to their actual beliefs.
Not only is multidimensionality inadequately 
handled by the human mind, but so is uncertainty. There 
are several cognitive biases or heuristics which affect 
subjective probability (95; 190; 196; 209). One such 
bias is anchoring, which is the tendency people have to 
anchor their judgment to the first value they think of.
For example a businessman forecasting sales may usethis
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year's sales as a starting point, even if this year is 
atypical, and adjustments to this first estimate 
are often insufficient or are made in constant amounts as 
new information is received. Some of the factors which 
affect which value will be the anchor are availability 
and representativeness. Availability refers to the ease 
with which a first estimate of an uncertain variable can 
be made. For instance, the presentation of information 
affects judgments, even when the information is equally 
likely (163). Representativeness refers to the 
similarity between some information and the population 
to which it belongs, and this has too large an effect 
on probability judgments. For instance, intuition 
apparently works on "a law of small numbers", so that 
a small sample is incorrectly thought to be as 
representative of a population's characteristics, such 
as its correlation or its average, as is a large sample.
xlndeed, the most common reaction to uncertainty 
is to ignore it (227),and most managers appear to make 
their decisions on the assumption that a value near the 
average of a parameter will occur (95) and the difficult 
task of assessing the full distribution is not attempted. 
For example, Burton and Kates (228) show how too simple 
attitudes towards uncertainty of natural hazards in 
resource management can lead to serious losses.
At the heart of the processing of uncertainty 
is Bayes Theorem, which is the optimal method of 
amending previously held probabilistic beliefs in the 
light of new information. If humans are intuitive 
Bayesians, then their assessments of uncertainty in the 
process of working through a decision problem should
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be logical. However, numerous studies, e.g. (52), have 
found that humans are apparently conservative, and do not 
change their prior probabilities with new evidence as 
much as they should if they were using a Bayesian model 
correctly. These results might occur just because 
probabilistic data in the real world is conditionally 
dependent and requires different aggregation procedures 
than the simple Bayesian procedures for conditionally 
independent data (221). Another consideration which 
makes one doubt the relevance of the results of these 
studies is the presence of cognitive bias of availability, 
referred to above, which suggests that sample results • 
would often overwhelm the prior judgments, which is 
the reverse of conservatism. These two contradictory 
considerations would suggest that humans are simply 
not Bayesians, conservative or otherwise, and a study 
by Lathrop (132) reinforces this view. He found that 
most studies suggesting conservatism averaged subjects' 
results. This is valid if subjects are using the same 
mental processes, with random variations around the 
average. However, Lathrop plotted each individuals *s 
result, and found their revised probability estimates 
(supposedly using Bayes Theorem) were "all over the 
scatterplot". Conjoint measurement testing for 
independence was negative, showing that subjects 
"were not obeying the formal rules of probability at all" 
(163, p.8) - that is, they were not even conservative 
Bayesians, they were not handling uncertainty in any 
logical consistent, manner at all!
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3.5 Conclusion
This section briefly reviewed several of the 
most common approaches to multidimensional policy analysis 
under uncertainty. It appeared that MDA was different 
to CBA/CEA in its generality, treatment of uncertainty 
and completeness; that MDA did not share some of 
the restrictive assumptions of mathematical programming; 
that MDA could help if a decision maker required 
simulation to be more than a road map; and that intuition 
needed an aid such as MDA in multidimensional decision 
making under uncertainty. When this thesis was begun 
there appeared to be no "alternative” to these approaches 
other than MDA which deserved further study. A more 
recent review of some decision approaches (30) appeared 
to confirm this need to investigate further methods of 
public investment analysis. But "alternative" is not the 
precise word for MDA - this section has shown that MDA's 
value may be just as much in complementing the other 
approaches by offering structure and rigour, as in 
offering a completely alternative approach. Certainly 
a review of the theory and practice of MDA in public 
investment analysis might be fruitful.
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4. MULTIDIMENSIONAL DECISION ANALYSIS UNDER CERTAINTY
MDA can be done when the outcomes of each 
alternative are known with certainty, or when these 
outcomes are uncertain. The crucial difference between 
the two situations is that, theoretically, value 
functions for dimensions can be used under uncertainty.
MDA under certainty is important for two 
reasons. The first reason is that MDA has most often 
been carried out under certainty for, as Huber noted 
in 1973, there are "hardly any field or field-like 
studies of situations where multiplicity of attributes 
and uncertainty were both formally considered," (99, p.1394) 
The second reason is that later chapters of this 
thesis will consider using models for certainty when 
outcomes of alternative courses of action are uncertain.
In particular, it is hoped to demonstrate that these 
three aspects of MDA under certainty can and should be 
used in MDA under uncertainty:
(i) the weighted additive model;
(ii) value functions; and
(iii) weights elicited under certainty.
Thus this chapter is crucial to the theme of the 
thesis. However, the area of MDA under certainty is an 
established one, and so the treatment will not be 
more detailed than necessary.
4.i The Underlying Assumptions of MDA Under Certainty 
For unidimensional decisionmaking under 
certainty there are three basic assumptions - the 
decision maker can order the alternatives, do so 
transitively, and he does not have infinite value for 
one alternative (this is the Archimaedian axiom - if
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infinite value existed, there would be no difficulty 
in deciding among alternatives). The presence of 
multiple dimensions does not remove the need for these 
axioms, for instance, the values of alternatives, the 
v(x) s, still require ordinality only, not cardinality, 
and the Archimaedian axiom is still required for 
trade-offs to occur between dimensions. However the 
presence of multiple dimensions makes necessary a 
fourth axiom. This is the axiom of value independence: 
the decision maker's (ordinal) values on each dimension 
are independent of levels at which other dimensions are 
set.
There are other names for this fourth axiom 
of value independence:
(i) preferential independence (178, p.26); 
but this is sometimes confused with 
Debreu-independence to be discussed 
X'~—plater, and is not specific to certainty;
(ii) weak conditional utility independence 
(178, p.26) - but this uses "utility" 
when "value" applies ( aid when it is 
applied to a set of dimensions it implies 
Debreu-independence within that set from 
dimensions outside the set (178, p.27);
(iii) monotonicity (26, p.A-43) - but this 
can also refer to Debreu-independence 
(62, p.7) ; and
(iv) single cancellation (216, p.A-43) - but 
this means little and apparently only 
refers to the two dimension situation (62, p.7).
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To evade all this confusion the term "value independence" 
appears appropriate, for it simply and clearly emphasizes 
the aspect of independence under certainty in the 
axiom, and it also is complementary to the term "utility 
independence" widely used for independence under 
uncertainty. There is no need to refer to conditions 
or singleness, as this is clearly implicit in the term 
"independence". (It should be noted that Keeney (114) 
has used the term value independence for Fishburn- 
independence, but Fishburn-independence refers to 
uncertainty^ and so "value" seems somewhat inappropriate.)
The first three axioms above simply mean that 
the decision maker is rational and logical. Although 
many decision makers may not base their decision on 
the first two axioms, some studies have shown that 
decision makers were surprised that they did not act 
upon the first two axioms (e.g. 141) and were willing 
to amend their decisions to coincide with them, and 
in one sample of 27 businessmen the three who did base 
decisions on the axioms were the most successful 
businessmen (184).
The fourth axiom, value independence, is not 
so obvious. There are occasions when it may not 
apply. For instance (216, p.A-44), there may be three 
dimensions in a choice between cars. A big car is 
preferred to a small one if both cost the same amount, 
whether this be a large amount or a small amount. But 
a big car may not be preferred to a small car if the 
third dimension is the existence of power steering. If
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both cars have power steering, the big car is preferred.
But if both cars do not have power steering, the small 
car may be preferred to the big car, for its easier 
handling. Thus the ordering of car size is not 
independent of the level at which the third dimension 
is set, that is, value independence does not occur.
Other examples (69) occur when the value for a high 
"probability of death" reverses if "pain" is set at too 
high a level, and when government satisfaction at a 
class’s increase in wealth becomes dissatisfaction if 
other classes remain extremely poor.
Such value dependencies could be handled in 
three ways. One way is to reframe the dimension so that 
reversal does not occur. Another way is to break a 
dimension into two so that, for example, "pain" became 
"pain below excruciating" and "pain above excruciating".
A third way (69) is to introduce another dimension so that, 
for example, "equity" is added to the income distribution 
problem. _
_ Value dependence does occur sometimes (e.g. with some
time streams of money) but overall it is not too common - there 
do not appear to be any other examples of it in the literature, 
for one thing. Moreover, simple questioning or the analyst's 
common sense would show if it did not exist. Formally, value 
independence occurs if (x^, xj , xrj) for any values of x«.
This implies that indifference curves over x^ and x. 
do not depend on the values of x^. This property can be 
tested by finding a value of x^, x^0 say, which sets
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(x^°, Xj°)~(x^*, with Xjj set at their most
preferred levels. One then checks whether the value of
Xj0 has to be changed so that (xi°, x.°)~(x^1, Xj) still,
with Xyj set at their least preferred levels. Alternatively,
and more simply, the decision maker could be asked if
his trade-offs between x. and x.s that is, the extra
amount of x^ which makes up for a given decrease in
x., vary as x*-r- do.3 iJ
The four axioms are implied in most aids to 
decision making, e.g. CBA/CEA. If all the axioms are 
not agreed to by the decision maker, MDA has little 
to offer him. He can only make intuitive, holistic 
rankings of the alternatives. That is, MDA is not 
descriptive, but is conditionally prescriptive (118) - 
if the axioms are agreed with, MDA offers a guide to 
decision making.
The following discussion assumes that the four 
axioms are valid for the decision maker.
4.2 The Benchmark Model
There are two approaches to MDA under certainty.
The first is Raiffa’s (178) "benchmark" model. Consider 
a two-dimensional decision with dimensions y and z.
A benchmark level of y is set at y ; this y*3 must be 
easy to imagine - it could be y* or y* or some most 
likely value of y, and y could be a dimension in dollar 
terms. (If there is a dimension of which one or more 
dimensions is not value independent, then that dimension 
should be the benchmark dimension, and hence the possible 
randomness produced by value dependence will be eliminated
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by making preferences for dependent dimension(s) 
with the other fixed. If there are several dimensions 
which are value dependent, all these will be benchmark 
dimensions while the others are varied. (6)j Then, by 
varying z, values of z* are found such that (z^, y^) v 
(z, y) for each alternative (z, y). If indifference 
curves for z and y have been established, perhaps by 
MacCrimmon and Toda's (142) method, then (z*, y ) 
equivalent to each alternative (z,y) can be read off 
an indifference diagram, by moving along the indifference 
curve from (z,y) to where the value of y is y^, and 
the corresponding value of z^ read off its axis. If 
there are more than the two dimensions y and z, the 
combinations of levels for each alternative are equated 
to a combination (x-,...,xl ), where one dimension, 
x., varies to achieve equivalent preference with the 
alternatives, and the x-r-, which are benchmark values of 
the other dimensions, are fixed.
The procedure is a sequential one (5), For 
instance, consider an alternative with three dimensions, 
(x^, *2* x3^* Benchmark values of X2 and x^ are set 
at X2° and x^ . Then by varying x^ an hypothetical 
alternative (x^, x2^, x^D'vCx^, X2, x^) is found, and 
then another hypothetical alternative (x.*, X2^, x^ ) ^ 
(Xj1, x2\ x3) is found.
The preferred alternative is the one with the 
most preferred of the x*s , for with the other dimensions 
held at benchmark levels, the x1s are in effect one­
dimensional proxies for each alternative, with the 
other dimensions standardised at benchmark values. If
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the rate of substitution between x and y is constant 
for all their alternative values, then any (z,y) 
pair can be expressed as (z + Xy, o) where X is the 
rate of substitution (178). One then only needs to rank 
the (z + Xy) value.
One apparent advantage of Raiffa's "benchmark” 
model is that it is general, and does not assume 
particular relationships between the dimensions.
Fischer (61, p21) avers that it does assume that trade­
offs between any two dimensions do not depend upon 
the level of other dimensions. However, the use of 
benchmark values for all but the one varying dimension 
ensures that trade-offs are made with these benchmark 
values in mind, whether they affect the trade-off 
or not. (In a later paper, Fischer corrects his earlier 
statement. (216, pA-47) ) That is, the benchmark 
model does not assume trade-offs are independent of other 
dimensions. Later paragraphs on the robustness of the 
additive model (which does assume this independence) 
indicate that this generality of the benchmark model 
is not essential , and may even be undesirable. 
Moreover, the method requires decision makers to make 
preferences between combinations of dimensions, and 
literature on unaided intuition (see Section 3.4) 
indicates that this will be difficult and probably 
inconsistent. Moreover, when there are more than 
two dimensions, the method is tedious and somewhat 
confusing. If there are D dimensions and A alternatives, 
.there are (D - 1).A separate preferentially equivalent 
judgments to make, varying levels of one dimension 
each time to find equivalence. In short, the benchmark
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method is tedious, and its generality does not appear 
to compensate for this.
4.3 An Introduction to the Weighted Additive Model
The second approach to MDA under certainty is to 
use models to combine values on each individual dimension 
into the one measure. The level of each alternative 
on each dimension is valued, v(x.), and weights for each 
dimension, w^, are found. This procedure is simpler 
than the benchmark method, for the v(x-) can be derived 
without trading off among dimensions, and the w^ can be 
derived by trading off only two dimensions at a time.
Discussion of this second approach will be in 
four parts: an introduction with some emphasis on the 
assumptions of additive and multiplicative models; the 
additive model and its applicability; the derivation of 
value functions for the model; and the derivation of 
weights for the model.
The additive value model is the one most commonly
used in MDA under certainty:
nv (x) « jL1 wg.vCx^ (4.1)
The important assumption (62) , of the additive value 
model is that trade-offs between levels of any two 
dimensions are independent of the levels at which other 
dimensions are held; if there are only two dimensions, 
the assumption is that trade-offs are independent of the 
levels at thich the two dimensions are combined. 
Generalising, this assumption means that indifference 
curves for any two dimensions are the same whatever the 
levels of other dimensions. This assumption will be 
called Debreu-independence, after the first person
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to prove its necessity for additive MDA under certainty 
(39; 178). Naming it after Debreu limits it to MDA 
under certainty. Other names for it, such as joint 
independence, or the term often used of preferential 
independence, do not do this. Note that Debreu- 
independence implies that the value functions are 
cardinal, not just ordinal as before. If Debreu- 
independence exists (and the four axioms of Section 4.1) 
then the addition of weighted values will presewe 
the ordinal ranking of the decisionmaker's preferences 
among alternatives, which is all that is required 
under certainty. There have been many proofs of the 
additivity proposition, based at the minimum on the 
axioms and assumptions given above (64; 65; 66).
Ordinal measurements are unique up to a 
monotonic transformation, so that the additivity 
proposition implies the multiplicative model
it nlog V(x) =1°gi51 wi *v(xi) = i21log(w.v(xi)) (4.2)
for the logarithmic transformation is a monotonic one 
of V(x) in (4.1). For the same reason, the multiplicative 
model implies a quasi-additive one (216). The 
importance of this is that a multiplicative model is 
no more or less assumption-free than the additive 
model, under certainty, if the same weights (which 
could all equal unity if no explicit weights are used) 
are used in both, as they are in (4.1) and (4.2).
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For instance, this assumption applies to 
conjoint measurement models. "Conjoint measurement 
theory constructs the overall and single attribute 
(value) functions simultaneously" (216, p.A-27), so 
that its value functions have weights implied in them, 
and these can vary, unlike the weights in the 
weighted additive model which are constant and imply 
constant trade-offs and indifference curves. However, 
these value functions are extremely difficult to 
derive for more than two dimensions, for they involve 
simultaneous trade-offs between all dimensions, over 
the full range of the dimensions. These conjoint 
measurement value functions are more difficult to 
derive than value functions derived for one dimension 
at a time, as required for the weighted additive model. 
An example is a conjoint measurement application (81) 
of housewives' preferences for discount cards defined 
on three dimensions - the size of the discount, number 
of stores accepting the discount card, and the cost 
of the discount card. Simplifying the demensions to 
just three points still required judgments for 3** = 27 
three-dimensional combinations. That is, conjoint 
measurement is limited in the number of dimensions it 
can handle. It is also limited in how much can 
be incorporated in the implied value functions by the 
number of points on each of the dimensions that can 
be included, e.g., the three points of the dimensions 
in the above housewife example produced straight line 
value functions with just one kink. (81, p.292)
-41-
Fig. 4.1 Value Function from Conjoint Measurement
The value functions for the weighted additive model can 
be more flexible and so incorporate more of the decision 
maker’s preferences.
In addition to these two limitations, conjoint 
measurement does not allow the decomposition of the 
decision into its constituent parts encouraged by MDA. 
Finally, conjoint measurement cannot be extended to 
decision making under uncertainty, while the value 
functions and concepts of the weighted additive model 
can be. Apparently these four reasons are why the 
conjoint measurement model is" rarely used outside of 
psychological research; they are the reasons why it 
will not be discussed further here.
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It is now appropriate to return to the weighted 
additive model. As noted earlier the additive and the 
multiplicative are both, in effect, additive models.
But when weights are not the same in both the multiplicative 
model of (4.2) may be (99, p.1398).
n
V (x) “ wiitii*vCxi) » or
n
log V(x) = iJL w± log v(xi) (4.3)
This formulation is used instead of (4.2) to allow 
calculation of the w. as regression coefficients from 
records of previous decisions similar to the one being 
analysed with MDA. This may be useful for psychologists 
investigating how humans make decisions, but it is not 
for managers making one-off decisions with MDA, as 
will be the usual case. Nor is it useful in such one- 
off cases to ask managers to choose among a set of 
alternatives similar to the set to be evaluated with 
the model to derive regression coefficients, as suggested 
in (99), for one may as well ask the decision maker to 
choose among the set of alternatives involved in the 
decision. Moreover, such holistic judgments do not 
allow the decomposition of the problem which studies 
of unaided intuition suggest is necessary (e.g. (190; 
163)) The important result of (4.3) for practical 
MDA is that the logarithmic transformation of v(x^) 
makes meaningful weights w^ to be almost impossible to
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elicit, for instance, are the logarithms to base e 
or 10? That is, the multiplicative model (4.3) is 
less intuitively meaningful than the additive model.
The real difference between the two models is 
in the implications for indifferncce curves between 
dimensions. The weights in the additive model (4.1) 
imply that the indifference curve for each pair of 
dimensions, i and j, is constant with a slope of 
-wi^wi* ^he multiplicative model (4.3) on the other 
hand has an indifference curve with a slope of 
(-Wj/w^ . x^/Xj), that is, the slope varies with levels 
of x^ and Xj. The constant slope of the additive 
model may at first seem contrary to economic theory, 
which usually assumes that indifference curves are 
convex to the origin. However, it must be remembered 
that the axes for the indifference curves are not linear 
functions of quantities of dimensions, as assumed in 
economic theory, but value functions of these dimensions, 
which incorporate any diminishing marginal valuation of 
a dimension into them, and by the-fourth axiom of value 
independence, these value functions will not change for 
differing levels of other dimensions. That is, indifference 
curves convex to the origin are implied in the value 
function axes, and so the linear slope of the weighted 
additive model is not contrary to economic theory.
This oversight of the difference between linear functions 
and value functions as indifference curve axes is 
common,which is unfortunate for it is an important
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defence of the weighted additive value model. Sharpe 
(185, pp.287-288) does not mention the difference 
between the two. And Easton (48) does not make explicit 
the existing non-linearity of the axes when discussing 
various models.
But Easton (48) does clarify the other 
assumptions made when a model is chosen. He derives 
the following general model of which the additive 
and multiplicative models are forms.
V(x) J (1 . v(x1)) (1 I Ph1/^P). C4.4)
P + 1
1
V(x) = Bw . v(x^) n , p = 1 (4.5)
The parameter p determines the shape of the indifference 
curves. If p = 0, then equation (4.4) reduces to the 
arithmetic mean, implying the additive model. If 
p = +1, equation (4.4) reduces to the geometric mean, 
implying the multiplicative model (4.2). In general, 
if p is positive, increasing its value increases the 
importance of high valuations relative to low valuations, 
that is the indifference curve is more 
convex. If p is negative, increasing its magnitude 
does the reverse. Thus the choice of the model is a 
value judgment, depending on the choice of p. But no 
method of eliciting p is available! As value functions 
have already incorporated the relative valuations of high 
and low scores, the case for assuming p = 0, implying 
the additive model, is stronger than any other. For any
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other choice of p is counting relative valuations 
more than once.
One last point about the additive model is 
that a zero valuation of an alternative on one 
dimension does not give a zero valuation for the 
alternative. If the decision maker requires this, the 
particular alternative with a zero level on a dimension 
could be removed from consideration before the additive 
model is used to compare alternatives, or the 
multiplicative model (4.2 and 4.5) could be used with 
linear value functions, despite its arbitrary p = 1.
4.4 The Applicability of the Additive Model * i
Now, how useful is the weighted model? Does 
its Debreu-independence assumption limit its usefulness? 
Edwards (53) has suggested that it is difficult to 
imagine circumstances under which Debreu-independence 
does not exist, and Fischer (62, p.9) agrees. But is 
there proof? The question is important and will be 
answered at length, because the applicability of the 
additive model is crucial to the recommended procedures 
developed in this thesis. The answer to the question 
will discuss three topics:
i the correlation of additive and other 
models' results based on the same data;
ii the correlation of additive model results 
with holistic judgments, i.e. the 
acceptability of the additive model; and
iii the correlation of additive model results 
with the external environment, i.e. , the 
accuracy of the additive model.
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First, the correlation of additive and other 
model results will be discussed. Yntema and Torgerson 
(224) approached the additive model from the viewpoint 
of analysis of variance, in which there are main 
effects from each dimension separately, and interaction 
effects, e.g., for three dimensions
V(x) = M + v(x^) + v(x2) + v(x.) +
= v(x1)v(x2) * v(x1)v(x3) + (4.5)
v(x2)v(x3) + v(x1)v(x2)v(x3)
where M is a constant - the grand mean of the values 
for each alternative - and the weights have been 
deleted for clarity. They suggest that if the value 
functions are monotonically increasing or decreasing, 
then using the main effects without the interaction 
terms will adequately approximate V(x) and any error 
in the approximation should be in the same direction 
for all alternatives considered. This "is not the 
sort of statement that can be proven rigorously"
(224, p.22) but they £ive this example of an interactive 
model,
V (x) = v(x1).v(x2) +v(x1).v(x3) +v(x2).v(x3) (4.6)
3If each v(x^) can vary from 1 to 7 there are 7 
combinations likely, and V(x) can vary from 3 to 147.
"If two alternatives differ in total value by more than 
6 (they will 86 percent of the time), then the probability 
of a wrong decision (by using a main effects additive 
approximation rather than the interaction model) is only
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0.005. If the difference in worth is more than 12, 
the approximation never makes a mistake" (224, p.22). 
Obviously the additive model approximation is very good.
Fischer (62, pp. 16-19) carried Yntema and 
Torgerson* s work further by testing additive approximation 
to two other interaction models,
N N
V(x) = v(x£) + il1 jgj v(xi).v(Xj), (4.7)
i f j
n
V(x) = xi + ^ Xj^ (4.8)
Unfortunately for this discussion of models under 
certainty, only the Pearson product moment correlation 
coefficient, which is interval-scaled, was used, while 
a rank correlation coefficient would have been more 
appropriate. Nevertheless, the correlation coefficients 
for 1000 vectors of random dimension values were 
generated for n — 3, 6 and 9 dimensions. For equation 
(4.7) the coefficients increased from 0.964 to 0.990, 
as dimensions increased from three to nine, which 
corroborates Yntema and Torgerson*s conclusions. But 
for equation (4.8), the coefficients fell from 0.858 
to 0.480 with increasing dimension numbers, which is 
disappointing, and shows that when interactions are 
very extensive, the additive model may be inadequate 
if there are many dimensions. ‘
Another comparison of models can be done
on some econometric results. Fromm and Taubman (75) 
used the Brookings Institute model of the U.S. economy
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to provide total values of fourteen economic policy 
alternative^, based on six dimensions such as real 
personal consumption expenditure. They used four 
models, the additive, the Cobb Douglas multiplicative, 
and two constant elasticity of substitution (CES) 
models. The additive and the multiplicative model are 
forms of the general CES model. The fourteen policy 
alternatives were rated 1, 4, 7 and 10 quarters after 
their implementation. Using ranks calculated from the 
cardinal values given in (75, Table 5.5), the Spearman 
rank correlation coefficients (all significant at 
below 0.01) between the additive model and the other 
three models were
Model Cobb Douglas CES 1 CES 2
Quarter 1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10
rs .89 1.0 .99 1.0 .86 .99 1.0 1.0 .86 .99 .99 1.0
The coefficients show that the correlation is below 
.90 only in the first quarter after the policy implementation, 
and after that the models are virtually the same. Again 
the strength of the additive model as an approximation 
of others is demonstrated.
Yet another approach is just to compare an 
additive and a multiplicative model. Sums and products 
of random variables are highly correlated, even if the 
variables are independent. "For example, for independent
random variables X, uniformly distributed over (0.0, 1.0),
10 10 1/10(1/10) i21 x£ and (^ Xi)-L/xu are correlated with a
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Pearson correlation coefficient of 0.89" (47, p.235). 
Furthemore, agreement among nine different additive 
and multiplicative models with 32 dimensions in a real 
world problem, measured by Kendall’s coefficient of 
concordance, was a high W = 0.96, with the same three 
alternatives in the first three positions for all 
models (47).
Thus Yntema and Torgerson’s claim for the 
generality of the additive model appears justified 
except for cases when interactions are severe. So 
the question about the applicability of the additive 
model becomes: are interactions very extensive when 
actual decisions are made? Or more precisely there are 
two questions: do humans consider interactions when 
they make intuitive decisions, and should they consider 
interactions?
Whether humans consider interactions when they 
make decisions is primarily a question for psychologists 
to answer. For if humans make accurate intuitive 
decisions,.using an additive or a non-additive model, 
there seems to be little reason for MDA or for any other 
decision aid for that matter. But, as noted in Section 
3.4, unaided intuition is inaccurate. Nevertheless, if 
humans use a model which an additive MDA model approximates, 
then at least MDA results should be acceptable to 
decision makers for the results will be similar to their
intuitive judgments.
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Innumerable empirical studies have found that 
the additive model was an accurate predictor of the 
decision maker's actual holistic intuitive preferences, 
with no other models any better (extensively reviewed 
in (61; 99; 163; 190) ). One technique used in these 
studies was analysis of variance, in which the amount 
of interaction could be measured. Even when interaction 
between dimensions existed in the intuitive judgment 
the additive model approximation provides correlations 
with intuitive decisions in the high .90s (61; 163).
In some examples of these instances, sixteen of twenty- 
nine clinicians judging mentally ill patients could 
have used interactions, and stockbrokers used interactions 
in their judgment (163). But these interactions were 
either not important enough to outweight the results 
of an additive main effects approximation, or were 
handled in an inappropriate manner in the intuitive 
decision.
Because most analysis of variance research showed no 
clear evidence that interactions were important for 
the additive model, some researchers have investigated 
different types of model, such as the lexicographic, 
which might be expected to correlate more highly with 
intuitive judgments. Tversky (208) has twice found 
evidence that such models may be used. Einborn (55)* has, too, 
but in a comparison of two such models used by 
decision makers with an additive model he found reasonable
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correlations of 0.85 and 0.81. Moreover, some of 
Einhorn's experimental procedures have been questioned, 
and so his finding that non-additive models are used is 
suspect, although his finding of their similarity to 
an additive model's results is not. One recent study 
of physicians' judgments of illnesses based on multiple 
cues (184) found a linear model predicted the holistic 
diagnosis better than conjunctive or disjunctive models. 
Moreover, another study to discover the existence of such 
models found no evidence for them (163), It appears then, 
that the additive model is a useful one, and that interactions 
are not important in most, if not all, cases.
In addition to analysis of variance, multiple 
regression has been used to compare the linear additive 
model with intuition; here interactions cannot be 
isolated, but the technique can be used when the number 
of dimensions increases above about two, for analysis 
of variance requires too many subject responses in 
these situations (61). Even though multiple regression 
usually assumes linear value functions, the results 
of its use have shown overwhelming support for the adequacy 
of the additive model. Apparently, the only such research 
where correlation fell below the.mid .90s was a study 
of job preferences of prospective school teachers 
(cited in (61) ) - average correlations were in the 
.60s and .70s for students with..and without prior teaching 
experience respectively. However, there appears to
in this study (61, p.28).have been "noise"
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A study not reviewed in the above literature 
has relevance to management. Dean and Roepcke (37) 
developed a 23 dimensional, weighted additive model 
for managing U.S. Army R and D resources. To check 
the validity of additivity they had estimates made of 
the value of the main effects and of the interaction 
between two dimensions in 252 cases, covering all 
the dimensions. In only 30 of the 252 cases was the 
interaction more than 25 percent of the total value, 
indeed, in only 43 of the 252 cases did a non zero 
valuation of interactions occur. They therefore 
continued to ignore interactions and to use their 
additive model.
Why is the additive model so useful even when 
interactions occur? Yntema and Torgerson's suggestion 
above that, if functions are monotonically increasing 
or decreasing, additivity is useful, has been tested 
in computer simulation studies and a "high degree of 
fit" between non-linear models and linear approximations 
was found (36, p.98). Two other"reasons for the usefulness 
of the additive approximation are that its weights 
are not effected by imprecision in the multidimensional 
value, and slight errors in a value function makes the 
additive model more appropriate (36). As the decision 
context is usually one where monotone value functions 
are measured with some error, the additive model
is a good approximation.
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In brief, then, the results of an additive model will 
be acceptable. But will they be accurate - how important 
are interactions in the real world? To answer this, the results 
of the additive model must be compared with the correct 
result or the results of more complex models, and not with 
human holistic preferences.
The studies of the validity of the additive model are 
reviewed in Dawes (35; 36). When there have been enough 
previous similar decisions to produce regression coefficients 
for use in an additive model, the additive model almost 
always makes better decisions about a given situation than 
a human decision maker. For instance, the weights to be 
given to the eleven dimensions ofthe Minnesota Multiphasic 
Personality Inventory (MMPI) were found by regressing MMPI 
results with the results of later, more extensive, diagnoses 
of whether a patient was psychotic or neurotic. In a plethora 
of studies, there has not been one case where a clinical 
psychologist who presumably could include interactions made 
a better diagnosis based on MMPI results than an additive 
model. In similar studies, predicted GPA was taken to be a 
function of 10 dimensions such as self-ratings of conscientiousness, 
or of three dimensions such as previous GPA. Correlations 
between final actual GPA and human predictions ranged from 
0.19 to 0.37; correlations between final actual GPA and an 
additive model's predictions ranged ^from 0.38 to 0.57. That 
is, the additive model was again the more accurate.
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More over , the additive model is better than human 
decision makers even if regression coefficients are not 
available. By using subjective weights in a model, results 
have shown with only one exception in 172 cases that the 
additive model was a better predictor of psychosis or GPA 
than humans were. Indeed, on the average, an additive 
model with equal weights is even better than an additive 
model with subjective weights! (35; 36; 56) (However, 
this does not mean even weighting is better than subjective 
weighting in particular cases rather than average ones - 
see (35, p. 15, footnote 1; 28, p. 44)}.
Despite this undoubted validity of the additive model, 
there is a reluctance among some analysts to use it. For 
example, Starr and Stein (197), after discovering that each 
dimension must be transformed by a value function before it 
is used in an additive model (or else the scale of measure­
ment affects the result) suggest a multiplicative model 
using untransformed dimensions so that two alternatives A 
and B can be compared by
Index A 
Index B
where, for example,
wv wzIndex A = • ZA and
w wIndex B = yg ^ . zg
and w and wz are the appropriate weights for two dimensions 
y and z. However, Index A = w^.log yA + wz«log That is,
Starr and Stein are using an additive model with a value 
function such that v(y) = log y and v(z) = log z. Whether
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this value function is in fact the value function of the decision 
maker is not tested for or justified. MDA under certainty 
using elicited value functions and an additive model is thus 
superior to this procedure, and if value functions are not 
available, this procedure is simply an example of MDA.
Moreover, Starr and Stein do not explain how the weights 
should be derived. In brief, the additive value model need 
not be dismissed.
It is time to summarise and conclude the discussion 
of the applicability of the weighted additive model. If 
dimensions are monotonically increasing or decreasing, the 
main effects captured in an additive model should usually 
outweigh any neglected interaction effects. The additive model 
provides results which correlate as highly or more highly with 
human decision makers' intuitive, holistic, decisions than 
any other model. This suggests that interaction terms are 
either unimportant or are being processed incorrectly by 
humans. Moreover, human decision makers make poorer judgments 
than an additive model, which indicates that even if interaction 
terms are important, they will be processed incorrectly by 
humans. The concusion one is compelled to come to is that the 
weighted additive model of MDA under certainty is valid, 
even when Debreu-independence does not strictly apply.
4.5 Procedures for Deriving Value Functions
Procedures for finding the value functions for each
dimension, and the weights for each dimension are almost
similar, for in each case the objective is to map values onto
*one scale which varies from x^ to xjL for each dimension i, or
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from w^* to w^ with one w. for each dimension. However, 
exposition will be clarified if the procedures for deriving 
value functions and those for deriving weights are dealt with 
separately. Deriving value functions will be considered first.
Discussion for mapping value functions will be in terms 
of just one dimension y, for by the axiom of value independence 
levels of other dimensions do not affect a value function.
For normalisation, the least preferred level of the dimension 
y*> is set to zero and the most preferred, y*, to 1. These 
two values of y can be actual values achieved by alternatives 
under consideration, or they can be easily imagined "benchmark" 
values of y. The next step is usually to rank the y's from 
the smallest to the largest, to produce an ordinal scale. While 
such a scale is adequate under certainty for unidimensional 
decisions, it is not adequate for multidimensional problems 
with Debreu-independence, forseveral scales need to be 
compared and so a cardinal scale is required. Thus the next 
step is to achieve a cardinal scale (which is unique up to a 
positive linear transformation, that is, u(x^) = a + b.u(x-) 
where a and b are constants, b > o). This is commonly done by 
rating the values of y. Some alternatives to rating are the 
Churchman - Ackoff (24) successive comparison method (found to 
be so complex as to be virtually unusable by one researcher 
(50), although it has been used elsewhere (199) ), and methods 
based on metrics (time-consuming). A more practicable alternative 
to rating is magnitude estimation (106; 198). Here the values 
of y are presented to the decision maker in a random sequence
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and he has to indicate the ratio of the strength of his 
preference for each y in relation to his preference for the 
first value of y presented. The concept of ratios has to 
be explained to some decision makers beforehand. This has 
been used to assess preferences for occupations, odors, 
politics, crimes, etc. (198). Magnitude estimation has two 
characteristics, in addition to its simplicity. The first is 
that it is a ratio scale, which is unique up to multiplication 
by a positive constant. The second is that a group preference 
could be found by taking the geometric mean of the responses, 
which dampens the extreme responses from biased or aberrant 
respondents. The arithmetic mean of values of y expressed on a 
ratio scale does not do this as effectively. (Of course, 
the median of responses could also be used as the response 
of the group, if desired.)
Which method of deriving value functions is best? There 
has been one test (107) which showed that the magnitude 
estimation method may be inferior to simple rating, although 
if an unidentified source of error in the ratio scales could 
have been eliminated, the magnitude estimation method would 
have proved better. Another study (83), of valuations of the 
severity of burns, found that magnitude estimation provided 
better results than rating, as measured by survival rates of 
patients. However, this study is an exception and most research 
has shown that usually "data on judgments are unaffected by 
the method used to collect them", as Eckenrode noted (50, p.189).
For instance, a recent study (164) compared three 
methods of deriving value functions - eliciting graphs, 
magnitude estimation, and using comparisons between dimensions.
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It found that the first two methods produced similar results, 
but that the third method (which was not suggested in the 
above review of procedures) was significantly different.
Three other recent studies confirms Eckenrode's 
findings of no difference between methods, von Winterfeld 
(215) compared simple rating and a variation of the magnitude 
estimation method to elicit value functions and found no 
significant differences in results. Fischer (62) compared 
direct rating with direct dollar judgment of levels of a 
dimension, to find correlations quite high. A third study 
which confirms this result is (28) , in which seven methods of 
evaluating weights (including magnitude estimation) were 
tested and the result was that "methods did not differ"
(28, p.41). Thus Eckenrode appears correct.
In any case, even if one method did produce value 
functions different to another, the difference to the choice 
among alternatives would be negligible. Fischer (62) took 
four variously curved value functions over a value range 
of 0 to 100, and compared the results of equally-weighted 
additive models using these value functions with results 
from three approximations to the value function. The first 
approximation was simply a straight line from 0 to 100; the 
second was two straight lines, one from 0 to the real value 
function at 50, then another from there to 100; the third 
was straight line approximations from 0 to 25 to 50 to 75 
to 100 on the real value function. The lowest Pearson product 
moment correlation coefficient for the gross linear approximation 
was .691, for the second approximation it was .851, for the 
third approximation it was .969. Varying the number of
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dimensions only made slight changes to the correlation
coefficients. Considering the extreme non-linearity of the
value functions in the study, the results show that the
value function need not be precisely accurate; that is,
even if simple methods of deriving them produce only approximations
to the actually held values, the additive model’s accuracy
will not be affected. Between three to five points on the
function other than the endpoints should be all that is
required on which to fair in the function. Indeed, if the value
function is close to being linear, perhaps one point is
adequate - O’Connor (163) found correlations of 0.98 when
he tried this in a real world application of a weighted
additive model.
Given these findings of similar functions from 
various methods of elicitation and the unimportance of small 
differences in value functions, one may as well use the 
simplest methods available, rather than a complex one. Ranking 
and rating appear to be the easiest to use, in that order (50) 
but magnitude estimation could be used as an alternative to 
rating, if the decision maker preferred it.
4.6 Procedures for Deriving Weights
The question is often asked, "What does it mean to 
say that one attribute is twice as important as another?" 
e.g. (140, p.29). Essentially, weights are used to stretch 
or shrink scales on each dimension which have been normalised
4
to measure from 0 to 1, say, so that the relative importance 
of each of these scales is incorporated into the decision. That 
is, w-s are the relative values of raising each x^^ to x^*
(with other x. held at their x^* levels). That is, weights are 
scale — or problem - dependent. For instance, the importance
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o£ the range dimension in a choice between three missiles 
, . *is different if its to x. distance is 10,000 miles to
20,000 miles rather than 10,000 miles to 100,000 miles. That
*is, weights do not depend solely on the level of x^* or x^ 
alone.
However, if there are only two levels for each
dimension (i.e. two alternatives) with each value of x^* set
*to 0 and the other value of x^, x^ , set to unity then
Fishburn (65) has proved that one only needs to elicit the
*relative values of each x^ as weights, not the relative
*values of raising each x.* to x^ , which are more complex
judgments to make. The essence of Fishburn* s proof is that
setting x^* = 0 eliminates the importance of the lower part
of the normalised value function scales when the x.* of zero
is multiplied by the weight in the additive model.
The following discussion of how to evaluate weights
will assume a choice between two alternatives, so that only the
x. need to be evaluated. For more than two alternatives,
* *read "raising x^* to x^ " for "x^ '.
What procedures should be used to evaluate weights?
The previous finding that different methods of eliciting 
judgments did not produce significantly different results, 
still seems to apply. Some studies which investigated 
different methods of deriving weights, as against different 
methods of deriving value functions are Eckenrode’s (50) 
ju^d those studies he referenced. Eckenrode tested six methods 
ranking, rating, three versions of paired comparisons of 
metrics, and the successive comparison procedure. The six
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methods provided consistent results in three different 
types of problem, with Kendall coefficients of 
concordance and Pearson product-moment correlation 
coefficients in the mid to high 90s. Eckenrode lists 
many other published experiments confirming this degree 
of consistency among methods.
That the derivation of weights is as consistent 
as the derivation of value functions is to be expected, 
for both are simply mapping values onto a scale.
However, it is significant that Eckenrode did 
not include magnitude estimation among the methods he 
investigated. For a most important fact is that no 
weight can be zero in a weighted additive model, for 
if it were, that dimension would not be incorporated 
into the decision. Thus rating is not usable unless 
some method of deriving a ’’base" of zero if found, for 
rating produces a cardinal scale which is unique up 
to a positive linear transformation and so permits some 
weights to vary quite legitimately. For example, if 
the w^ for two dimensions were 1 and 0.5, a legitimate 
transformation could change these to 1 and 0.9 or to 1 
and 0.1. Fischer (62) calculated correlations between 
additive model results when the ratio of the highest 
to the lowest w^ varied from 81 : 1 to 9:1 to
1:1. The Pearson product moment correlations were only 
in the mid .70s for the 81:1 and 1:1 results, but 
correlations were higher for the 81:1 and 9:1 and for the 
9:1 and 1:1 results. Thus the amount of error using the 
cardinal scale of rating to find w^s could be serious, although
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it will usually not be. The important point is that 
there is no way of assessing the error because a
cardinal scale has no true zero unless one is established 
as a base.
Only the ratio scale of magnitude estimation 
has a true zero (34, p.29) and so it evades the problem 
of cardinal scales referred to in the previous 
paragraph. Hence one correct procedure would be to 
rank the x^ s, then set the most preferred of the x. s 
to be a w^ of 1, say, then use magnitude estimation to 
find each other w^, 1 > w^ > 0. However, rating could 
also be used if a base of zero was set at the relative 
preference for all dimensions set at x^*. This would be 
a natural base from which to compare raising each 
dimension, but appears to be rarely used in rating 
schemes, which is unfortunate considering rating is 
often easier than magnitude estimation.
Research into the derivation of weights has 
shown that humans usually weight only a few dimensions 
when they make holistic judgments, and that when weights 
are derived for each dimension separately the weights 
are far more uniform. For example, Hoepl and Huber (94) 
found weights used in holistic judgments of teachers by 
students, using regression analysis. When the students 
provided direct weights for each of the dimensions, the 
weights were more uniform than those found by the 
regression analysis. Slovic (189) found stockbrokers did
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the same when rating stocks on eleven dimensions.
O'Connor (162; 163) and Slovic and Lichtenstein (190) 
review such studies, which are virtually conclusive on 
this point. Research has also shown that weights for 
dimensions at the bottom of a hierarchy of dimensions 
calculated from weights given to higher dimensions do not 
agree with the weights that subjects give directly to 
the bottom dimensions. The lesson to be learnt from 
this psychological research is that the derivation of 
weights can be difficult and the weights derived can be 
uncertain. For instance, O'Connor (163) found that water 
pollution experts gave water purity a weighting only 1.7 
times that given to the relatively unimportant dimension 
of water colour. Later discussion produced a greater 
divergence between the two. Indeed, O'Connor found that 
gaining agreement about weights was more difficult 
than gaining agreement about value functions.
Fortunately, this uncertainty about elicited 
weights is not very important. For instance, O'Connor 
used each of the widely varying weights for each of his 
subjects with the agreed upon value functions in an 
additive model. Weights which were averages of the widely 
varying ones were used with the value functions in an 
additive model to provide a benchmark. Correlations 
of the individual results with the benchmark result were 
all above 0.92, most were above 0.95. Sharpe (185) also 
cites a computer selection study which had conclusions 
"almost completely insensitive to even severe changes in
von Winderfeldt (215) had a similargoal weights".
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experience. As well, the study of Fischer (62), varying 
the ratio of highest to lowest weights, has already 
been mentioned - it found correlations were in the mid 
0.80s or above if the difference in ratios was not too 
large. Thus results appear to be quite stable as the 
weights in an additive model vary.
However, it would be appropriate to investigate 
more closely the factors which affect the stability 
of results with varying weights. As noted, Fischer 
(62) found that, when weights rose linearly from the 
lowest to the highest weight, it was only when the ratio 
of the highest to the lowest weight rose from 1:1 to 
extremely unlikely values of 91:1 or so that the stability 
of results was affected, and that the number of 
dimensions involved in the additive value model appeared 
to have no effect on the stability of results. But 
what if the weights did not rise linearly from the 
lowest to the highest weight, and what if the number of 
alternatives as well as the number of dimensions in the 
additive value model was varied --would the results still 
be stable? It was to answer this question that the 
following experiment was carried out. A simulation 
program of an additive value model was written that varied
(i) the number of alternatives;
(ii) the relative height of the highest weight 
to the lowest weight;
(iii) the number of dimensions;
(iv) the pattern of the rise of weights fromthe 
highest to the lowest.
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As regards (iv) there were four patterns of 
weights used to represent the various patterns that 
weights could be. The four patterns were, for n = 1, 2...N 
dimensions,
(i) level (i.e. level weights)
, , - 1/ ( (n/N) x 5) >(nj exponential (w = 1 -1/ev v J J)
(iii) arithmetic progression (wn = n) (i.e. 
linear weights)
(iv) logarithmic (wn = -ln(l - n/N) )
Because, in an additive model, the order of dimensions and 
their weights is immaterial, it is possible to assume 
vreights are all level or -rising from the lowest to the , 
highest in this fashion. Graphically, the four patterns
Ratio of 
highest to 
lowest weight
Figure 4.1 Patterns of Weights
In the long run, E(v(x) ) = E(Ew^.x^) = 
Zwi.E(Zxi), with Ewi constant for any particular 
weighting pattern. Thus one e.xpects the ranking of 
alternatives to be unaltered whichever weighting 
scheme is used, for Zw^ will be a constant for each 
scheme and E(Zx^) will be the same for each alternative
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Nevertheless, the variance of rankings around these 
expected values may be quite large, and will depend on 
variables such as the height of the largest weight 
compared to the lowest, the number of dimensions, and 
the number of alternatives involved. Using the four 
representative patterns, the resulting rankings of 
alternatives can be compared using the Friedman 
Multi-sample Test which is similar to the Kendall 
Coefficient of Concordance for agreement in rankings 
(26). Essentially, the test will discover if the rankings 
of alternatives differ with the various weighting 
patterns used. A computer program was run for 2, 5, 8,
11 and 14 dimensions in each alternative; and for the 
highest weights being 2, 9 and 16 times the value of 
the lowest weight; and for 3, 6, 10 and 20 alternatives. 
The values for each dimension of each alternative were 
obtained from a pseudo-random number generator, the 
weights were calculated from the formulae above and 
the value of each alternative found with the weighted 
additive vodel. Results for 50 replications under each 
set of conditions with the four patterns of weights are 
shown in Table 4.1. The test statistic is the x2 
and values for Type I error levels are shown in the 
table. Table 4.2 shows the results when only the three 
rising, non-linear, patterns of weights - patterns (ii), 
(iii) and (iv) about - were used. The results are 
similar to those in Table 4.1 except that x2 values are 
smaller in Table 4.2 indicating that there is a closer 
agreement in the rankings, as one would intuitively expect 
when the three similar, rising, patterns of weights were
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The precise Type I error levels associated with the 
2X values are not important, for the weighting patterns 
used are representative of extreme conditions, not 
actual ones, and in any case it is the Type II error 
level which is pertinent - the probability of erroneously 
accepting that the rankings are the same. Unfortunately, 
the Type II error levels are not available, and would in 
any case depend upon the discrimination between the 
ranks which a particular decision maker required for a 
particular decision. However, the probability of a 
Type II error, for a given set of conditions, becomes 
larger when the probability of a Type I error becomes 
smaller. Thus in the tables, when the Type I error level 
becomes small, there is a strong likelihood that the rankings 
are not the same.
The tables indicate that the changes in Type II 
error level are insignificant when the relative height 
of the highest weights changes, which is consistent with 
the results of Fischer (62), although he worked only with 
a linear pattern of weights, fewer alternatives, and a 
larger change in height. The tables also indicate that the 
Type II error level changes slightly when the number of 
dimensions and the number of alternatives change. The 
Type I error level appears highest for two dimensions, 
then drops for five dimensions and then only declines 
slightly for more dimensions. The tables indicate 
that the Type II error level increases with the number of 
alternatives.
TABLE 4.1
9Average Values of x » the Friedman Multi-Sample Test 
Statistic for Agreement in Rankings Using the Four 
Patterns of Weights in an Additive Value Model. (Type I Error Levels and x2 Values in Parentheses)
No. of 
Alternatives
Relative 
Height of 
Highest 
Weight 2
No.
5
of Dimensions
8 11 14
3 (0.10-4.61; o.os- 5.99; 0.01-9.21)*
2 7.10 5.74 4.62 5.03 4.97
9 6.69 5.44 6.24 5.24 5.15
16 5.93 5.71 5.16 5.64 5.16
6 (0.10-9.24; 0.05- 11.07; 0.01-15.09)*
2 17.59 14.93 14.10 14.33 12.98
9 17.17 15.19 15.15 13.57 13.56
16 16.95 14.62 14.45 13.92 13.99
10 (0.10-13.36; 0.05 -15.51 ; 0.01-20.09)*
2 31.87 28.38 26.52 26.79 25.42
9 31.59 27.56 27.15 25.00 €4.92
^—- 16 31.21 27.48 27.39 25.61 25.67
|ggg|g
20 (0.10-27.20; 0.05 -30.14 ; 0.01-36.19)*
2 68.33 60.65 57.10 56.68 55.76
9 68.29 61.29 57.01 55.51 57.42
16 68.26 60.72 57.52 57.66 56.83
* These are Type I error levels and corresponding X2 values.
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TABLE 4.2 
2Average Values of X , the Friedman Multi-Sample Test 
Statistic for Agreement in Rankings Using the Three 
Non-Linear Patterns of Weights in an Additive Value Model (Tyne I Error Levels and y2 Values in Parenthei
No. of Relative
Alternatives Height of 
Highest 
Weight 2
No. of Dimensions
5 8 11 14
3 (0.10-4.61; 0.05 -5.99; 0.01-9.21) *
2 5.40 4.73 4.21 4.55 4.47
9 5.17 4.52 5.35 4.87 4.73
16 4.55 4.56 4.36 4.76 .4.73
6 (0.10-9.24; 0.05 -11.07;; 0.01-15.09)*
2 13.50 12.51 12.22 12.15 12.16
9 13.02 12.66 11.88 12.10 12.70
16 13.45 12.33 12.31 12.22 12.45
10 (0.10-13.36; 0.05-15.51; 0.01-20. 09)*
2 24.37 23.25 22.34 23.10 22.38
9 24.23 22.44 23.14 21.87 22.23
16 23.94 22.66 22.37 22.28 22.56
20 (0.10-27.20 ; 0.05-30.14; 0.01-36. 19)*
2 52.16 49.42 48.69 48.83 48.32
9 52.17 49.27 48.17 48.12 49.47
16 52.14 49.59 48.65 49.17 48.77
2* These are Type 1 error levels and corresponding X values
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In practical terms, the results of the computer 
simulation mean that time need not be spent on getting 
precise values of weights, and that the time could more 
profitably (in terms of a more robust solution) be 
spent in ensuring that the number of alternatives was 
no larger than necessary. Moreover, the addition of 
more and more dimensions should not decrease the 
robustness of the solution from an additive value model.
4.7 Conclusion
This chapter has found the additive value model 
for use in MDA under certainty is both acceptable to 
decision makers and, judging from the occasions when 
human and additive value models' decisions can be 
validated against an objective standard, that it will also 
be more accurate than them. Rating or magnitude 
estimation was found bo be quite simple and adequate 
for eliciting value functions and weights for dimensions. 
Considerable evidence was presented to show that the 
results of an additive value model were quite robust to 
changes in value functions and weights. Thus the model 
appears to be an excellent method of MDA under certainty. 
The following chapters will recommend its use for MDA 
under uncertainty as well.
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5. UTILITY THEORY
5.1 The Elements of Utility Theory
MDA under certainty has been covered. Decision 
making under uncertainty is a far more complex and difficult 
task, for the alternatives do not have a point value, 
but rather a probability distribution of values.
Choosing among the alternatives on the basis of one 
or more moments of this distribution of values is 
unsatisfactory, because third or fourth order moments 
may have to be included to satisfactorily describe 
such distributions, and preferences for these moments 
are difficult to assess.
Utility theory approaches this difficulty by 
mapping the distribution onto a utility scale, and the 
alternative with just the highest expected or first 
moment of utility is to be preferred, without regard 
to higher moments. The utility transformation rests on 
axioms, similar to the four underlying MDA under certainty. 
Unidimensional utility theory posits that the decision 
maker can assign utilities to uncertain alternatives 
on a monotonically increasing (or decreasing). cardinal 
scale. An Archimaedian axiom limits utility to finite 
values and, analogous to transitivity, a sure-thing 
principle ensures that utilities for a dimension are 
independent of levels of that dimension in other 
alternatives. Note that monotonicity is explicitly 
incorporated, while it is not in MDA under certainty, 
although Yntema and Torgerson (224) consider it a 
condition for value additivity.
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The presence of multiple dimensions sometimes 
requires another axiom, analogous to the certainty 
axiom of value independence. This axiom is utility 
independence: utilities for each dimension are 
independent of the levels at which other dimensions 
are held. This axiom can be stated more formally: 
u(x^ | xt°), the utility of x^ conditional on the value of xj 
being held at x. is a positive linear transformation
of u(x^ | Xr) for all values of xr. Utility independence 
is sometimes referred to as strong conditional utility 
independence (178) (when this applies to a set of 
dimensions, strong conditional utility independence 
becomes the uncertainty analogue of weak conditional 
utility independence for the set of dimensions, i.e., 
value independence plus Debreu-independence from 
dimensions outside the set (216).) However, the term 
utility independence is suggested as a clear uncertainty 
analogue to value independence. Note that, unlike value 
independence, utility independence is not crucial 
to the use of MDA, and models have been developed which 
do not require its existence. As all the axioms 
apply to utility, they are usually expressed in 
probabilistic terms, e.g. (42; 178).
Again, the unidimensional axioms appear rational and 
acceptable. Fortunately, the multidimensional axiom of 
utility independence is fairly frequently applicable, because 
more is usually preferred to less, whatever else 
is happening. Moreover, utility independence is
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simple to test for. It can be tested for while 
deriving the utility functions for each dimension by 
asking the decision maker if his certainty equivalents 
50/50 gambles at various values of would be different 
if levels of xj were different. For instance, the 
certainty equivalent 'v (x^ , x. *) should remain at the 
same value if the values of theother dimensions (x-) 
were changed from the least preferred to the most 
preferred levels, say. Or, more generally, utility 
independence can be tested for by simply asking the 
decision maker if he thought about the levels of x?
when considering what the certainty equivalent 'v 50/50 
gambles at two values of xi was (117). If the decision 
maker answers no, it can be assumed that the certainty 
equivalent is not influenced by what level of xt z was, 
and hence utility independence exists.
5.2 Deriving Utility Functions
The mapping of dimensional values onto a utility 
scale should be done with questions involving lotteries 
to be a strictly legitimate measure of utility for 
uncertain outcomes. There are three major procedures 
for deriving a utility function for a dimension, y, say. 
The first, the Basic Reference Lottery Ticket (BRLT) 
method, asks the decision maker to nominate a probability 
p, such that p.(y*) + (1 - p).£y*) ^ (y*) whence 
u(y*) = p, if u(y*) = 0 and u(y*) = 1. This method is 
applicable if an attribute cannot be put on a continuous 
scale (101), e.g. y*, y1 and y* are owning 0, 1 and 2
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cars respectively. This property of the BRLT method 
will be especially useful in multidimensional studies, 
in contrast to unidimensional studies which commonly 
use the continuous dimension of money. However, a 
decision maker may have preferences for some particular 
probabilities, thus biasing his answers to BRLT questions 
Moreover, this first method has been found to be 
sometimes more difficult than the next one to be 
discussed (100; 101) because decision makers find it 
difficult to distinguish between low probabilities 
(e.g., .2, .1 and .05) and between high probabilities, 
and consider them all just very unlikely or very likely 
respectively.
The second method of eliciting utilities is the
Equally Likely Gamble's Certainty Equivalent (ELCE)
method. In this, the p is set at a neutral 0.5, and for
each dimension the decision maker is asked to choose
a certain value, to a 50/50 lottery involving y*
and y*. These two extreme values of y must be levels
relevant both to the decision maker’s experience and to
the problem at hand. This certainty equivalent has a
utility of 0.5 on a scale 0 > u(y) > 1. A similar
value ^ a 50/50 lottery involving y* and y has a
5 7utility of 0.25 and so on to y , or perhaps to y , 
after which a line is faired through these points.
It is easier if the questioning is indirect (5). That 
is, y values are nominated and the decision maker asked 
if equivalence to the 50/50 lottery occurs, until it 
does, rather than asking what is the y value at which 
equivalence occurs . Figure 5.1 illustrates this method.
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Figure 5.1 Elicited Utility Function
The third method of deriving utility functions 
is the Ramsey method. The decision maker is given 
two lotteries, each with two outcomes. He has to 
select a level of one of these outcomes if the 
probability in both lotteries is 0.5. In view of the 
need to consider two lotteries at once, it is not 
surprising that the Ramsey method has not been often 
used or recommended (101).
If a utility curve is fitted to obtain an algebraic 
formulation of the utility function it should be of a 
particular type, depending on the risk aversion of the 
decision maker. Risk aversion ususlly prevails, as 
elicited utility functions have shown, e.g. (195; 203), 
because bureaucratic managers believe that good 
decisions are normally expected but bad decisions are 
reprehensible - forcing risk aversion (85). This risk 
aversion will also exist for their politician masters,
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for "at each election, individual voters compare their 
assessment of past government performance with their 
own personal expectation of how government should perform" 
(126, p.10), and thus politicians are judged on their 
term of office, just as, in a similar way, bureaucratic 
managers are. (Note that this risk aversion is not so 
commonplace among mainly self-employed farmers (101) 
which is as one would expect if the above explanation 
for the presence of risk aversion was correct.) Thus 
risk aversion should be expected in public investment 
decision, even though "the law of large numbers" would 
suggest that the risk of income loss in any one single' 
public investment project would be diversified away 
by the returns from other, uncorrelated, projects. For 
the return on public projects are not only efficiency 
returns but also include political effect, and political 
gains may not compensate for political losses. For 
example, effects on a particular region or a particular 
voting bloc may not be compensated (180).
Risk aversion exists if the certainty equivalent 
for a 50/50 lottery between two values of x. is less 
than the average of these values. (For instance, on the 
graph of the utility function, Figure 5.1, at u = 0.5, 
the y value of the utility function is less than that of 
a linear function, so risk aversion exists.) If the 
difference between the two decreases (increases, is 
constant) as the values of y increase, then the risk 
aversion decreases (increases, is constant). This can
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be found by tediously questioning the decision maker 
for pairs of y (65) , but can also be gauged from the 
points on the graph of the utility function. To do 
this, divide the y range into three or more equal sized 
segments. The points on the vertical utility scale 
halfway between the utilities of the bounds of each of 
these segments correspond to certainty equivalent 
values of y. Then if the horizontal axis differences 
between the upper bounds of each segment and its 
certainty equivalent decreases (increases, is constant) 
as the values of y increases, then the risk aversion 
decreases (increases, is constant).
If the risk aversion is decreasing, as it should 
reasonably be for some dimensions (195) - why be more 
averse to a gamble if you can better afford it? - then the 
utility function might be of the form u(x) = log x or
xc(0 < c < 1). If the risk aversion is increasing,
'— 2the utility function might be quadratic, u(x) = x + bx (b < 0)
or some other polynomial- of appropriate form. If the risk aver­
sion is constant, then the utility function is linear or of the 
form u(x) = 1 - e”cx (c > 0) (5). This last exponential form 
is often used for its simplicity^for all that is required to 
specify it is x^A, x.* and one % 50/50 gamble at 
(xi*, x.*), e.g. (90; 117; 124).
5.3 Procedure of Application
These basics of utility theory are applied in 
this sequence for multi-attribute problems:
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(i) formulate the decision into alternative
courses of action, measurable on dimensions 
that define the preferences of the decision 
maker;
(ii) assess the probability distributions of the 
results of each course of action, on each 
dimension (Chapter 6);
(iii) derive the utility function of the decision 
maker for the range of results on each 
dimension (this Chapter);
(iv) use the appropriate utility model to find 
the expected utility of each course of 
action (Chapters 7 to 10);
(v) adopt the alternative with the highest 
expected utility.
5.4 Differences between Value and Utility
The differences between value and utility can be 
summarized in a table.
TABLE 5.1
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN VALUE AND UTILITY FUNCTIONS
Condition Value Utility
Alternatives 
Scale of function
certain uncertain
ordinal cardinal
Is scale necessarily mono-
tonically increasing or no yes
decreasing ;
Independence of preferences value utility
on each dimension from levels ^dependence independence 
of other dimensions r
Independence strictly required Debreu- Fishburn- 
for the additive model independence independence
(see Ch. 7)
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"Scale of function" in the above table needs 
elaboration, for not all functions dealing with certain 
multidimensional alternatives are ordinal, and not 
all functions dealing with uncertain multidimensional 
alternatives are cardinal (as suggested in (61, pp.45-46), 
for instance). For example, while the value of a 
unidimensional alternative, v(x), requires only an 
ordinal scale, the value functions on each dimension, 
v(x^), are cardinal in the additive value model 
used with multidimensional alternatives. And while the 
utility of a unidimensional alternative, u(x), needs 
to be cardinal if there is probabilistic dependence of 
levels on each alternative, if probabilistic independence 
exists then u(x) need only be ordinal.
The appropriateness of the terminology adopted in 
this thesis for the various forms of independence should 
be clear from Table 5.1. For example, the connection 
between value and utility independence is brought out. 
Moreover, alternatives under certainty can be seen as 
’degenerate* gambles, i.e., having a probability of one.
Thus if utility independence exists, so does value 
independence. If utility independence exists for a set
(xi» xj,+v • • >) from another set (xj , Xj+1,.*.)» 
then value independence exists for that set, and if
value independence exists for a set, then Debreu- 
independence of pairs of dimensions in that set from 
outside dimensions also exists. Finally, if Fishburn- 
independence exists allowing an additive utility model, then
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Deb reu- independence allowing an additive value model 
also exists (178). However, these relationships are 
not reversible, e.g., value independence does not imply 
utility independence.
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6. PROBABILITY
6.1 Eliciting Subjective Probability Distributions
Utility theory deals with preferences for uncertain 
consequences for which some probability distributions 
are required. These could be derived from historical 
data or from a model based on the relative frequency 
concept of probability. Perhaps Schlaifer's "sparse data 
rule" could be used to produce an approximate cumulative 
distribution function from N observations (8), where 
the kth ranked observation is an estimate of the 
k/(N + 1) fractile.
However, as decisions often deal with unique 
events objective probability distributions of variables 
involved are usually not available. So the decision 
maker's subjective probability should be used, that is, 
the probability distribution he believes in and wishes 
to act on because it is based on whatever information 
and experience he possesses. That is, probability 
becomes a measure of one's belief in the outcome of a 
particular event. Indeed, even if objective probability 
distributions are available, they should not be used 
unless the decision maker believes in them - when they 
are subjective probability distributions anyhow.
However, the use of subjective probability is 
not a simple straightforward matter. Human incapacity 
to correctly process uncertainty has already been noted;
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for instance, humans are not Bayesians, and use 
incorrect heuristics. This incapicity can also be 
observed in elicited subjective probability distributions 
which are too'Vtight" when compared to available objective 
probability distributions. For instance, Alpert and 
Raiffa (4) asked for the 1 and 99 percentiles of 
subjective probability distribution of quantities 
which were easily verified objectively, such as yearly 
foreign car imports. But the true objective value was 
not within the subjective percentiles for 40 to 50 
percent of the time. Even when this was pointed out to 
subjects, with urgings to widen their distributions, 
subjective probability distributions were too tight.
This tightness has been observed in many other 
experiments e.g. with managers in classes at the London 
Graduate School of Business Studies (156). This together 
with the other biases in subjective probability noted 
in Section 3.4 would indicate that "objective" distributions 
should be used wherever possible, at least as a starting 
point for deriving subjective distributions.
But what if there is no objective distribution 
available, or if the objective distribution is based 
on such sparse data that the decision maker does not 
believe in it, from a knowledge that there is no law of 
small numbers corresponding; to the law of large numbers? 
Then the subjective probability distribution one must 
fall back on must be "correct" because there is no 
criterion other than belief to judge whether bias exists 
or in which direction it operates if it does exist.
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(Of course, the subj ect.ive- distribution" should 
be internally consistent, that is, probabilities 
sum to one for mutually exclusive and exhaustive events, 
as well as being consistent with the beliefs of the 
individual.) However, there are several subjective 
distributions to be believed in! A review of the 
psychological bases of subjective probability by 
Hogarth (96) comes to these pessimistic conclusions. 
Because the human mind does not handle uncertainty 
well, and usually operates in deterministic terms, 
there is no distribution in the mind waiting to be 
elicited; thus elicitation will be difficult, for 
different elicitation methods elicit different 
distributions of the same variable by the same person.
This is confirmed by another review of subjective 
probability (209) and is well illustrated by graphs of 
four such distributions elicited by four methods in (219). 
Moreover, "in reality, subjective probabilities determine 
preferences among bets and are not derived from them, 
as in the axiomatic theory of rational decision" (209, 
p.1130). Indeed, some experiments (95) have shown that 
deterministic point estimates were more accurate than 
elicited distributions, or at least the modes of these 
distributions were. Hogarth concludes, "From the evidence 
available, I would hypothesize that for the statistically 
naive (that is, many managers or those who provide them 
with information) probabilistic forecasting will depress 
predictive ability in the short run" (95, p.20). As 
training programs are impractical in many cases, 
are pessimistic findings indeed.
these
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In view of these findings, should MDA under 
uncertainty be limited to those few decisions where 
there are objective probability distributions or where 
trained estimators of subjective probability are 
available? No, because, as noted, the test of a 
subjective probability distribution is the decision 
maker’s belief in it, and he could believe in his own 
subjective distribution more than he does in one 
elicited from a trained statistician. MDA under 
uncertainty has to use the subjective probability 
distributions it has available. Indeed, the desire 
to include all possible outcomes in decision making 
(if only to evade later criticism that some possibilities 
were overlooked) is one of the reasons put forward for 
decision analysis, e.g. (222), and is why distributions 
were used in the Mexico City airport decision analysis » 
for example (113). Given that the decision maker 
admits uncertainty, that is, has a subjective probability 
distribution which he believes in and wants to incorporate 
into his decision making, then decision analysis can 
assist, even if the decision maker is statistically 
naive, for the distribution is going to be incorporated 
into the decision one way or another anyhow, if the 
manager believes in it. What can be done is to elicit 
a subjective probability distribution in a way that will 
minimize the effect of human biases, but which will be 
convincing to the decision maker.
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There are several methods of eliciting 
distributions available (42; 88; 101; 156; 219).
Indirect methods, which have the decision maker answering 
set questions which assume a normative stochastic model 
in the decision maker's mind (e.g. Bayes Theroem) or 
assume his subjective distribution to be of the beta 
(96) or any other form, would obviously be unreliable, 
given Hogarth's findings mentioned above. Moreover, 
indirect methods assume a linear utility function for 
money, if money is involved in the questioning, or 
ask hypothetical questions which can be difficult to 
answer (101). The indirect approach is the basis of the 
probability wheel technique (196) in which a pointer on 
a two-coloured wheel is spun, and the decision maker 
asked when he considers the likelihood of an event to 
equal the probability that the pointer will stop in a 
varying colour. This obviously requires an awareness 
and belief in the relative frequency concept of probability and 
in randomness, and it has been found that executives 
feel uncomfortable about the implication that business 
risk is like gambling at a casino and find the method tiring 
1(156).
There are several simple direct approaches.
Fractile assessments of the cumulative distribution 
function can be made. Assume x is likely to fall in the 
range x° to x*; what is a value of x0,5 such that it is 
equally likely that x will be less than or greater than 
x0,5? x0,5 will be the 50 percentile? Similarly find
x0,75 if x is sure to be between x0,5 and x1, x0,25 between 
x° and x0,5, and so on until 5, or perhaps 7, percentiles
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are elicited and a curve faired through them. This
approach is favoured by many writers, e.g., (4; 88;
156; 219). Another and far simpler procedure is to
elicit the mode ("most likely value”) and the 5 and 95
percentiles ("1/20 chance of being less/more than”)
and use approximation formulae given in (167) to find
expected utility. But all these direct and indirect
procedures use lottery-type questions which are unfamiliar
to many people and need to use hypothetical situations
which prompt hypothetical answers in many cases. Thus
these procedures are often difficult to apply, and even
if they can be applied the decision maker has the
impression (137, p.403):
"Look, I feel that I know something about the 
probability distribution for this attribute, 
but (I am being forced)... to think in terms 
which make me uncertain as to whether I am 
correctly translating this information."
These procedures with lottery-type questions also put
the decision maker in relatively passive role compared
to the analyst, and so do not closely involve the
decision maker in building up his distribution. Smith
(193) has suggested a method in which the decision
maker does not answer lottery questions and need only
rank differences in probability between pairs of discrete
intervals of x and between differences between intervals.
These rankings are manipulated by rank correlation
techniques to produce a probability distribution function.
However, the number of rankings is too large if the
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number of intervals (howsoever they are chosei) is larger than 
say 3 or 4, and Hampton et al. (88, p.27) believe the 
method "will be psychologically and intuitively meaningless 
to the decision maker".
There are two very simple approaches to the 
elicitation of subjective probability distributions which 
do not suffer from any of the defects mentioned, but 
which appear to have been overlooked in most decision 
analysis literature; one approach is suitable for 
continuous variables, or a discrete variable with 
several possible outcomes, the other approach is suitable 
for a discrete variable with only a few possible outcomes.
The first approach is that developed at the
University of New England (5) and by some World Bank
staff (173). The World Bank staff had first asked
subjects to draw continuous subjective distributions,
but had abandoned this because the decision makers
appeared to be "aesthetically influenced by the
deceptively attractive appearance of the smooth curve
and impressed by the complicated formulas. His judgment
seems to lose its sharpness ..." (173, p.52-53). The
World Bank staff then developed a second method in
which the decision maker himself divides the possible
range of x into i = 1, 2, ...n intervals and allots
n
probability Pj^ to each interval with = !•
(The intervals could be just a straightforward "high, 
"jnedium" and "low" if necessary.)
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The decision maker varies the size and the number of 
intervals and their probabilities until he is satisfied 
that the histogram he is working with adequately 
represents his beliefs. This author suggests that the 
decision maker can be asked to spread 100 percent over 
the intervals in proportion to their beliefs, and 
researchers at the University of New England sometimes 
give decision makers matches to spread over the intervals. 
The great advantage of this approach is that it does not 
require answers to lottery-type questions, allows the 
decision maker/analyst relationship to be flexible, allows 
quick revisions to early assessments (which could have 
been effected by anchoring, for instance), and involves 
the decision maker in a way which he can easily understand , 
thus encourgaing a belief in the elicited subjective 
probability distribution. Appropriately enough, it is 
sometimes called the visual impact method (5).
The second very simple approach to probability 
elicitation is useful for discrete distributions. Here 
a statement of an outcome is made, and the decision 
maker asked to tick a box indicating his subjective 
estimate of its likelihood. For instance (adapted from 
(202 ; 210), the statement or event might be:
Event 2: Public opinion will demend a heavier
emphasis on preventive health and general 
welfare services.
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0.0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5.6 .7 .8 .9
Won't very unlikely fifty- likely very
occur unlikely fifty likely
The numerical probabilities which fit the verbal 
descriptions can be changed, but the use of both helps 
the decision maker. Certainly this approach should be 
easy to implement, but it is limited to discrete variables 
with two, perhaps three, values, and it has no inherent 
tests for consistency like the 100 percentage points 
in the visual impact method.
Both these simple approaches elicit in an 
easily understood wray the information which the decision 
maker can provide and no more. The decision maker is 
involved in the building of the distribution and hence 
believes in it and can change it easily as his awareness 
of uncertainty increases in the process of elicitation 
and interaction with the analyst.
Whichever method of elicitation the analyst 
uses, there are some essential first steps (based on 
(196) and Section 12.2). First, motivate the decision 
maker by noting the importance of his judgments about a 
variable to the decision. Second, ensure that the 
decision maker knows he should not allow his preferences for 
outcomes to affect his judgment of their likelihood.
Perhaps this unscrambling otf probability and desirability 
could be done formally, with scales for probability and 
desirability to be filled in. This might be useful 
for the discrete variables, but would be difficult 
for continuous variables, and anyhow may complicate 
the assessment without increasing accuracy.
1.0
cer
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Third^ define the variable very carefully in terms 
the decision maker is familiar with - the clairvoyant 
test is useful here: could a clairvoyant reveal the 
answer in a single number without requesting 
clarification of terms? Fourth, lead the decision maker 
into an awareness of uncertainty, without allowing the 
usual biases to cloud the elicitation. This author 
has found that the deterministic prejudice of the 
human mind means that elicitation must start with a 
single point estimate which can then be demonstrated to 
be not absolutely certain to occur. Decision makers 
then quickly grasp what is required. If the interview 
begins with the limits of uncertain outcomes, decision 
makers can be uneasy with the whole process, and, 
moreover, these limits become two anchors. However, 
it must be admitted that most modern analysts advocate 
beginning with the limits; e.g. (74; 196). Whichever 
approach is used, the decision maker should be prodded to 
try to ensure that his distribution is not too tight or 
other biases are not affecting his judgment. The visual 
impact method is useful at this stage, for it allows 
changes to be quickly made, and the interrelationships 
of judgments to be seen. The fifth step arises out 
of the fourth, and that is testing for probabilistic 
independence. If discussion shows that some elicited 
probabilities will be dependent on another stochastic 
variable, then this other will have to be held fixed 
while distributions are elicited (this problem of 
probabilistic dependence is discussed in the next section).
-91-
The sixth and last step is verification, that is, 
testing to see if the decision maker really believes 
in his judgments. This can be done by drawing inferences 
e.g., if the probability of a value occurring is 
really twice that of another.
Finally, some mention should be made of scoring 
rules which have been developed to try to ensure 
elicited probabilities are really what the decision 
maker believes they are. However, they complicate the 
assessment procedure and their effectiveness has not 
been proven (88; 95). Indeed, unconscious biases can 
still occur even though decision makers are rewarded for 
correct answers (209, p.1130), so that using scoring 
rules may be akin to worrying about ants while elephants 
are rampaging through the campsite. If the assessor 
is aware that the correctness of an important decision 
depends on his honesty, there should be no' need for 
scoring rules.
6.2 Dealing with Probabilistic Dependence
A problem which may arise in multidimensional 
decision analysis is that two or more dimensions may be 
probabilistically dependent, in which case a joint 
distribution will be required. Not only is assessing 
joint distributions hard work, but using them in utility 
analysis is tedious - a computer program will probably be 
required. Thus probabilistic dependence should be evaded 
where possible. Such dependence can be tested for by
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introspection and checked by assessing several 
unconditional probabilities, p (y) and p(z), and.then 
comparing their products p(y).p(z) to a separate 
assessment of the joint probability (5). If the two 
agree reasonably closely, independence can be assumed.
However, it is important that probabilistic 
independence is not assumed to exist when it does not. 
There has been negligible research into probability 
models in decision analysis, and probabilistic 
independence has usually been assumed for simplicity, 
e.g. (46; 113). But the problem' of probabilistic 
dependence does arise in simulation models for risk 
analysis, and there at least the existence of dependence 
can seriously affect results. World Bank staff found 
that overlooking dependence (they call it correlation) 
"may lead to a completely wrong interpretation in the 
analysis" (173, p.45), and they "believe that the 
influence of correlations on the outcome of the analysis 
is more important than the influence of the shape of 
any particular distribution" (173, p.47). These 
conclusions were based on results from several project 
evaluations. Now, this dependence will also be as 
critical in a multidimensional utility model as in a 
simulation model, for in each it is the relationships 
between the variables that ;affects whether a low value 
on one variable can be compensated by a high value on 
another (with independence) or not (with dependence). 
This was strikingly demonstrated in perhaps the only
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investigation of dependence in multidimensional 
decision analysis, in Dillon and Perry's review in 
(169) . A hypothetical but realistic example with four 
dimensions was used, three of them binomial and 
stochastic, and two of these were made probabilistically 
dependent. The expected utilities of four alternatives 
were calculated using the multiplicative model, incorporating 
the dependencies. It was found that the results of an 
additive model incorporating the dependencies had a 
product-moment correlation coefficient of virtual 
unity with the results of the multiplicative model. But 
then probabilistic independence was assumed, and the 
additive model used with the four possible combinations 
of independent probabilities. Here the product-moment 
correlation coefficient varied from 0.98 (significant 
at 21) to 0.79 (insignificant at 101). That is, 
probabilistic dependence could quite seriously affect 
the results of a decision analysis if it is overlooked, 
depending on the severity of the dependence and the 
number of dimensions involved.
If tests show that probabilistic dependence 
exists, what can be done? There are four procedures 
available (173; 174). The first is to transform the 
dimensions until independence is achieved. The most 
practicable way of doing this is to combine the 
dependent dimensions into one. But doing this means 
that one of the benefits of multidimensional decision
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analysis , the clarity obtained from disaggregation, is 
missed. So a trade-off may have to be made. The second 
method of handling dependence is to relate jointly- 
dependent variables to a hierarchical system of 
variables to achieve conditional independence. This 
would be done after analysing the causes of uncertainty 
and grouping dimensions with similar causes. However, this 
procedure would require the decision maker to provide 
conditional probabilities for groups of dimensions - 
not an easy task, for correlations of just two dimensions 
are difficult enough to think about. The third method 
of handling dependence is more promising, and involves 
using certainty equivalents in an additive value 
model (see Chapter 15). Certainty equivalents, by 
definition, will not suffer from probabilistic dependence, 
and using them in a decision analysis will probably be 
easier than a utility analysis of a full joint distribution. 
(Note, however, that certainty equivalents for independent 
dimensions will have to be elicited first to allow 
elicitation of certainty equivalents for the dependent 
dimensions.)
If neither of the three procedures above are 
used, and the decision maker still wants probabilistic 
dependence to be incorporated into the decision analysis, 
then a full joint distribution will be necessary. This 
is found by assessing the distribution of one variable 
(say y), and then, for each interval of this variable, 
the conditional distribution of z is assessed. (In 
other words, keep the number of values of y small.)
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The joint probabilities are p (y, z) = (p(y).p(ylz). Equa­
tions to use these probabilities in utility models will be 
given as the utility models are discussed.
Conditional probabilities are used in cross-impact 
analysis to compute scenarios and this deserves mention 
here (230 to 236). Most of the research has been on the 
mathematical aspects of combining probabilities of events 
with such uncertain results that one writer has remarked,
"There seems peculiarly little point in applying a method 
which is designed to provide a rigorous mathematical answer 
to the implications of data stemming from human judgement if 
human judgement is to be used to select a particular answer 
from the range of those supplied by the rigour of mathematics." 
(232, p.342). The conclusion seems to be despair over the use 
of conditional probabilities at all because of the difficulty 
of manipulating them and because "psychological research by 
Kahremann and Trevesky has already shown that man is not 
Bayesian^at all." (231, p.87) While cross-impact manipula­
tions of probabilities are more complicated as those of MDA, 
these conclusions should be borne' in mind by a decision analyst 
who attempts to allow for conditional probabilities. The point 
being made here is that MDA must be an approximation for 
precise calculation of actual probabilities is unlikely, and
cross-impact experience confirms this.
Finally, it could be , noted that decision theory uses 
Bayes Theorem to incorporate objective test data into prior 
subjective probability distributions. This will not be 
covered here, because of space constraints. However, two
points might be noted. Bayesian preposterior analysis 
could be used to see if further study to refine some of 
the estimates used in a decision analysis would be worth­
while. And if the likelihoods used in Bayesian analysis 
have to be subjective, they will suffer from all the 
imperfections of elicited subjective probabilities.
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As noted in Chapter 4, the weighted additive 
value model appears to be adequate for most decisions 
made under certainty. However, there is no consensus 
on the applicability of an additive utility model for 
decisions made under uncertainty. Thus several other 
types of utility models must be discussed along with the 
additive. The discussion will cover models in the order 
of decreasing number of assumptions in them. The follow­
ing Table 7.1 lists the models and their assumptions.
The additive utility model assumes that Fishburn- 
independence exists (sometimes called marginality 
(178) or marginal equivalence (65]). The assumption is 
here called Fishburn-independence after the first 
person to prove it, and thus to limit it to decisions 
under uncertainty and to highlight that it is the analogue 
of Debreu-independence. Proofs of Fishburn-independence 
have been given by Fishburn and others (64), with a 
very simple proof being given by Raiffa (178), which is 
based on utilities of base levels of (y, z) , that is 
(y*» z*)> not affecting the result when the levels are 
associated with other levels of y and z.
The assumption of Fishburn-independence is that 
the utility of a level of a dimension depends on the 
marginal probability distribution of that dimension, and 
not on the joint probability distribution of it with 
any other dimension. Take two levels of each of two 
dimensions:y^ and y2, and z^ and z2. Suppose lotteries 
gives a 50/50 chance at these y^ and y2 and and z2*
7. THE ADDITIVE UTILITY MODEL
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TABLE 7.1
UTILITY MODELS AND THEIR MAJOR ASSUMPTIONS
Utility Models Assumptions for each dimension of:
Fishburn- Utility Debreu- Value
independence Independence independence independen
Additive, with 
Fishburn- 
independence 
for all levels 
of each 
dimension
X
Additive, with 
Fish-burn- 
independence 
for any two 
levels of each 
dimension
X X X
Multiplicative X X
Quasi-additive 
with utility 
independence
X X
Quasi-additive 
without 
utility 
independence
X
R(V), with V 
found using 
the additive 
value model
X x
R(V), with V 
found using 
the bench­
mark model
X
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Lottery 1 Lottery 2
Fishburn-independence implies that the decision maker 
would not pay anything to have either of the y’s 
combined with either of the z’s before the lottery is 
taken.
Keeney (108) gives an actual example of a test 
for Fishburn-independence. The decision maker had to 
choose between alternative telephone equipments which 
meant different delays to customers in two geographical 
areas in America. Consider the probabilities of delay 
of 0 and 0.1. Let the lotteries in the above figure 
be
(0, 0) ~--- (0.1, 0)
Then the first lottery is preferred to the second because
the combinations in the first mean equity between the
customers in each area. Thus the decision maker prefers
the first to the second lottery, and so the test for
Fishburn-independence is negative.
Richard has investigated Fishburn-independence in
some detail (81). When a decision maker opts for the
mors "equitable" lottery above he is considered multivariate risk 
averse, when he is indifferent between the two lotteries he is
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risk neutral, and when he opts for the more "inequitable" 
lottery above he is multivariate risk preferring. If 
multivariate risk preference or risk aversion exists, 
then Fishburn-independence does not exist and 
multiplicative models, discussed in the next chapter, may 
be applicable. Actually, one study (40) has found that 
multivariate risk preference or risk aversion usually 
exists, but as this thesis plans to demonstrate, this 
doesnot invalidate the additive model in practice, 
even though it does in theory.
Notice that strictly each of the possible 
values of x^ should be tested with each of possible 
values of x., j / i. If this would be too tiresome, 
because there were too many dimensions, a procedure 
using the concepts of utility independence and value 
independence is available. If utility independence 
and value independence exist, and Fishburn-independence 
holds for any two levels of each of the dimensions 
(as in the two lotteries discussed earlier), then the 
additive utility model applies (178). Note that value 
independence does not apply in decisions involving two 
dimensions, for there are not other dimensions for 
trade-offs to be independent from, so in two-dimensional 
situations only utility independence needs to be tested 
for before testing for Fishburn-independence.
The additive utility model is used if Fishburn- 
independence exists (113)1
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n
u(x) (7.1)
m
where u(x^)
utility of dimension x^, and w^ = the weight for 
dimension x., found by the methods outlines in Chapter 4, 
or by methods to be discussed in the next chapter.
The model can also be presented as (from (5) )
m n (7.2)
The second model is more difficult to assess, as the 
probabilities of combination of levels of dimensions, 
rather than of the values of each dimension, must be 
elicited. It need only be used if the dimensions are 
probabilistically dependent.
Fishburn-independence implies Debreu-
independence (7; 8) because decision making under 
certainty simply deals wthh degenerate gambles. This 
means that u(x) = v(x) up to a positive linear 
transformation; it also means that, if Fishburn- 
independence exists, then v(x) = u(x) up to a positive 
linear transformation. Thus value functions (which 
are easy to elicit) can be used in place of utility 
functions (which require lottery-type questions to 
elicit) if Fishburn-independence exists (46).
The additive utility "model is a simple one, and
it is often used whether its assumptions do strictly apply or 
not (see Chapter 12). However, as noted, there is no 
consensus that the additive model is a general one, so 
other models will have to be discussed.
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If utility independence and Debreu-independence 
exist, but Fishburn-independence does not, then the 
multiplicative model is applicable. If there are only 
two dimensions, then the quasi-additive model is also 
applicable in this situation, but the multiplicative 
model is more practicable (see Chapter 9).
The proofs of the multiplicative model are due to 
Keeney and are complex; they are based on utility 
independence and Debreu-independence (called preferential 
independence by Keeney) of sets of dimensions, and the 
cardinal utility function property of being unique 
up to positive linear transformations. Proofs for 
more than three dimensions are in (110), for two dimensions 
in (111) .
The conditions for the multiplicative model are 
that for some dimension, Xj say, Debreu-independence 
with each other dimension exists, and just x. is 
utility independent of other dimensions. Of course, 
if all pairs of dimensions are Debreu-independent, then 
just any one of the dimensions needs to be utility 
independent of others. The multiplicative model is (113)
N
K.u(x) + 1 = (K.k^.u(x^) + 1) (8.1)
where u(x^) is the utility o^ x^ scaled from 0 to 1, 
are scale factors ranging from 0 to 1 for each u(x^) 
and K is another scaling constant. The formula is solved 
for u(x).
8. THE MULTIPLICATIVE UTILITY MODEL
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The u(x^) are found by one of the methods in 
Chapter 5. If probabilistic independence exists the 
u(x^) refer to the expected utility of an alternative on 
dimension x^; if probabilistic dependence exists, then the 
u(x^) refer to the utilities of the particular levels of each 
dimension in a joint outcome x, the expected utility of an 
alternative is then the sum of the utilities of each such 
outcome multiplied by its probability of occurrence.
The procedure to find the k^. and K is given by 
Keeney (110), and is based on the BRLT method of eliciting 
utilities. The decision maker is presented with three hy­
pothesized consequences, Cl, C2 and C3, involving all the 
attributes, and asked to choose a probability such that 
p.Cl + (1 - p). C2 a/C3 for sure. The two consequences the 
decision maker must choose between probabilistically are 
combinations of the most preferred and least preferred 
levels of all attributes,
XC1 = (x1*,:x2*, ... xn*) = 1, and
C2 = (xl*> x2*J * * V} = °
The consequence for sure is, when finding k.,
C? = (xi*f•t +
Once a value of p is found which makes p. C^ + (1-p) . C^Cg 
k^ is set to p. This is done for each x^. The k^ can be 
understood as the relative preferences for raising a particu­
lar xi from x^* to x^*, with all other attributes remaining
at xiA.
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Another method of finding the k^s is based on 
the Ramsey method of eliciting utilities (118).
The end levels of two dimensions are taken (with 
other dimensions held constant) and other levels 
of the dimensions are found so that, for x, and X2 say,
u(x1# x2*) 'v u(x1*, x2) (8.2)
Using basic algebra and the multiplicative or additive 
utility models, the utility of these two consequences 
can be equated to yield
k1.u(x1) = k2.u(x2) (8.3)
As u(x^) and u(x2) can be read off the utility functions 
for these dimensions, k, can be expressed as a linear 
function of k2, or vice versa. This is done for all 
dimensions. With all k-s then expressed relative to 
each other, all that remains to be done is to find the 
absolute value of one of the k^s. This has to be done 
by the first of Keeney’s two methods outlined above, 
with the p selected set equal to a k^. With this 
absolute value, all the other k^s can be scaled to it 
using their linear relationships. Two clear examples 
of this second method are in (117; 120).
The two advantages of this second method are that, 
except for one dimension, it does not require the extreme 
x^ s to be considered in evaluating the k^s, and it 
does not make the decision maker consider simultaneously 
all dimensions set at x^* and x^*. Keeney has used this 
second method in some recent tests but it should be noted 
that its Ramsey method has been found to be the more
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difficult than the first, BRLT, method in many 
unidimensional situations (see Chapter 5).
Once the k. are found K can be found by solving 
n
K + 1 = ill (Kki + 1) (8.4
This can be done by iteration ( 107) , with a fi rst
value
n
of K of -1 < K < 0 if Lej k.i > 1, and K > 0 if
.E1k. i=l l < 1. Af te r an iteration, if the r.h. s. > 1.h.s
of (8 .4) then the f i rst value of K must be increased
and vice versa. The total util ity of each outcome is
then found from the multiplicat ive model (8 .1) above.
Note that if Ek. = 1 then K = 0 and the multiplicative
model becomes the additive model. Thus checking for
Ek. = 1 is in effect a check for Fishburn-independence.
Finding the k^ with the above two methods
involved lottery questions. However, it might be
asked whether lottery questions are required, for
each dimensions is known for sure to be pertinent to
the decision, or it would not have been included.
Moreover, the meanings of the k. and the w. used in the
weighted additive value model are the same, that is,
the relative value of raising each to x^*, with
x-r held at x?*. Thus as these x.* to x.* scales are ii* i* l
known to exist with certainty, the technique to derive 
them could more easily be to simply set Cl to 1 and 
C2 to 0 and use rating to set each C3 a k. value within 
this range.
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If rating is used in this way to find the 
weights k., /the information required for the multiplicative 
model is almost the same as that for the additive model. 
Utility functions, weights (k^ in the multiplicative 
model, w. in the additive), and utility and Debreu- 
independence are all found similarly. One advantage 
of the multiplicative model in these circumstances 
is that the sum of the weights equalling one is the 
test for Fishburn-independence rather than the more 
difficult lottery questions used to test for Fishburn- 
independence in the additive model. Another advantage of 
the multiplicative model is that it does not require 
Fishburn-independence. On the other hand, the additive 
model has two advantages. The first is that the weights 
do not have to be assessed relative to C2 as the upper 
limit of unity, and thus their derivation does not 
require a consideration of all dimensions raised to their 
most desirable levels simultaneously. (This is 
because only the values of the w^s are used directly in 
the additive model, not the value of C2,and setting the 
w^ of the most desired dimension to unity and scaling 
other w^s relative to it produces the same rank ordering 
of consequences as setting C2 to unity and scaling the 
w.s relative to it.) The second advantage of the additive 
model over the multiplicative model is that it is 
intuitively understandable by most decision makers.
Weighing the advantages ofeach of the two models is a 
matter for the decision maker and the analyst. Perhaps
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the acceptability of the additive model outweighs the 
advantages of the multiplicative model, especially as 
the results of the two are extremely closely correlated, 
even when there is no Fishburn-independence. Chapter 11 
discusses this correlation in detail.
In short, the multiplicative model might be a 
useful model for the analyst to know and use, although 
it is more difficult for a decision maker to understand.
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9. THE QUASI-ADDITIVE AND OTHER UTILITY MODELS
There are two quasi-additive utility models, 
both developed by Keeney before his multiplicative model.
One assumes utility independence in all dimensions, and 
the other does not. Proofs of the quasi-additive 
models are relatively simple (109; 111), depending 
on the property of a utility function of being unique 
up to a positive linear transformation, which allows 
utility functions to be scaled one on another. Proofs 
of theother models are complex, and these models will 
be discussed briefly after the quasi-additive models.
9.1 Utility Independence
The first quasi-additive model requires only 
that dimensions be utility independent. Diccussion of 
the two-dimensional model will precede that for more 
dimensions. The model is (178)
u(y,z) k1.u(y) + k2.u(z) + (1 - kj - k2) .u(y) ,u(z) (9.1)
where k^and k2 are constants and u(y) and u(z) are 
utilities of an alternative on dimensions y and z. The 
utilities are found as usual, with tests for utility 
independence being carried out while they are being 
derived. Finding the constants uses the ELCE method 
(108). After the utility functions have been found, 
find which of y* or z* is most preferred. Say y* is 
most preferred. Then a value ? of y is found such that
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uCy1) a; u(z*). Thus k^.u(y^) = k2, because u(z*) = k2
by definition. From the utility function, the value 
uCy1) can be found, and hence k^ (or k2) can be expressed 
in terms of the other constant. Then a certainty 
equivalent is found, u(y, z) ^ a 50/50 lottery at 
(y*,z*) and (y*, z*). This certainty equivalent has 
a utility value of 0.5, and so setting this on the left 
hand side of (9.1) with y and z equal to y and z*, and 
solving, provides a value of k1 (or k2). Then the other 
constant can be found from their known relationship.
Using these constants, u(x,y) can be found for any 
alternative. Note that if (1 - - k2) = 0, the
additive model applies.
It should be clear that this method of finding 
constants is more complicated than that which could be 
used to find weights in the additive and multiplicative 
models, that is, rating the values of raising y* to y* 
and z* to z*. The multiplicative model could be used, 
in place of this quasi-additive model, for when there are 
only two dimensions there is no need to test for Debreu- 
independence, which is an additional condition for the 
multiplicative model but which is not relevant in two- 
dimensional decisions. Note that when the multiplicative 
weights kj and k2 sum to unity the additive model applies. 
This is the same condition as-that for the quasi­
additive model, which indicates that the quasi-additive 
and multiplicative weights k. and k2 are similar, despite 
their different derivations.
-109-
Procedures are more complex when there are 
n > 3 dimensions (111). Again, utility functions for 
each attribute are found. However, in addition, 2 
scaling constants are necessary, and finding these is 
tedious. These scaling constants range from
u(xx*, x2*, ..., xn*) = 1 to
u » x2* » • • • » ^ - ®
These constants rate the utility of hypothetical 
consequences containing each possible combination of 
x^* and x.*, i = 1, 2,},n. Raiffa (178) gives one 
probabilistic method of determining these constants, 
but the method is tedious. Apparently the model has 
only been used once, but then it was used in a 3- 
dimensional problem under certainty where simple magnitude 
estimation procedures were used to find weights and the 
value functions (225).
9.2 Utility Dependence
The question now arises - what if utility 
independence does not exist? Keeney (109) has developed 
models forthis situation, but they are complicated, 
so the first thing to do might be to attempt to transform 
the dependent attributes into one that is independent. 
There are two ways of doing t;his (2). The first, the 
a priori way, finds a new x^ by analysis. An example 
occurs when the problem is minimizing costs at a counter 
(x^) while minimizing the waiting time of customers at 
the counter (x2). Here, waiting time itself can be
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expressed as a cost (from lost sales, ill will). The 
objective transformation, then, is the cost to avoid 
the delay. A similar transformation would be to 
transform intensity and frequency into the one attribute 
of loudness. The second method of transformation is a 
posteriori. Here the efficiency curve, or the curve of 
most efficient transformation of x- into X2, or vice 
versa, is drawn, and the decision maker is then asked 
his utility for these combinations. Some ingenuity here 
will pay dividends in simpler decision analysis.
But if mutual utility independence is still not 
attainable, then a modified version of the quasi­
additive model is applicable. Keeney has developed this 
only for n = 2 or 3 dimension problems, but utility 
dependence will probably only apply for 2 or 3 dimensions. 
Strictly speaking, the model applies only when n - 1 
dimensions are utility dependent of the others, but the 
model should be a good approximation when all dimensions 
are utility dependent, because the model gives five 
degrees of freedom, more than previous models (109}.
For the 2 dimension case, with z utility 
indepent of y, but not vice versa, then
(9.2) u(y1z) = (l.u(y| z°).(l-u(z|y°) ) + k2.u(y|z1)u(z y°)
where u(y/z°), for instance, means the utility of the value 
of y conditional on z held constant at z° while the 
utility function is being elicited. Thus for 2 attributes, 
three conditional utility functions are required, each 
scaled from 0 to 1:
y/z°, y/zlf z/yo
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In the application of the model, the utility function on 
the utility independent attribute, u(z/y ), is set to a 
standard scale of 0 to 1; however, weights, and ^2 
are required to scale the other utility functions to 
this one. To do this, Keeney suggests that the analyst 
first find consequences (y°,z*) ^ (y*,z°). Thus z* to 
z on the z/y° utility scale equals yQ to y* on the 
utility scale, so k- = u(y | z°)/u(z^|y°) as both scales 
have a zero origin. Then find consequences (y°,z^)^
(y ,z ) , and then \^2 - u(y*| z^)/u(z^| y°), similarly.
Alternatively, and more simply, one could use the 
methods suggested in Chapter 4 to find weights for 
(y*|z*), (y*|z*) and (z*|y*), with a base of y*,z*)
The 3 dimension problem with utility dependence 
is similar in spirit, but requires six conditional 
utility functions and five weights for them which would 
be.difficult to elicit. The full model is in (109), 
where Keeney also describes how indifference (or iso­
preference) curves can be used. However, the derivation 
of indifference curves requires the decision maker to 
vary two attributes at once, while assessing his 
preference for consequences containing them, and so are 
probably as difficult to elicit as conditional utility 
functions, even though questions involving lotteries 
are not involved. This was confirmed with university 
administrators (166) .
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9.3 Other Utility Models
There are other utility models, but there have 
been no atemmpts to apply them. They are developments 
in the theory of utility which are mentioned here 
solely for completeness.
The concept of generalized utility independence 
(67; 70) arose to account for cases of value dependence 
using the terms of this thesis. It is a generalisation 
of quasi-additivity. It in effect allows for a 
transformation of the value dependent dimension so that, 
for example if x. is generalized utility independent of 
x2,
u(x) = u(x1) + u(x2) . f(x1) (9.3)
It can be shown that either an additive or multiplicative 
model can be used if certain generalized utility 
independence conditions and some "essentiality" require­
ments hold for x.. The models require 2n constants to 
be evaluated as the utilities ofLextreme alternatives 
plus two conditional utility functions for each affected 
dimension, which would certainty be tedious and difficult. 
An analyst would be advised to attempt the corrections for 
value dependence outlined in the previous Section before 
attempting this model.
Bilateral independence (68) is an attempt to 
allow for utility dependence on both dimensions rather than 
in the quasi-additive model (9.2) above.just one as
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The model requires two conditional utility functions 
for each dimensions, and a symmetrical attitude to risk 
in each dimension involved. Again, application would be 
even more difficult than the quasi-additive model (9.2).
The most general development of utility theory 
is Farquhar's fractional independence scheme (58; 59). 
Using the mathematical concept of fractional hypercubes, 
he has developed decompositions that include all models 
discussed so far, and which can, moreover, allow for 
more and different dependence conditions on each 
dimension. The "fractional hypercube methodology uses an 
extraordinary amount of special notation and terminology" 
(59, p.257) and is primarily developed for interaction 
terms between and among dimensions and requires 
conditional two dimensional utility functions, in 
addition to the conditional one dimensional utility 
functions required in previous models. As the theme of 
this thesis is that, in practice, these interaction 
terms are unimporannt, there seems little point in 
hacking a path into the lush mathematical jungle of 
fractional hypercubes. No attempt has been made to apply 
the fractional hypercube models that extend beyond the 
quasi-additive models.
Fishburn (68) has attempted to approximate 
situations with complex interactions among dimensions 
with a mixed additive-multiplicative model requiring 
only conditional one dimensional utility functions.
Using mathematical approximation theory and making
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the assumption of multivariate risk aversion on all 
pairs of dimensions, he shows that a simple additive 
utility model can be a good approximation providing 
A is small, where
A = {u(y*, z*) + u(y*, z*)> -
{u(y*, z*) + u(y*, z*)} (9.4)
This appears to be another way of saying that the additive 
utility model is adequate if multivariate risk aversion 
is small, for (9.3) is merely the difference between 
the utility for the two gambles in the test for Fishburn- 
independence, and is zero if independence exists.
However, if the (difficult) bilateral independence model 
is used, the model is a close fit no matter the degree 
of multivariate risk aversion. This is to be expected, 
as the bilateral independence model even has one more 
degree of freedom than the quasi-additive model assuming 
utility dependence of one dimension (9.2).
9.4 The Treatment of Time
Most investment decisions involve a time sequence 
of outcomes. In private investment decisions, this 
means discounting in one or another its various 
forms must be used. But public investment decisions have 
time effects that are more complex because non-financial 
attributes are involved which are difficult to discount 
(if only because there is no marekt cost of capital to 
assist in establishing a discount rate); because
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horizons are infinite or more difficult to forecast 
than the life of a product or a mine, say; because 
valuations of a level of a dimension may depend on that 
dimension's Jevel in the past or future; and because 
valuations of a level of a dimension may depend on the 
level of another dimension in the past, present or future. 
For all these reasons, it is appropriate to consider 
the treatment of time here.
The time sequence of outcomes can be handled by 
treating each outcome as a dimension. When each 
outcome or dimension, x , is known with certainty, then 
Meyer (149) has shown that, if each xt is value independent 
"of x.+1, then either the additive or multiplicative 
value model is appropriate. The additive model is 
appropriate if Debreu-independence of each (xt, *t+1) 
pair exists, as noted in (149)e Koopmans has shown that 
the additive model is appropriate if just x^ and x2 
are Debreu-independent and value independent of each 
other, and a stationarity assumption exists so that 
two time streams are ordered similarly if the x.^ of 
each stream are removed and the remaining outcomes
advanced one period.
In decisions involving uncertainty, the
additive or multiplicative utility models can be used 
if each xt is utility independent of xt-1, t = 2, 3,..n, 
and x j, is utility independent of xn with Fishburn-
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independence existing for any two xts permitting the 
additive model (149).
Now it could be argued that utility independence 
for each outcomes on the same dimension is not likely 
in decision situations involving time. For example, 
the utility for a high level of unemployment will 
depend on whether there was a high level of unemployment 
the year before. One way of evading the complexity 
involved when such utility dependence exists is to 
recast the outcomes. For instance, the time period 
could be extended from one year to five years say, when 
the interdependencies between years could be averaged 
out.
If this recasting of outcomes to produce utility 
independence is not possible, there are several 
approaches available. Meyer (151) provides one.
Rather than each outcome xt being utility independent,
if it can be shown that each subset of dimensions
{xj, .... xt> is utility independent of {xt+1, ... xn>,
, vice versa, then either
nu(x) = tE1 at.u(xt), at > 0 (9.5)
n
or u(x) = t21(bt + ct.u(xt) )
Testing for the assumptions for these would be tiresome, 
as each subset must be considered. Moreover, if utility
and
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independence for each x^ did not exist, it is unlikely 
to exist for all subsets.
Fishburn (63) produced a model that did allow 
for some interdependency between attributes in 
neighbouring periods, by using an assumption called 
Markovian dependence to produce the model
u(x) | t^1 u(x| xt+1) - tf2 u(xt+1) (9.6)
The utility functions are conditional on all other 
dimensions being held at a set level. Markovian 
dependence demands that the decision maker is indifferent 
between sets of uncertain time streams if and only if 
the probabilities of each set of streams are the same. An 
example is given in (15, p.24). Unfortunately,
Markovian dependence was "not felt to be sufficiently 
intuitively meaningful to be used" (14, p.3) in the only 
decision analysis for which it has been considered, 
which considering its complexity is not surprising.
Notice that Fishburn required a two "dimensional" 
(i.e. consequences at different times) utility function 
in model (9.6), whereas Meyer required only the usual 
one dimensional utility functions. Bell also requires 
two-dimensional utility functions in his more generalised 
model. Bell (14; 15) uses the concept of mutually 
conditional utility independence. For a three dimensional 
situation (each dimension could be a set of outcomes at 
different times), Xj and X2 are mutually conditionally 
utility independent if each is utility independent of the
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other, given that is at a fixed level. If each 
subset , .. /,3L_i is mutually conditionally utility 
independent of Xi+i» ••• xn » and vice versa, and 
n > 4, then
n-1 n-1
u(x) = tl’1 u(xt, xt+1) - tS2 Cxt) (9.7)
n-1 n-1
or u(x) « tf1 (8 + n(xt, xt+1) )/tjg2
(B* li(xt|xt+1°) ) - 6
where 8 is a constant and all two dimensional utility 
functions are conditional on a fixed level of all the 
other dimensions.
In a detailed application of MDA involving 
time, Bell (15) did use this model for two of the four 
decision dimensions involved, with, furthermore, two 
of the decision dimensions being mixed in the time 
dimensions, so that, for instance, the two dimensional 
utility function was of the form u(yt, z..) and the one 
dimensional function was (ztlz?+i)* Despite this 
complexity, the decision analysis did provide usable 
utilities although it has not been used in an actual 
decision. Bell (15, pp.43-44) is open minded about 
whether the complex utility model would provide better 
management policies than a simple additive model. But
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he is convinced that the MDA approach which involves 
some consideration of utility independence concepts 
is a useful one.
One argument against the complexity of 
Bell's model is that the time and effort expended on 
it may mean that consideration is not given the problem 
of the decision horizon (simply assumed to be 50 years 
in Bell's application), Meyer (149) considers the 
situations where the horizon is variable or uncertain, 
and his approach requires joint utilities for an uncertain 
stream of consequences and uncertain horizons. Models 
can be built up depending on the dependencies between these.
There is much other complexity in all decision 
analysis involving time. For instance, there is the 
large amount of uncertainty involved, and analysts must 
consider all the other factors which may be involved 
and their uncertainty. As well (149X the rate of 
resolution of this uncertainty about other factors will 
affect the period of uncertainty about the project, so 
that utility functions will include utility for risk and 
attitude to risk, which in principle it should not.
Finally, making each year's outcome a dimension can make 
a MDA extremely cumbersome, e.g., if there are just 
four decisian dimensions and 20 years of outcomes for 
each, the MDA involves 4 x 20. = 80 "dimensions", and 
if there several alternatives involved, eliciting the 
subjective probability distributions will also be a 
daunting task. The obvious conclusion, then, is that
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some simplifying assumptions in the data used in the 
model will be necessary, suggesting that the model 
should be a simple and robust one and not the more 
complex ones mentioned in this section.
9.5 Conclusion
Several non-additive and non-multiplicative 
models have been reviewed in this chapter. The quasi­
additive model with utility independence was found to 
be similar to the multiplicative model, and its constants 
were more difficult to elicit than those in the multi­
plicative model, especially when n > 2. The other models 
discussed were developed for situations when utility or 
value independence did not exist, and require more 
information to be elicited from the decision maker 
than for models based on utility or value independence. 
These other models have rarely been used. The quasi­
additive model with utility dependence on one dimension 
has been used (in two dimensional decisions only (90;
108) ) but as Chapter 12 will demonstrate, the additive 
model may have been adequate. The more advanced models 
have not been used, and the difficulty of eliciting the 
information required may see them remain so.
All these comments also apply to the complex models 
developed to MDA under uncertainty involving time sequences 
of outcomes. Hence the more advanced models will 
not be considered further in this thesis.
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10. THE R(V) MODEL
10.1 The Basic Model
It can be shown (67; 178) that if v(x) and 
u(x) exist, then a monotonic transform R exists such 
that u(x) = R(v(x)). That is, if alternatives are 
evaluated using value functions, then the resulting 
evaluations can be transformed into utility- 
evaluations that can be used in decision making under 
certainty. This is the basis of the R(V) model, 
developed by Raiffa (178) , which might be used if the 
utility independence assumptions of other utility models 
in previous chapters do not apply.
The model first requires v(x) for each alternative 
x. This can be found by the benchmark model or by the 
additive model. If the benchmark model is used, then 
each alternative will have been evaluated on a varying 
standard dimension, v(x^), with other dimensions held 
constant*at a benchmark level. Then R can be obtained 
by finding a utility function for the values on the one 
standard dimension, using either the BRLT or ELCE method. 
That is, R is a transformation that captures non-linearities 
between value and utility functions due to utility depend­
ence. This is shown in Figure 10.1, 
formed to v(x^), and then to u(x-).
x- is trans-where
-121A-
Figure 10.1: Elements of the R(V) Model
O
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If, because of its generality and ease of 
application, the additive value model is used to find 
v(x^) for each dimension of each alternative, finding 
R can be a little more difficult, for the utility function 
is derived from not one standard dimension, , but from 
a multidimensional valuation. First, the most preferred 
and least preferred values of the multidimensional 
alternatives are set at the limits, that is, v(x*) = 
u(x*) = 1 and v(xk) = u(x*) = 0. Then, using the BRLT 
or ELCE method, the utilities of some intermediate 
holistic alternatives are derived. Deriving this 
utility function will be the only occasion for the 
probabilistic questions strictly required for utility 
functions in the decision. Other utility models 
require these utility functions for each dimension, with 
n(= the number of dimensions) times the number of lottery 
questions as a consequence, and they also require a 
multidimensional holistic utility function for the 
k. * s in Keeney's models.
Once the utility function for the v(x)s have 
been obtained, it is possible to find the expected 
utility of each alternative under uncertainty:
m m
E(u(x)) = pj.u(Xj) = j2xPj.R(Uj) (10.1)
where Pj refers to the probability that the jth outcome will 
occur. Note that the R(V) model is thus apparently 
limited to probabilistically dependent situations.
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The advantages of the R(V) model are analogous 
to those of the benchmark model in MDA under certainty.
It makes no assumptions about utility independent 
dimensions, because utility functions are derived with 
other dimensions held constant (if the benchmark model 
is used to find the v(x)s), or over the whole set of 
dimensions in the decision (if the additive value model 
is used to find the v(x)s). Nor does the R(V) model 
assume any of the other independencies of other utility 
models.
However, it does have disadvantages. The 
tediousness of the benchmark model in finding the 
v(x)s has already been mentioned (Section 4.2) If 
the additive value model is used, deriving the utility 
function requires answers to lotteries involving 
multidimensional alternatives. And the difficulty 
of assessing the joint probability dimensions required 
for equation (10.1) has been noted. Nevertheless, 
the R(V) model does offer a solution to decision 
analysis when utility independence does not exist which 
would be more easy to use than the quasi-additive 
utility model.
10.2 Implications Arising from the R(V) Model
The R(V) model (10.1) which links utility and 
value functions has some implications for decision 
situations in which utility and probabilistic independence 
exist , as well as for those discussed in the previous 
section in which they do not. These implications will
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be discussed for the additive utility model first, 
and then for the multiplicative utility model.
Chapter 7 noted that, because Fishburn- 
independence of utilities implies Debreu-independence 
of values, the additive utility model can legitimately 
use value functions in place of the more difficult to 
elicit utility functions. That is, in this situation 
the same result is obtained from a decision analysis 
using value functions as is obtained from a decision 
analysis using utility functions. This means that the 
R transform is linear, and hence there is no need to 
try to elicit it. It also means that the additive 
value model is usable with probabilistic independence, 
so that
u(x) = ZE(w..v(xA)) -—" (10.2)
and the R(V) model, with R being linear in this 
situation, is not limited to probabilistic dependence, 
as (10.1) is, if Fishburn-independence exists.
Now, actually value functions found by rating 
and utility functions found by lottery questions are not 
dissimilar. Fischer (62) found that results from 
multidimensional utility functions under certainty correlated 
highly with results of multidimensional value functions - 
product-moment correlation coefficients were in the mid 
to high 0.90s - indicating that the two functions are 
quite similar. In a unidimensional decision analysis
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with doctors (78), there was ’'good correspondence”
(165, p.36) between their utility and value functions.
The only other test of similarity between the two 
functions (13) was somewhat unsatisfactory because 
two-thirds of the subjects who gave value functions 
did not provide consistent utility functions when 
answering lottery questions - a not insignificant finding 
in itself as regards applicability of utility functions. 
This similarity of the two functions should not be 
surprising when one considers both the research outlined 
in Sections 4.5 and 4.6 which Eckenrode summarises 
in his finding that "data on judgments are unaffected 
by the method used to collect them” (50, p.189) and the 
research outlined in Sections 3.3 and 6.1 which shows 
that answers to probabilistic questions are not precise 
measures of attitudes to uncertainty. Indeed, Tversky 
(229) shows how risk aversion can switch to risk 
preference over a part of the utility function if the 
type of questions are changed. Bearing in mind this 
imprecision inherent in functions derived from 
probabilistic, lottery-type, questioning there is no 
evidence that value functions cannot be used instead of 
utility functions in MDA under uncertainty.
This similarity of utility and value functions 
has implications for the use Pf the R(V) model (10.1) 
when a multiplicative utility model is strictly 
appropriate because, although utility independence exists, 
Fishburn-independence does not exist. The additive value 
model can be used as before in the R(V) model, but there
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is no need to use lottery questions to elicit the 
utility function and the transform R, for the simple 
rating used for value functions will be sufficient 
as it gives approximately the same answer. In brief,
(10.1) is usable for all utility dependence or independence 
situations under probabilistic dependence and does not 
require lottery questions.
It would be helpful if the previous discussion 
had implications for utility independence without 
Fishburn-independence (i.e. the multiplicative model
(8.1) ) under the more usual situation of probabilistic 
independence. And in fact it appears to do so. The 
u(x^) in the multiplicative model (8.1) refer to the 
expected utility of an alternative on each dimension 
under probabilistic independence. Now, if value and 
utility functions are similar, the model could refer 
to the expected value of an alternative on each 
dimension . That is, more easily-elicited value 
functions could be used in place of utility functions 
right at the start of a decision anlaysis, even if 
probabilistic independence exists. It has already 
been noted in Chapter 8 that the constants in the 
multiplicative model (8.1) can quite legitimately
be found using a value function also. So there is 
no need to use lottery questions at all for the multi­
plicative model with probabilistic independence !
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But the similarity of utility and value functionsH 
together with the R(V) model, has an even more important 
implication. Instead of using the multiplicative model 
with probabilistic independence, why not use the additive 
value model with a R transform? This R transform 
derived from holistic, multidimensional, questions 
will capture the non-additive interactions between 
dimensions as well as utility dependencies. That is, 
the probabilistic independence additive model (10.2) 
becomes the more general model
u(x) - R( E(wi.v(x£))) (10.3)
10.3 Conclusion
In conclusion the R(V) model appears to be a 
very general one. Not only does it offer a simple 
method of analysis whenever utility and probabilistic 
dependence exists but together with the observed 
similarity of elicited utility and value functions, it 
provides a mechanism for MDA under uncertainty in 
conditions of utility and probabilistic independence, 
that does not require utility functions.
A diagram summarizes this discussion of the 
R(V) model succintly.
\ Probabilistic Dependence ProbabilisticIndependence
Utility dependence (10.1) (10.3)
Utility independence 
with Fishburn- 
independence
(10.1) (10.3)
Utility independence 
with Fishburn- 
independence
(10.1) with
R linear
(10.2)
Figure 10.2: R(V) Models
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11. CORRELATIONS BETWEEN UTILITY MODELS
The high correlation between the additive 
value model and other value models has been noted.
Whether the additive utility model correlates as well 
with ether models has not been investigated as 
thoroughly; indeed, the data is sparse.
von Winterfeldt (215) studied students’ utilities 
for apartments measured on 14 dimensions. The mean 
correlation between holistic preferences and the results 
of an additive utility model was 0.84, which is high 
considering the large number of dimensions and the fact 
that tests showed that although Debreu-independence 
existed, Fishburn-independence did not (216). The 
only other test of the additive utility model is by 
Fischer (62). In the first of two experiments, he 
tested five students’ holistic preferences with 
additive, value and utility models for choices among 
hypothetical three dimensional cars, and for choices 
among hypothetical nine dimensional cars, each with 
probabilistic dependence. In this experiment, Fischer 
found that the additive value and the additive utility 
models correlated in the mid to high 0.90s, but that the 
additive value model correlated a little better with 
holistic value judgments than did the additive utility 
model with holistic utility judgments. This suggested 
that Fishburn-independence may be an important assumption 
affecting the additive utility model's applicability. So
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in a second experiment with ten students, Fischer tested 
correlations between utility holistic judgments, the 
additive utility model and the R(V) model (which does 
not assume Fishburn-independence) for a choice among 
hypothetical three dimensional jobs under uncertainty with 
probabilistic dependence. An analysis of variance 
showed that, despite significant interaction between the 
dimensions, interactions in the utility holistic choices 
were only 1.2% of the sums of squares, and so it is 
not surprising that the R(V) and additive utility models 
produced identical product-moment correlation coefficients 
of 0.925 with the holistic judgments, and that the two 
models themselves had a product-moment correlation 
coefficient of 0.95, and produced almost similar 
absolute interval-scale deviations from the holistic 
judgments - revealing "that the degree of prediction 
afforded by (all) the decomposition models was about 
as high as possible given the degree of reliability 
inherent in the holistic utility^judgments" (62, p.80).
In the case study of a non-hypothetical decision 
to be described in the next chapter, the results of the 
additive utility and the multiplicative utility models 
had a product-moment correlation coefficient of 0.96, 
again quite high, even though the k.s in the multiplicative 
model did not sum to one, whibh indicates Fishburn- 
independence did not exist.
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No other studies of multidimensional utility 
models appear to be available. However, Keeney has 
found the constants for a six dimensional multiplicative 
model and for three separate two dimensional quasi­
additive utility models. These were derived from 
actual decision makers or those close to them in their 
area of expertise and experience, although hypothetical 
decisions were the basis of the quasi-additive models.
By making some assumptions, the constants can be used to 
indicate whether an additive model could have been used 
instead of the multiplicative and quasi-additive models 
which were used because Fishburn independence was shown 
not to exist. Assume that there is probabilistic 
independence, so that expected utility can be used in 
all the models (178). Then using possible combinations of 
E(u(x^)}, for i = 1 to 6, or i = 1 and 2, as they vary 
in equalintervals from 0 to 1, one can find the total 
utility for all these possible outcomes, using the values 
of k^s given in (106, p.119 and 130-131) and (113, p.113). 
The product-moment correlation coefficient between results 
of the multiplicative model and of the additive model 
was a high 0.98, which was also the coefficient for the 
additive and the two quasi-additive models in which 
utility independence applied.
One cannot apply this- procedure to a fourth case, 
a quasi-additive model with utility dependence, given in 
(199) because of the dependence between the utility
r
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functions on the dependent variable, and hence between the 
expected utilities, However, if combinations of values 
of x and y, each from 0 to 1, are inserted into the 
full quasi-additive model, and into two separate 
additive models each using one of the two dependent 
variable utility functions, the results are interesting.
If the interval scale correlations are close, then 
expected utilities of uncertain consequences will also 
be close, which would indicate that the second conditionally 
dependent utility function for the quasi additive model 
is unnecessary, and that an additive model would suffice. 
When the linear dependent function is used in the additive 
model, the Pearson coefficient for results from the 
quasi-additive and the additive models is 0.98. When 
the non-linear dependent function is used, the coefficient 
is somewhat lower at 0.87.
xJThis scattered evidence suggests two conclusions. 
First, if utility independence exists, then the additive 
utility model correlates highly with other models, 
expecially if probabilistic independence exists. Second, 
the additive utility model provides answers that will 
be almost as acceptable (because they agree with holistic 
judgments) as the additive value model under certainty. 
Unfortunately, there is no method of assessing whether the 
additive utility model is as 'accurate as the additive 
value model was found to be in Section 4.4, because there 
is no method of assessing what the result of the model 
should have been by later information, as in GPA's under 
certainty for example, for utility analysis does not 
produce the correct decision under uncertainty, but 
merely the wise one.
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Why do the utility models produce results which 
are so similar? The first explanation would be that the 
interaction terms are so insignificant. And this would 
be reinforced by a second explanation, which is based on 
the fact that Debreu-independence is the certainty 
analogue of Fishburn-independence. As Debreu-independence 
is unimportant in decisions under certainty and thus 
permits the additive value model to be so general, one 
would also suspect that Fishburn-independence is,
(although the relationship is not a necessary one, even 
though the reverse relationship is). For expected utilities 
on each dimension used with probabilistic independence 
are certainty equivalents and so it is little wonder that 
the additive utility model correlates so highly with 
other models under probabilistic independence. Models 
are then, in effect, models under certainty and Debreu- 
independence has been shown not to be a constraint to 
the applicability of the additive value model in this 
situation. However, this explanation does not apply 
to probabilistic dependence, for then there are no 
expected utilities on each dimension which are certainty 
equivalents. Hence the reason for the robustness of 
the additive model with probabilistic dependence is not 
known.
The implication of this evidence is that the 
additive utility model appears to be almost as good as 
any other with utility independence, and that if this is 
so, Fishburn-independence can usually be assumed and so
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the simple additive value model using simply-elicited 
value functions can be used under uncertainty just as 
well as under certainty. The full implications of this 
finding depend on the aims of a decision analysis and 
will be elaborated on in Chapter 13.
However, three reservations are pertinent.
First, the above sample of applications of multidimensional 
utility models is a small one. Second, the boundaries 
of the conditions under which the model similarities 
occur are not known, nor are the reasons for the 
similarities. Third, some decisionmakers may require 
a model to be a precise representation of reality, which 
should include interactions, however unimportant.
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12. APPLICATIONS OF MULTIDIMENSIONAL UTILITY THEORY
Huber (99) has given a thorough review of field
and field-like applications of MDA under certainty, with
results that have been summarized in Chapter 4.
Jackson (101) has reviewed agricultural and non-agricultural
applications of unidimensional utility theory used
under uncertainty. He found that in only a few cases
had MDA under uncertainty been actually used in real
decisions and then a linear utility function was usually
assumed. A few other examples of utility theory had
used real world data, but the examples had not been
used in helping to make a decision. The important
findings from the few real-world applications were that,
although utility functions can be elicited, even for
groups (29; 195 especially), there is concern about
utility functions on both practical (128) and theoretical
grounds (100); that satisfactory probability data is
sometimes difficult to obtain (23); and that a great
difficulty is convincing managers to use decision
analysis, (20; 23) especially sophisticated models (27).
After his survey of U.S. firms that actually used
or trained in decision analysis found no drastic change
in general decision making procedures and only occasional
changes in individual decisions, Brown (20, p.88)
concluded: [
"My own feeling is that (decision analysis's) 
contribution to the quality of decision making 
often seems to come more from forcing meaningful 
structure on informal reasoning than from 
supplementing it by formal analysis. "
-135-
A1though it is rarely mentioned (one exception is 
(79)), one other reason why unidimensional decision 
analysis under uncertainty is difficult to have adopted 
is that most decision problems are multidimensional.
However, there is very little application of 
multi-dimensional decision analysis under uncertainty in real 
world situations either. Fischer's and von Winterfeldt*s 
experiments with students have been mentioned, but a 
test of theory is its actual applicaton in a real world 
decision. The rest of this chapter will briefly 
review the few applications of MDA under uncertainty, and 
then present a case study of MDA under uncertainty 
used in a real public investment analysis.
Some field-like applications are due to Keeney 
(108; 115). He elicited quasi-additive utility 
functions for a realistic but hypothetical decision with 
each of four decision makers or those close to them in 
their field of expertise and experience. One was a 
telephone company executive, choosing among telephone 
installations; one was a chief nurse, choosing between 
blood bank levels; one was an oceanographer choosing
between surveys; and the fourth was a deputy chief of 
the New York Fire Department. Keeney found that two 
dimensional utility functions were elicitable for a 
decision maker with statistic? or other quantitative 
training or for one who compensated for a lack of this 
training with enthusiasm, but that the utility functions 
were somewhat unsatisfactory if the decision maker was 
uninterested.
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Moreover, for more than two dimensions, the 
BRLT method of eliciting utility functions and k^s for 
quasi-additive models was too time consuming and too 
complex (115, p.221), at least without an interactive 
computer program.
Keeney and others have continued these 
exploratory, field-like studies at IIASA e.g. (17;
120; 123; 124; 125). These have involved both utility 
functions and probability distributions (usually obtained 
from a simulation model) for various multidimensional 
decisions (using proxy decision makers) involving, for 
example, spruce budworm, energy policy, salmon fishing. 
And an interactive computer program (207) has been 
developed to assist in MDA. However, these studies 
have not been intended to assist an actual decision 
maker but rather to show how MDA could be used.
(Another such example is (38).) Nevertheless, the 
research is valuable for its concern with the continuing 
complications of impacts over time and of differing, 
multiple, decision makers.
An almost real world application of MDA under 
uncertainty (45; 46) dealt with choosing between 
various educational curriculums, with the stochastic 
results of these being measured on 41 dimensions which 
were results in various tests!. Because school principals 
found lottery questions meaningless, thus making utility 
functions out of the question, value functions were found 
by the "direct ordered metric" method of 
Fishburn (65), which entailed answering 50 questions
for each of the 41 dimensions - this was used because the 
principals had doubts about their ability to use rating
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and magnitude estimation. If they had realized they 
were going to have to answer 50 x 41 = 2050 questions 
about two differences between test percentile scores 
as an alternative, they might have chosen rating; 
indeed, there were complaints of "over-sophistication’1.
A linear programming formulation was used to derive a 
group utility function from the results of the "direct 
ordered metric" questionnaires. Ranking and rating was 
used to find weights (which were not problem- 
dependent however) although how group weights were 
derived is not obvious. An additive model was used, 
with subjective probability distributions which were 
assessed with a method essentially similar to the 
histogram method. Although no tests for Fishburn- 
or Debreu-independence were made (or for utility or value 
independence), the results have met with "generally 
favourable" reactions from school principals, and the model 
has been published and distributed to many of them as 
a "guide" to decision making, to be verified by 
intuition.
Another application of MDA under uncertainty 
involved the timing and siting of a second airport at 
Mexico City (this has been discussed briefly in Chapter 
3) (113; 159). Utility functions for the six dimensions 
were derived using the ELCE method, and subjective 
probability distributions were derived by a direct 
method assuming a continuous distribution. These were 
elicited in committee meetings with the Director of 
Airports and his staff, where views converged on a single
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answer quite quickly. Complete testing for utility 
independence and Debreu-independence gave positive 
results, and so the multiplicative model using k. 
found with probabilistic questions was employed to 
"indicate effective strategies" out of 100 possible 
alternatives. Sensitivity testing showed that modal point 
estimates rather than complete probability distributions 
of the dimensions would not have altered the results.
This suggests an additive value model may have been 
adequate with the modal points as certainties, but 
the decision makers wanted full distributions to be 
included.
This would appear to have been a classic, 
thorough, multidimensional decision analysis, the 
success of which would indicate no requirement for 
simplification or approximation. However, some 
approximations were made: three points in time 
represented the thirty years time span in the decision, 
no discounting was done, and probabilistic independence 
was assumed even though it was admitted to be an 
over-simplification. Moreover, the actual decision 
involved dimensions not included in the multiplicative 
model, such as externalities, political effectiveness and 
flexibility! In the final recommendation to the 
Mexican President, these dimensions were handled by 
simply ranking alternatives on them (which assumes 
certainty equivalents - see Chapter 15) and using 
dominance to arrive at three final alternatives to choose 
from. Nevertheless, the results of the complete decision
-139-
analysis had a profound effect on the direction of the 
Departmental advice to the President, and "it would 
appear, from all the evidence that the participants 
were able to assemble, that the essential recommendations 
of the study were followed." (116, p.367)
Another real-world application of MDA under 
uncertainty involved the chief executive of a mining 
company deciding whether and how to bid for rights to 
extensive ore deposits and how to extend production 
capacity (90). The two dimensions used were NPV and 
production capacity and a quasi-additive utility function 
was used. Lottery-type questions were successfully 
used to elicit probabilities and utilities, and the 
utility independence requirement for the quasi-additive 
utility function was verified. The problem of 
probabilistic dependence of prices in succeeding time 
periods was evaded in a very rough fashion by eliciting 
unconditional distributions and then using one random 
number to sample from all the distributions. However, 
the decision maker "was satisfied that his views and 
values were properly represented and, hence, he had 
no conflict with accepting the optimal strategy"
(90, p.46). But it was fortunate that a third dimension, 
shortness of capital, which the decision maker thought 
of right at the completion of the analysis, did not 
affect the optimal strategy, or the whole complex analysis 
would have had to be repeated. It should be noted that
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the third term in the quasi-additive utility function 
which differentiates it from an additive function 
(90, p.44) had an extremely low value compared to the 
other two terms, suggesting that an additive model 
would have been adequate. Nevertheless, this was a 
successful application which had a direct influence on 
a decision.
Litchfield et al (137) claim MDA under 
uncertainty has been "useful" in an R and D environment 
and demonstrate using a hypothetical example. They 
have found that lottery-type questions are difficult 
to apply to elicit probabilities and utilities, and so 
use the visual impact method for probabilities and 
value ratings for utilities. They have found that 
utility independence (judged by their value ratings) 
does not always exist, yet an additive model is always 
adequate. Weights are found by a form of magnitude 
estimation. But despite their multidimensional utility 
function, they do not use expected utility as their 
criterion, as von Neumann-Morgenstein theory has 
demonstrated should be the one to use! They present the 
decision maker with complex patterns of the whole 
distribution of utility, without a completely satisfactory 
method of deriving the optimum alternative from these 
patterns having yet been developed. Nevertheless, as 
noted, the MDA has been useful.
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There appear to be no other published 
applications of MDA under uncertainty. Overall, these 
four real-world applications show that it can be used 
effectively in real-world situations, even when groups 
of people are the decision maker, that the simple 
models appear to be quite robust to possible violations 
of their assumptions, and that these violations or any 
approximations in the model construction do not make 
the application ineffective in their rather general 
aims of problem understanding rather than problem solving.
A Case Study
An application of MDA under uncertainty was 
carried out for a real decision as part of this thesis 
for three reasons. First, to give the writer first­
hand experience of the techniques. Second, to add 
another application to the very small sample of real- 
world applications. Third, to verify the strengths and 
weaknesses of MDA under uncertainty apparent from the 
earlier applications.
The decision maker was a comparatively "brainy" 
Lieutenant-Colonel in the Australian Army who was 
expected by others above and below him in rank to make a 
decision on the basic type of truck required for first- 
line transport support of aniarmy division even if the 
minor adjustments to his decision might be made in later 
reviews. A friend of the writer’s, he had some months 
previously said that the decision was an extraordinarily 
difficult one for him, because it depended on so many 
considerations (dimensions) about which he had very little 
data (uncertainty).
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The problem at this stage was not to decide on a 
particular make of truck, but rather to decide on the 
size and the mobility requirements of the truck, so that 
the field of investigation could be narrowed and prelimin­
ary position papers begun to be written. Previously, an 
expensive cost-effectiveness study had been conducted, with 
the officer considering its recommendations "contentious" 
because it used "hard" peace-time data when his requirement 
was for war-time, because some of the costs included were 
of questionable relevance and because it did not include 
other dimensions important to him. The cost-effectiveness 
study concluded that very small and medium vehicles were 
appropriate. In another study, ad hoc procedures linked 
with intuition indicated that the required truck was in 
the medium range.
The steps followed in the MBA: were those listed in 
Section 5.3. Firstly, in discussion with the analyst, the 
decision-maker said that the dimensions and the range of 
alternatives for the decision were those shown in Figure 12.1. 
The first dimension,cost per equivalent truck unit, was based 
on a 5 ton truck, with the number of other sized trucks to 
carry equivalent payload being based on the decision maker’s 
and some U.S. Army experience. Then (necessarily) subject­
ive probability distributions were found. Preliminary truck 
costs were extracted from a trade magazine and from a special­
ist staff officer; and repair, petrol, oil, lubricants, tyre 
and driver costs were obtained from aggregated Army historical
C
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records . The decision maker began by putting most likely, 
and upper and lower bounds on each of these components 
of cost, and then a distribution of cost for each 
vehicle was assessed using the visual impact method.
The next two dimensions of availability and 
mobility were also stochastic. As a basis for the 
decision makers subjective probability distributions, 
distributions for these were obtained from officers in 
several different Army Corps, as well as a public 
servant experienced in both military and civilian truck 
fleets. In the first two interviews, the analyst soon 
discovered that it was unwise to begin with a request 
for probability distributions, as the interviewee 
was not used to them, and considered them either 
completely unreliable or impossible to elicit.
, Figure 12.1 is an example of the form given to 
the later interviewees, with a request to simply tick 
the appropriate category for each type of truck. When 
this was done, the analyst would indicate a tick the 
position of which had taken some time to decide, and ask 
if the interviewee would like to spread his judgment 
over two categories in perhaps a 60/40 ratio. With this 
nudge, subjective probability distributions were soon 
filled in for as many types of truck as the interviewees 
felt knowledgeable about. It was found that the 
dimensions of mobility and availability had to be 
precisely defined, and that assessments in percentage 
form, rather than fractions or decimal figures, were 
the easiest. All interviewees felt happy with their
assessments and only one declined to make the percentages
sum to 100, but nearly all voluntarily emphasized that 
they were based on experience and may not apply in the 
future. The results of these interviews were given 
to the decision maker and he made final probability 
distributions based on them.
The other two criteria, cross-loading ability 
and troop-carrying capability, were known with virtual 
certainty for each type of truck by the decision maker, 
and value functions were elicited for them from the 
decision maker by asking him to rate them on a percentage 
scale.
The third step in the study was to find utility 
functions for each dimension. Utility functions for the sto­
chastic dimensions were derived using the BRLT method for the 
continuous cost scales and for the non-continuous mobility 
and availability scales. The ELCE method was, found to be in­
comprehensible by the decision maker. The value and utility 
functions are shown in Figure 12.3 and 12.4. Weights were 
found by rating the raising of each dimension from x.* to x**, 
and also by Keeney's probabilistic method of finding k^, with 
no important difference in results between the two methods.
The decision maker preferred the probabilistic method, be­
cause he said it made him consider all the dimensions in rela­
tion, although why the rating method did not do this is not 
known. By the time the k^s were elicited, the decision 
maker was used to answering probabilistic questions.
The fourth step of the MDA was to find the appropriate 
utility model. At this stage it became obvious why most pub­
lished applications of MDA have evaded the issue and adopted 
the additive model, for there was no time left for the compli­
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cated questioning required for a theoretically correct exam­
ination for utility and Debreu-independence. However, in 
discussion, the decison maker verified that in his opinion 
utility and Debrue-independence did exist, even though 
the strict tests for it were not possible.(As the decision 
maker would be using the model to make the decision, this 
could perhaps appear to be sufficient validity). For example, 
utility independence was verified by asking if his utility 
for the dimension of availability would change if the mobil­
ity of a truck changed. When the decision maker replied no, 
he was asked if his utility for availability would change if 
the costs per equivalent truck unit changed. Again the 
answer was no. The decision maker soon understood what 
was being discussed, and verified utility independence existed 
for each dimension from all other dimensions. A similar type 
of discussion verified the existence of Debreu-independence.
With utility and Debreu-independence verified it was 
possible to use the multiplicative model. The k.s added to 
0.64, implying non-additivity, and X was found by iteration 
to be 2.0. Results of the multiplicative model are shown in 
Figure 12.5 which indicate that a 5 ton truck is preferred to 
a 2h ton and a lh ton truck. (It might be noted that the 
R(V) model was not used because this wrriter had not fully 
realized the implications of the R(V) model (Section 10.2) 
when the case study was done).
The total analysis took about 10 hours of the decision 
maker's time and 2 to 3 weeks of the analyst's time. Even so, 
the analysis was somewhat rushed towards the end; for example, 
re-questioning of the decision maker about some utility func­
tions was necessary because they did not exhibit the risk-
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aversion one would expect. Much time was spent in recouch­
ing the analyst’s questions about hypothetical alternatives 
into realistic terms. For instance, chances of a truck 
having either very good availability or very bad availability 
were only credible if spare parts were assumed to be obtain­
able solely from a politically unstable foreign country.
This realism was important for the accuracy and acceptability 
of the decision analysis, and required more preparation and 
imagination than the analyst at first realized. Questioning 
for an application of MDA under uncertainty is time-consuming, 
and tiring. It would be a rare decision maker holding real 
executive responsibility, either an individual or a committee, 
who would have the time and patience to undergo the complete 
and theoretically proper interrogation. However, despite 
the rush in this application, both the decision maker and the 
analyst were at first satisfied that the results of the 
questioning were accurate enough. With more experience on the 
part of both the analyst and decision maker, the time scale 
might be shortened, but not considerably.
At the end of the analysis', the decision makbr was 
presented with the results in the form shown in Figure 12.5.
He was surprised at the differences between the preferred 
vehicles, and would have liked to do some sensitivity testing 
with varying weights and preferences. He was especially con­
cerned about the weight given to cost, and was searching for 
more realistic and comprehensible questions to find the k^ for 
cost that would compare the full cost over ten years of, say, 
a cheap 2h ton Japanese truck with drivers with the equivalent 
unit cost of a large very expensive truck with its drivers over 
ten year. He also started considering criteria which had not
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been included, to differentiate between the better trucks.
In short, the decision analysis was a part of the decision 
making process, not its culmination. But the decision maker 
did not regret the time, for he thought the way the analysis 
forced a consideration of all the issues involved was 
worthwhile, and he certainly understood the problem better. 
However, his comments indicated that he did not fully under­
stand the analysis, most especially the utility aspects, 
despite the analysts attempt to explain it at the start of the 
case study. Utility is certainly difficult to comprehend 
quickly. His general comments on decision analysis, as well 
as those of others involved in the case study, are incorporated 
in the next chapter.
Postscript to the Case Study
As the decision maker could still not arrive at a 
decision, the analyst suggested that a survey be made of how 
truck types were selected by successful Australian truck fleet 
managers^—The analyst conducted this survey of eleven loading 
fleet operators, three in the public sector, (168) and found 
that their approach was both similar to and different from 
the decision analysis approach he had adopted. There were 
two main similarities. First, the investment decision was 
always a multidimensional one, with the number of dimensions 
ranging from three to six. The most important dimension was 
the payload of a truck, which should be as large as possible 
within constraints on loading, etc. Second, the major source 
of information was their own experience. But there were 
differences too. First, the operators all used lexicographic 
ordering 'for the first few factors considered, although trade 
offs must have been made intuitively to settle on the required
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levels . The only explicit trade-offs made were expressed 
in money values, such as maintenance costs and initial 
cost. Second, no probability distributions were used, and 
the operators carried out trials of a vehicle until they 
could obtain a benchmark or certainty equivalent measure of 
it on the dimension about which they were uncertain. If 
there was too much uncertainty the vehicle was not even con­
sidered (that is, its certainty equivalent was of negligible 
value). Indeed, operators invariably said that when an in­
vestment decision was made no uncertainty existed. Third, 
there was usually very little objective analysis of the 
decision, and unaided intuition and judgment were used.-
The survey found that as large a truck as 
possible should be bought. This had a direct influence on 
the decision maker. He recommended that trucks of about 
lh tons payload be bought - the upper limit of those con:id- 
considered feasible in the decision analysis. The basic 
procedures discovered in the survey will probably be used 
in the selection of a make of truck later.
It is not easy to compare the effect of the two 
studies on the decision maker. Admittedly, he adopted 
the procedures of the second, but not of the first.
The second also provided more information than the first, 
e.g. about reliabilities of various makes of trucks. And 
the second was more easy for him to understand.
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But the first study using MDA need not be dismissed 
out of hand. It took two to three weeks instead of 
four months; was limited to the decision maker’s 
experience, while the second expanded it by surveying 
experiences of others; and the first did provide 
results that suggested the lh ton truck was among the better 
trucks. The point is that the two studies were different 
types and so their effects should be also. Nevertheless 
it must be admitted that the first study using decision 
analysis was difficult to comprehend, and that its 
use of explicit trade-offs rather than lexicographic 
ordering and its use of explicit probability distributions 
rather than certainty equivalents made it less convenient 
to executives in the Army. These aspects will be 
discussed in the next chapter.
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FIGURE 12.2 - AN EXAMPLE OF A COMPLETED INTERVIEW FORM
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FIGURE 12.3 - VALUE FUNCTIONS
Dimension 3 5
Alternative Cross-loading capability
Passenger­
carrying
possibilities
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8 ton CL .85 .6
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13. A PRELIMINARY EVALUATION OF MULTIDIMENSIONAL 
DECISION ANALYSIS UNDER UNCERTAINTY
13.1 The Advantages
The various procedures and models of MDA
under uncertainty have been surveyed, and its few
applications have been discussed. It is now appropriate
to make a preliminary evaluation of the usefulness of
MDA under uncertainty.
The advantages of decision analysis have been 
thought to be:
(i) It uses the decision makers own preferences 
and attitude to risk in the decision.
(ii) It br-eaks a complex decision problem into 
smaller parts which can then be examined 
more clearly. This means that decision 
makers become aware of issues involved 
and the trade-offs that are required - 
hence a more careful and informed decision is 
/ made. This has been found to be appreciated 
by decision makers, even when the precise 
results of the decision analysis are not 
accepted (152). This decomposition of 
decisions also permits more dimensions to 
be considered than would otherwise be the 
case (62).
(iii) It could provide a structure for decision
making in a group. This structure provides
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a basis for communication within the 
group; facilitates the development of 
alternatives and goals; isolates and 
identifies real sources of conflict that 
need to be resolved (17); and allows 
various areas of expertise to be incorporated 
into the decision making (53).
(iv) Once the variables in a decision analysis 
algotithm have been established, the 
decision maker could simply concentrate 
on the values of these variables in similar, 
later, decisions (224). This also provides 
consistency in the solution of problems.
Whether all these advantages are achieved in 
practice has to be discussed, and requires a close 
examination of MDA theory. There are two aspects of 
any theory: the internal consistency of its model, and 
the model's '"fit" to the real world.
13.2 Model Formulation
.. The situation in which decision models are used
can be shown in this figure, from (201).
Figure 13.1 The Decision Model and Reality
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1
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The bottom line 1, where a model is logically analyzed 
to produce numerical results, is dependent on the 
internal consistency of the model. The internal 
consistency of MDA utility models is undoubted, for 
the mathematical proof of each has been established.
It is this internal consistency where most research 
effort in MDA has been expended.
But what about the "fit" of the model to the 
real problem? This depends on the "fit" of the formal 
problem to both the real problem and to the formal 
model. Consider line 2, which concerns the fit of the 
formal problem to the model. In MDA under uncertainty, 
the formal problem refers in theory to utility functions 
and models derived through lottery questions. However, 
the formal problem is not as simple as that. A utility 
function can vary with the methods used to elicit it
(209) . Moreover, the BRLT method of elicitation which 
must be used for the discrete dimensions often found 
in MDA suffers from the problem of bias for particular 
probabilities and if the decision maker has a love 
of gambling per se, which is never tested for, then 
the utility function elicited with lottery questions is 
biased. Furthermore, the curve-fitting used on elicited 
points of the utility function only approximates the 
utility function. Perhaps a dimension simply cannot be 
scaled on a utility curve, because preferences do not 
satisfy the utility axioms, or because the decision maker 
(e.g. a politician) does not wish to make his utility
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function known or be made explicit. As well, subjective 
probability distributions also vary with elicitation 
methods, and rely on the decision maker successfully 
abstracting preferences for payoffs from his beliefs 
about their likelihood. In brief, the inputs to the 
model from the formal problem are approximations, not 
the clear unfuzzy facts that the numbers associated with 
them make them appear.
But the really crucial link in the "fit" of 
the model to the real problem is line 3, which is the 
"fit" of the real problem to the formal problem. This 
is problem formulation. One question to arise here 
is whether the dimensions included in the formal 
problem really do include all the factors involved and 
whether they are defined properly, e.g., does service 
frequency adequately define customer satisfaction?
But more importantly, one might ask whether all the 
possible dimensions, all the possible alternatives, and 
all the possible outcomes have been included. This 
latter is especially critical for MDA under uncertainty, 
for unexpected outcomes could occur. For instance, in 
an analysis of a decision about whether a farmer should 
spread superphosphate dr not, the farmer did not include 
in the formal problem the outcome of rain after the 
superphosphate was bought and before it could be spread, 
and this actually occurred and ruined the superphosphate 
(101). Moreover, there will be assumptions of 
discreteness (e.g., high, medium, low prices) or of
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probabilistic independence in almost every model, 
because the full model would be impossible to build 
or be too difficult to structure.
Under what conditions in public investment 
analysis would lines 2 and 3 in Figure 13.1 be as 
"noise"-free or "pure" as decision theorists seem to 
suppose? This depends on five factors of the real 
problem (suggested by those in (30; 98; 160; 194) ).
(i) the nature of key tasks carried out by the 
public body involved;
(ii) the level within the body at which the 
analysis is made;
(iii) the environment in which the investment 
project will be developed and operated;
(iv) the dependencies among the organizations 
involved;
v (v) the number of decision makers involved.
Each of these factors will be discussed in turn, with 
the understanding that other factors are held at some 
fixed level so that just one factor can be concentrated 
on. The aim of the following discussion is to 
demonstrate that the situations where MDA under uncertainty 
is used will probably b-e those where lines 2 and 3 
will be impure.
The nature of the key tasks carried out by the 
public body involved affect the purity of lines 2 and 3,
If the tasks are simple, not variable, and/or have been 
carried out often so that experience has been built up
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(e.g., many engineering tasks in Telecom) then MDA 
could be straightforward. Because of the known structure 
of the real problem,the ease of evaluating an analysis, 
and the known cause and effect relationship, the model 
should be reasonably valid because line 3 at least will 
be pure. These straightforward tasks do exist in the 
public sector, but Weberian bureaucratic rules have 
been developed for decisions concerning this type of task 
and because of the certainty surrounding this type 
of task, the simple additive value model could be also used.
So it is suggested that MDA under uncertainty 
would more often be considered for tasks which are not 
straightforward (e.g. new types of health centres, 
location of new dams), and hence line 3 would be more 
or less impure.
The level within the body at which the analysis is 
made is also a factor affecting problem and model 
formulation. If the analysis is purely a technical 
one, then the formal problem would be expected to be 
similar to the real problem, for the analysis deals with 
specialist, core, technologies which are, at this 
technical level, sealed off from outside influences.
However, at the managerial level of analysis, the 
complexities of co-ordination within the organization 
and of interaction with the; environment of the
organization would mean that the formal problem and the static 
model are likely to be very different to the real, changing,
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mult i - faceted, and probably unique real problem. As 
most public investment analyses will be managerial, 
with technical analysis being limited to the 
implementation of an investment decision, MDA again 
is faced with an impure line 3.
The environment in which the investment project 
will be developed and operated also affects line 3.
The most uncertain variable in public investment is 
public reaction. President Lyndon Johnson, architect of 
his Great Society programs, was surprised at the rioting 
in the ghettoes after all the things he had done for 
the poor and black. But other uncertainties involve 
economic conditions, demand for services (e.g. for 
air travel), climatic conditions, bureaucratic abilities 
(e.g. the PPBS disappointment), and later legislative 
changes. These uncertainties can indeed be incorporated 
into the model, albeit with somewhat uncertain 
probability distributions (line 2), but probabilistic 
dependencies may exist if the environment is very much 
uncertain and interrelated and this may have to be 
ignored in the model. In any case, even if the inter­
relationships are incorporated by various forms of 
simulation (e.g. subjective information modelling (30) ) 
there will be a requirement for simplification in the 
simulation models. In brief, the complex uncertain 
environment means line 3 will be impure to some extent 
in public investment analysis.
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Dependencies among the organizations also 
affects line 3. If dependencies are few or serial, 
then standard rules or schedules can co-ordinate 
organizations. But if dependencies are complex or 
reciprocal, then co-ordination becomes more difficult.
An example of dependencies in public investment analysis 
is redistribution of income between classes (organizations). 
These dependencies raise the problem of multiple decision 
makers, to be discussed in the next paragraph. But it 
should be noted that the "bureaucratic" model of inter­
acting organizations deciding public investment is a 
powerful one for which there is some empirical 
evidence (3; 11). This "bureaucratic" model posits 
that public organizations have predictable positions on 
most issues and that these are limited to the narrow 
world-view cf the organization, commonly called 
"empire-building". As public investment analysis 
involves several organizations and lobby groups, this 
suggests complexity in the real problem's goals because 
it is "still not understood how hard an agency will 
pull on a given issue, and what particular tactics 
will be employed" (11, p.31). Hence line 3 will be 
impure.
Finally, there is the problem of multiple 
decision makers. This situation is an outstanding 
characteristic of public investment analysis (223), 
and all the models discussed so far assume a single
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decision maker. Of course, there are some multiple 
decision models but, as the following discussion 
of them will illustrate, they are of extremely limited 
usefulness.
Firstly, developments in multiple dicision maker 
models should be reviewed. (The review must necessarily 
be brief, as the field is large and complex, and the 
point is only a small part of the thesis' argument). Recent 
multiple decision maker models have had to overcome Arrow’s 
Impossibility Theorem (10). This showed that if the deci­
sion makers each ranked the alternatives, then there is no 
social welfare function combining this information which 
satisfies five "reasonable" assumptions. The reasonableness 
of these assumptions has been questioned, and it is possible 
to have an ordinal social welfare function provided 
some strict conditions of anchoring are met (80). But 
it is by postulating a cardinal function for each 
decision maker that a social welfare function for 
certain alternatives is best constructed, and an additive
S'model is usually sufficient for this (47). As regards 
uncertain alternatives, Harsanyi (89) proved that if 
the group is indifferent between two uncertain r
alternatives whenever the individuals are indifferent, 
then the social welfare function is additive. (This 
is akin to the test for Fishburn-independence).
Keeney (131) has also ‘examined conditions very 
similar to Arrow's for an additive cardinal social welfare 
function which isi additive. Nash (47; 158)
examined a model with utilities measured from a "status 
quo" position which is the alternative that the decision 
makers receive if they cannot achieve a mutually
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acceptable bargain. This model can be expressed as a 
multiplicative model. In one application of it (47) 
finding the status quo alternative was extremely 
difficult. Of course, if each decision maker is 
taken to be a dimension, then any of the various models 
discussed previously in this thesis can be applied if 
the relationships between the decision makers are 
appropriate, e.g., the additive or multiplicative 
(122). Using this last approach, social welfare functions 
for three easily defined groups have been found - users 
of a computer system, voters and families relocated due 
to highway construction (127). Nevertheless there 
remain some perplexing and disturbing problems about 
additive and multiplicative functions (122, p.436).
How useful are these multiple decision maker 
models in decreasing "noise" in lines 2 and 3 (which is 
our main concern here)? Firstly, they all require that 
each decision maker has already done a MDA before the 
preferences are combined. This would mean trained 
analysts would be required with "each decision maker.
The difficulty of implementing PPBS is insignificant 
compared to the difficulty of implementing this.
Secondly, these models ignore the realities of multiple 
decision making with bargaining, deception, and inter­
personal tensions coalescing with the requirement for 
information from various sources before a decision can 
be made by an single decision maker. In this regard, 
"research findings indicate that interacting groups are 
generally superior to other groups (i.e., synthetic,
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nominal, Delphi) for evaluation or decision tasks"
(160, p.7). Indeed, if there is goal conflict among 
groups then decision analysis is an inappropriate 
mechanism for decision making because analysis 
accentuates the conflicts! (30) For MDA requires 
measurable, precise, goals, but if an analyst tries 
to elicit these precise goals rather than allowing the 
initial discussion to centre on diffuse goals and 
alternatives which can have many interpretations, 
he is likely to increase conflict. Alternatively, 
the analyst may settle for "harmless" goals for the sake 
of the model (267). In the same vein, a model decided" 
by external or senior authority may disguide conflict.
Nutt cites the MDA of the TFX purchase done by the 
American Department of Defence as an example. "Policy 
makers and operating personnel (i.e. air force, navy) 
placed radically different weights on evaluation 
criteria-used to select General Dynamics as the TFX 
contractor. Conflict was hidden in analytical procedures 
and not fully recognized until the U.S. Navy refused 
delivery of the F-lll", (160, p.ll). In brief, in the 
initial non-analytical system of multiple decision 
makers in public investment analysis, social welfare 
function models have little place. Not that group goals 
cannot be achieved. Jorgenson outlines several examples 
of it being done, but the "formulation activity results 
in complex and heterogeneous information (which) is 
changed all the time through the group process" (104, p.142) 
Only by very simple, interactive, dynamic models (not those 
of classical MDA) will group decision making be assisted (30
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So it should be obvious that MDA will be a difficult 
process, not assisted in the real world by complex 
social welfare function models, and that public 
investment analysis using MDA will thus have an impure 
line 3.
The conclusion one is drawn to from this 
discussion of problem implementation is that when MDA 
under uncertainty is used in public investment analysis 
the model will very rarely have a good "fit" to the 
real problem. The model will caricature the world, 
so that the model’s output will caricature the real 
decision to be made.
13.3 Implementation
Not only is the formulation phase of a MDA 
likely to have "noise", but so is the implementation 
phase, which is lines 4 and 5 of Figure 13.1. For 
instance, there will be changes in utility functions 
through time, so that the formal conclusion is not 
related to the input to the model, that is^line 4 will 
be impure. It is at line 5 relating the formal 
conclusion and the real conclusion where the greatest 
barrier to the successful implementation of MDA under 
uncertainty occurs, and this barrier refers to the 
perception of differences between analyst and decision 
maker . The relationships between the model, the world, 
the decision maker and the analyst are summarized in 
this diagram based on Jackson (101).
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Figure 13.2 - Interrelationships of Perceptions
Reality
Analyst's model of 
reality Decision maker's model of reality (R)
Decision model
The unbroken lines indicate perception, the dashed 
line indicates communication. Thus the decision model 
depends on how the analyst perceives the world, how 
he perceives how the decision maker perceives it, and 
how he perceives how these relate to the decision model. 
Any of these perception or communication links could 
introduce "noise" into the model as far as the decision 
maker is concerned, without the analyst even being aware 
of its existence. This is especially critical in MDA 
because the framing of questions to elicit utility 
functions and k^s for dimensions other than money in 
real terms that the decision maker will accept and 
respond to is extremely difficult.
Even a dimension of cost can be difficult to
elicit, as the problems in finding the k^ for cost in the 
truck investment case study demonstrated. These perception
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links are most noticeable in MDA's explicit treatment 
of uncertainty. As noted in Chapter 3, managers usually 
do not like to admit to uncertainty. Not one of the 
executives interviewed in Australia’s eleven leading 
transport fleets said that uncertainty existed when they 
made an investment decision. This reliance on managed 
uncertainty will be most noticeable in bureaucracies, 
where the ideal often appears to be an organization which 
can function whoever holds positions in it, so that 
individual beliefs and values are not as important as 
unassailable "facts". Moreover, bureaucracies take 
longer to arrive at decisions than private companies
(223) , and so there is more opportunity to manage the 
uncertainty involved in a decision.
Now, it is the difference in perceptions of 
analysts and decision makers that makes possible, on 
the one hand, a statement that decision analysis offers 
an approach to complex decisions that is rational and 
incorporates manager's beliefs and attitudes, and on the 
other hand, the extremely scant and continuing use of 
decision analysis by practising managers. For instance, 
Jackson (101) interviewed farmers who had "a good deal 
of exposure" (101, p.152) to decision analysis over 
years and found they were not using it. The six 
farmers he used to analyse ^real-world decisions "were 
not really convinced of the. merits of the approach"
(101, p.152). And a consideration of the applications 
in Chapter 12 is disheartening. It is unknown how many
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school principals continue to use the MDA model to 
select curriculums. The Mexican government does not 
appear to be using MDA on other real-world problems 
after the departure of the airport decision analysts. It 
is not reported that the chief executive of the mining 
company asked for more decisions to be analysed.
Litchfield et al are not explicit about how "useful"
MDA is and how often it has been used in their company.
And the Army officer in the case study will almost 
certainly not be using the technique again.
What has gone wrong? It is not possible, 
after years and years of preaching and experimentation, 
to ignore the unacceptability of decision analysis to 
practising managers. Only two writers appear to have 
tried to understand why this unacceptability occurs 
(as distinct from being concerned with the application 
of decision theory in practice). Dillon (42) addressed 
himself to acceptance among agricultural economists, and 
so the points he raised were not meant to apply to 
public investment analysis. However, it may be useful 
to discuss two of his points here. Firstly, is decision 
analysis unacceptable because other decision techniques 
are available to handle uncertainty? The discussion 
in Chapter 3 would indicate that this is not so for 
public investment analysis., Secondly, is decision theory 
personalistic when general techniques are required?
There may be relevance here for public investment analysis,
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for the problem of multiple decision makers has been 
already noted.
Moreover, the personalistic nature of decision 
analysis leads into Jackson's (101) reason for its 
unacceptability. In an original hypothesis, arrived 
at after real-world decision analysis with several 
farmers, he emphasises the philosophic committment 
inherent in decision analysis - man is free to choose 
between alternatives as he perceives them using his own 
perceptions of and attitudes to uncertainty. The 
decision maker uses his own view of the problem to 
make- a choice.
"This implies the existential notion of 
reality being, in some sense, subjective.
By encouraging the decision maker to include his 
feelings in his problem decision theory recognizes 
the importance of considering the individual 
as a whole, both his intellect and his emotion 
.... He acts on the basis of the truth as he 
believes it, not on the tuuth based on objective 
criteria. This is the existentialist notion of 
'''—truth. " (101, p. 164)
Jackson suggests that the one dimensional, technocratic,H§p
nature of Western society makes this decision theory 
approach inappropriate, and that managers look to 
techniques and gadgets to make decisions for them, 
rather than facing up to their situation. Hence, 
managers do not use decision theory.
However, there is another interpretation of how 
people view decision theory! Jackson's farmers who did 
not use decision theory preferred intuitive decision 
making based on experience - which is even more
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existential and subjective. And although the farmers 
did not like to use probability distributions, the 
point estimates of probability they preferred to use 
can also be viewed as certainty equivalents, which 
incorporate both the decision maker's uncertainty and 
his attitude towards it that is uncovered in decision 
analysis. Just because people sometimes find it hard to 
express utilities and probabilities, it does not 
necessarily mean that reason and objectivity have almost 
destroyed the subjective dimension of man, for it could 
simply mean that this subjective dimension of man is 
difficult to express in the terms required by decision 
analysis. It is this other interpretation of why 
decision analysis is unacceptable which will now be 
explored.
There is much evidence to suggest that practising 
managers, in both the public and private sectors, use 
very subjective decision making processes. Some of 
this evidence is the following items. First, the 
highly rational techniques of operations research have 
had only a very limited usefulness in public investment 
analysis, as Chapter 3 showed. Second, a survey of 
496 managers (183) showed that "rationality" was ranked 
only eighth out of ten characteristics of importance 
to a decision maker, while ['perception, or the ability 
to formulate problems" was ranked first by 821 of the 
managers. Third, most of the data used in managerial 
decisions is soft and speculative which must be 
"synthesized" rather than "analyzed" (154, p.255).
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Fourth, the exact roles of leadership which is so 
important in management are so subjective that the 
social sciences cannot agree on what constitutes them 
(154). Finally, the decision making process is 
almost invariably a dynamic process which the ordered 
steps of decision analysis do not capture (144).
The reason for the subjectivity that this evidence 
illustrates may be in the abilities of the two 
hemispheres of the brain (154; 201). The left hand 
hemisphere operates linearly, and sequentially, as 
language does. The right hemisphere operates in a 
holistic relational way,as pictures do. From the 
previous paragraph, most decisions are predominantly 
processes of the right hemisphere. Most importantly, 
the ambiguities, and irrationality of the right hemisphere 
"by their very mode of operation, (are) not readily 
accessible to causal explanation or even to linguistic 
exploration" (154, p.52), and so elicited models, utility 
functions and probability distributions are not 
precise, and are not perceived by decision makers to be 
so. Of course, some people do have a well-developed 
linear, left hemisphere, and this can be measured by 
tests used in Decision Perception Analysis (105).
Decision Perception Analysis research has found that 
managers can be placed on a quantitative/qualitative 
scale, and so can jobs. Jobs having a high quantitative 
rating would be those in engineering, for instance, or 
those in the public sector which are unlike public 
investment analysis as measured on the five factors
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discussed earlier. Those managers who most match 
their jobs on the quantitative/qualitative scale are the 
ones who are happiest in their work, because, in the terms 
used here, the models used in the job "fit" the real problems 
and solutions as perceived by the managers, and hence 
acceptability occurs.
In brief, decision analysis, rather than being too 
"existential", may not be existential enough, because the 
models used do not fit the decision maker’s perception of 
the real problem and solution.
13.4 Conclusion
The conclusion that one is drawn to by the above 
discussion of model formulation and of implementation is 
that decisions and decision makers are bound together, and 
that decision analysis must recognize this. Tn short, decisions 
are grown, not made by rational decision makers (144), so 
that models cannot be developed or recommended without regard 
to their acceptability and purpose. That is, a utility model 
cannot provide the optimal course of action, but, as Keeney 
puts it, rather just "indicate effective strategies" (113, 
p.116) , or be just "a method for decision analysis rather than 
decision making" (116, p.368), in an open rather than a closed 
loop of decision making. What evidence there is in applications 
of utility theory (Chapter 12) reinforces this. If this 
more limited aim had been emphasized as the goal of MDA, 
rather than the optimising aim, there may have been more 
applications. In brief, the decision model cannot be a 
surrogate for the decision-space, a replacement for it, as 
physical models can be for physical phenomena, but the decision 
model can be used to provide perspectives on the decision- 
space (201).
-174-
Now, if MDA is to provide perspectives on effective 
strategies rather than provide the optimum solution, 
there are several inferences to be drawn. They all con­
cern the acceptability of MDA. The sophistication and 
precision of decision models which are unnecessary for 
this limited aim could be discarded. Greater 
comprehensibility and understanding would result, so 
that the decision maker would use the
conclusions to increase his understanding of the
issues involved to allow him to make a better final 
decision. There is evidence to support this claim.
Bertie Tell (204) tested four different models on a 
real-life evaluation problem of the Swedish Air Force. 
Subjects were senior air force staff officers who were 
motivated by knowing that the results would be used 
by the Swedish Department of Defence. The dimensions 
used had been structured by the Air Staff a short time 
before. After the thirty subjects had given the 
functions and weights required for four different types 
of models, they were asked to rank them on these 
attributes:
(i) time requirement at construction;
(ii) believed precision;
(iii) ease of understanding the questions 
posed by the model;
(iv) ease of finding the information required 
by the model;
(v) which method the subject wants the Air Force 
to use.
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For all of these attributes, a simple additive value 
model was superior to Keeney’s multiplicative utility 
model, with a statistically significant difference 
occurring in almost every situation. As well, the two 
simple additive models tested were always ranked 
superior to the two relatively complicated models tested. 
This experiment shows that simplicity aids acceptability.
As well, this simplicity would mean that the decision 
analysis model would be a vehicle for communication 
among the many people involved in the decision, for 
simplicity aids understanding. Furthermore, 
simplicity encourages the decision maker to break down 
the problems into its constituent parts, so that they 
can be considered in isolation. Thus, simple models 
used in a decision analysis rather than a decision making 
role reinforce the advantages of MDA outlined in Section 
13.1, rather than detract from them. Furthermore, 
simplicity permits sensitivity analysis to be easily 
done, for the data required for new weights and value 
functions, or even new dimensions, can be quickly 
obtained and used. This is especially important for 
the dynamic circumstances of much decision making.
In terms of techniques, simplification would 
indicate that the easily understood additive model 
should be used for MDA under uncertainty, with expected value 
rather than expected utility being used as the criterion. 
This is the same as using the R(V) model with an additive 
value model and a R transformation that is linear. If the
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analyst is uncertain whether R may affect results if it 
is non-linear, he could derive two or three points on 
the R function. That is , the assumptions of the 
additive utility model should not be ignored. If 
Fishburn-independence obviously does not exist, the 
dimensions involved might be joined or transformed 
so that it could be assumed to exist, of course.
The following table summarises the simple 
models that should be used in place of more complex 
ones, based on the discussions in this thesis. The 
first, complex, model is separated from the second, 
simple, model by a "/", and when two equations for a 
model are referred to, they refer to probabilistic 
independence and dependence situations respectively.
TABLE 13.1
THEORETICALLY CORRECT MODELS AND THE PREFERRED 
SIMPLE MODELS FOR VARIOUS INDEPENDENCE CONDITIONS
Condition Model
Value dependence of 
a dimension
Value independence 
without Debreu- 
independence
Value independence 
with Debreu- 
independence
Utility independence 
without Fishburn- 
independence
Utility independence 
with Fishburn- 
independence
Utility dependence of 
dimension(s)
Generalised utility independence 
model (9.3)/transformation of the 
dimension (Section 4.1) and then 
the additive value model (4.1).
Non-additive value models/additive 
value model (4.1)
Additive value model (4.1)/ 
additive value model (4.1)
Multiplicative utility model (8.1)/ 
additive value model with an R 
transformation if the transformation 
is strongly non-linear (10.1) or (10,3)
Additive utility model (7.1) or (7.2)/ 
additive value model (7.1) or (7.2) 
using value functions.
Quasi-additive (9.2) or Fishburn1 or 
Farqhuar's dependence model/additive 
value model with an R transformation if 
the transformation is strongly non-linear
(10.1) or (10.3).
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The next three chapters discuss areas where MDA 
could be simplified, while not diminishing its ability 
to achieve its limited, "perspectives”, aim; indeed, 
these simplifications may improve its ability to 
achieve this aim.
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14. DECOMPOSITION
The first of three concepts which can be used 
to simplify the application of MDA deals with 
decomposition. If there are only a few dimensions to 
be considered, say n .$ 10, then all the models discussed 
above could conceivably be used. But if there are more 
dimensions than this, the number of functions and the 
number of weights to be elicited is quite large, 
raising the tediousness and the length of the questioning 
of the decision maker to inordinate heights. When this 
occurs, various types of dimensional decomposition can be 
used to simplify the decision analysis. Of course, 
whether decomposition is required and the extent of 
it ultimately depends on the desires of the decision 
maker.
One of the most commonly used methods of 
decomposition assists decision makers in deciding on 
weights for many goals by using a hierarchy of goals.
This would be especially useful in public investment 
analysis, for government departments often have higher- 
level goals, such as "to improve health", which are 
difficult to express as concrete working goals, but 
which must be borne in mind if working goals are not 
to become an "end" themselves rather than a "means"
(188) . The weights of the additive value or additive 
utility model are especially amenable to this decomposition. 
An example concerns high-level goals which are defined 
and weighted as follows:
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Higher-level Goal Weight
1. Speed .5
2. Reliability .2
3. Flexibility .1
4. Prestige .2
1.0
Then the effects or relevance of each lower-level 
dimension to these higher-level goals are defined in 
a matrix, with each column summing to 1. Note that 
if the problem-dependency of weights is to be incorporated 
into the decision, this relevance matrix should refer
to the relevance of raising each xiA to X
held at xt,,
'VHigher-level
Goal
Dimens ion\ 1 2 . 3 4
Low cost- .6 .1 .4 .2
Modularity .1 .2 .2 .2
Good supplier «
support .6 .1 .2
Low risk .2 .1 .3 .4
1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
This second matrix is then multiplied by the vector of 
higher-level goal weights to give final dimension weights.
K
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Dimension Weight
Low cost .40
Modularity .15
Good supplier support .22
Low risk .23
1.00
This basic principle of hierarchical additive 
decomposition has been widely used. For instance, four 
computer systems were assessed on 41 dimensions after 
the above decomposition had been twice done on six 
higher-level goals. Sensitivity testing showed changes 
in goal weights did not severely affect the final 
computer system rankings (185) . A similar procedure is 
followed by the widely-used relevance tree model, where 
the alternatives, as well as the dimensions, can be 
decomposed. Such a procedure is used by NASA, USN, 
Honeywell, and other organizations (12).
Another form of decomposition is based on the 
goal-fabric concept. Here dimensions are broken down 
into lower level sub-dimensions which can be analysed 
as a sub-decision. Thus performance cuuld be broken 
down into maneouvrability, range, speed, etc. This was 
proposed in an additive model for transport planning (13), 
and Keeney (113) provides a real world example of this 
approach. In his decision analysis for the Mexico City 
airport study, the dimension of airport capacity was 
broken down into three dimensions of capacity in each of 
1975 1985 and 1995, because utility functions were
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different for each of these because demand would be 
different. The utility for the alternatives on these 
sub-dimensions was found using the multiplicative model 
and then inserted into the full decision analysis.
Some recent decomposition research has centred 
on the requirements of utility and Debreu-independence 
needed for the multiplicative-model, and on simpler 
methods of verifying their existence than the tests outlined 
in Chapters 7 and 8. The core of Keeney's (112) research 
is to combine dimensions and then test for utility 
and/or Debreu-independence of these sets of dimensions 
from other sets. Heretofore in this thesis, Debreu- 
independence has referred to the independence of trade­
offs between two dimensions from other dimensions, and 
utility independence to the independence of utility on one 
dimension from levels of other dimensions. These are 
their usual applications in a particular decision analysis. 
However, if value independence refers to a set of 
dimensions, then trade-offs within that set are 
independent from the levels of dimensions outside the 
set, that is, the set is also Debreu-independent of 
outside dimensions. Thus, in referring to a set of 
dimensions, one can use the term Debreu-independence or 
value independence; writers on decomposition concentrate 
on trade-offs, and so the term Debreu-independence will 
be used. It is the certainty analogue of utility 
independence among sets of dimensions and is implied in 
the existence of the latter. Basing his proofs on this, 
Keeney finds several relationships between sets of
-182-
(i)
dimensions ,
(ii)
If two sets of dimensions are utility 
independent, then their union and intersection 
are utility independent, too - so that if a 
chain of intersecting utility independent 
sets of dimensions is constructed, then the 
sets of dimensions and their unions are 
utility independent of their complements 
in the chain, which could mean that some 
particular dimensions need not be tested for 
utility independence if they are involved 
in utility independent chains.
If (Xj, X2, *3) is a set of dimensions, 
and if (x£, x^) is Debreu-independent of 
x^, and X2 is utility independent of 
(x., Xj), then (X2, x^) is utility independent 
of Xj - thus tests for Debreu-independence 
might be used to supplant some more 
difficult, lottery-question testing for 
utility independence if sets of dimensions 
are being considered. However, an analyst 
needs only to test for utility independence 
on one dimension if Debreu-independence 
exists for all pairs of dimensions anyhow 
(123) so this second finding may not have 
much practical relevance.
the two most important being:
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Ting's (207) research in decomposition is 
similar to Keeney's, but he concentrates more on 
Debreu-independence. He develops relationships among 
Debreu-independent sets of dimensions which can be used 
to evade testing each pair of dimensions for properties 
of utility or Debreu-independence. The most relevant 
of these relationships are:
(i) If two of the pairs in three dimensions or 
sets of dimensions are Debreu-independent, 
then the third pair is also - and so need 
not be tested. This applies even if there 
are more than three dimensions involved 
in the analysis (117).
(ii) If the union of two sets of dimensions is 
Debreu-independent of another set or union 
of sets, then the union and the set or the 
two unions are also utility independent if 
one attribute in the union is utility 
independent of an attribute in the other 
set or union of sets - so utility independence 
need not be tested for each set in this 
situation.
It is now appropriate to make an assessment of 
Keeney's and Ting's procedures, First, the procedures 
require an enormous amount o£ concentration for even the 
analyst to keep track of the interrelationships among the
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sets of interconnected attributes, with the decision 
maker being unlikely to be able to do so. Second, 
the time and concentration required for testing sets for 
these relationships will be lengthy. As Keeney notes, 
"Decision makers find it very difficult to think about 
lotteries (required for utility independence tests) 
involving more than one attribute, because they must 
consider simultaneously both trade-offs between different 
levels of the attributes and the probabilities that 
the various consequences will occur" (112, p.13).
Third, whether sets of dimensions can often be 
constructed that will have non-empty intersections is 
debatable. Judging from the applications mentioned 
in Chapter 13,in most situations the intersections 
would be empty, with a goal-fabric hierarchy of 
dimensions like this:
Set 1
2.1
Set 2 
I
2.2 2.3
with each set of dimensions describing an aspect of the 
decision space. This would suggest that Ting’s approach 
which emphasises non-empty intersections may be more 
often used. In the example above, if the union of sets 
1 and 2 is Debreu-independent from a third, then sets 1 
and 2 are also utility independent from the third.
In brief, decomposition of goals and the goal- 
fabric approach can be very useful if there are many 
dimensions, but much of the tedious testing for 
independencies in most decision analysis appears to be 
unavoidable, unless the analyst relies on general
-185-
discussion with the decision maker to verify the 
independencies - a course both might prefer in real 
applications, given the robustness of the models 
to violations of independence and the limited aim of 
practical decision analysis.
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15. CERTAINTY EQUIVALENTS
The second of the three points of MDA
simplification is the certainty equivalent. Certainty
equivalents offer a promising way of easing the
difficulty of decision analysis. A certainty equivalent
(5fc^), is an amount of , such that for sure ^ (x^)
where x. refers to the full uncertain outcome of x- 1 i
for a consequence. Conditional certainty equivalents,
(5c- /xt) , are those where x? are held at some constant
levels. A certainty equivalent combines both the
decision makerh utility andthe probability distribution
m
of a dimension, for u(x^) = uCji^ Pj,xij) = E(u(x^)).
Thus, certainty equivalents could be elicited rather 
than utility functions and probability distributions, by 
discussing with the decision maker the full uncertainty 
involved in an alternative, and asking him which of 
various amounts of x^ would be indifferent to the 
uncertain alternative. Because managers have been 
found to operate as though certainty exists this must be 
how they operate, intuitively. It could be argued that 
the use of certainty equivalents means that the full 
benefits of decomposing a decision into its constituent 
parts of risk and attitudes to risk are not obtained.
This may be so, but one could also argue that if the full 
uncertainty of an outcome is;discussed with a decision 
maker, even though a precise distribution function is not 
obtained, and if indirect questioning is used to find the
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point where u (x.) 'v u(x^), then risk and attitudes to 
risk are being elicited. Considering the variability 
of distributiore, and utility functions with methods used 
to elicit them, it is not certain that certainty 
equivalents are less ’’accurate" than values derived from 
probability distributions and utility functions.
There are many advantages to the use of 
certainty equivalents. One is that the uncertain outcomes 
which are indifferent to the certainty equivalent are 
not hypothetical, as they often must be in the 
elicitation of utility functions, but are the actual 
alternatives facing the decision maker. This leads to- 
another advantage of certainty equivalents, which is 
the increased acceptability of the analysis to the 
decision maker when using certainty equivalents, for 
managers appear to intuitively operate using them and 
the sophistication of distribution and utility functions 
are not'usually explicitly involved. The final 
advantage of using certainty equivalents is that it 
saves time. If a full decision analysis is done, each 
alternative on each dimension must have a distribution 
function, and each dimension must have a utility function 
whereas if certainty equivalents are used, a certainty 
equivalent replaces each distribution function and a 
value function replaces each.utility function, and both 
replacements are more easily elicited. This saving of 
time assists a dynamic consideration of the problem.
-188-
One disadvantage to the use of certainty 
equivalents is that subordinates cannot be entrusted 
to make decisions based on the decision maker's 
previously derived utility function (5). However, this 
disadvantage can be worried about after decision 
analysts have first convinced decision makers to use 
MDA under uncertainty themselves. The pressing 
problem is to convince decision makers to use decision 
analysis to supplement their intuition,let alone 
convincing them that someone else could be trusted to 
use it too.
Thus far, discussion has centred on certainty
equivalents for each dimension, and not the models that
combine them. If Fishburn-independence exists, so that
N
the additive utility model applies, then u(x) = .2..u(x.)N 
N v
= .£^v(x^), even if there is probabilistic dependence
between the dimensions (178),for Fishburn-independence 
means that any probabilistic dependence would not affect
the utilities for each x. This presents another method
of evading the difficulties of probabilistic dependence
if Fishburn-independence exists or can be assumed to
exist (Section 6.2).
For non-additive utility models, there is strictly 
a requirement for probabilistic independence before 
certainty equivalents can bemused in the model (178; 110;
111) with the expected utility of an alternative being 
expressed in terms of the certainty equivalents of one­
dimensional outcomes. However, the importance of this
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use of certainty equivalents is that if certainty 
equivalents are used one is dealing with MDA under 
certainty. In this situation, the additive value model 
has been found to be quite adequate, so that MDA under 
uncertainty with probabilistic independence can be 
decomposed into a simple additive value model if 
certainty equivalents are used, no matter whether the 
additive or multiplicative utility model may have 
applied. Moreover, with probabilistic independence, 
results of the additive value model will be unique up 
to a monotonic transformation, so that the monotonic 
R transformation forthe R(V) utility model for MDA 
under uncertainty will not change the ordering of 
alternatives, and hence need not be elicited from the 
decision maker. That is, and this is an important 
conclusion, there is no need for utility functions or 
uncertainty models of any sort if probabilistic independence 
exists, for an additive value model used with certainty 
equivalents will be adequate. The one minor proviso 
to this concerns the quasi-additive utility model with 
utility dependence. The additive and multiplicative 
utility models assume utility independence and hence 
imply that value independence exists, so that the 
value additive model can be used. But even if utility 
independence does not exist then value independence may 
still exist. So if utility independence does not
gxist, then the quasi-additive utility model with utility 
dependence might still be applicable, using certainty 
equivalents y. conditional on two standard levels of z.
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That is,
E(u(y,z)) = k2u(?,z°). (1 - u(2|y°) + kH(yi z^)u(2 ly°)
where z and z* are the two standard levels of z and 
two scaling constants are required. However, this model 
with more than two attributes is an exceedingly difficult 
one to apply, as Chapter 9 notes.
In conclusion, the use of carefully elicited 
certainty equivalents has many benefits for the 
acceptability and tractability of MDA under uncertainty^ 
especially if probabilistic independence exists, with 
no proven degradation in the accuracy of its measurement 
of the decision maker’s assessment of and attitude to 
risk resulting from their use.
x
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16. DOMINANCE
16.1 Dominance Under Certainty
Two concepts - decomposition and certainty 
equivalents - which can be used to simplify decision 
analysis have been discussed. The third and final 
concept to be discussed is that of dominance.
Under certainty, all that is required to test for 
dominance is to rank each alternative on each dimension. 
Then an alternative is dominated if it is bettered or 
equalled on all dimensions (with at least one dimension 
bettered) by at least one other alternative. It may 
be thought that this dominance is unlikely to occur. 
However, in Keeney’s MDA for the second Mexico City 
airport, for example, four out of eight alternatives 
were dominated. The four dominant alternatives were 
then redefined into five more precise alternatives, 
and two of these were dominated, which left only three 
to consider in more detail, and one of these dominated 
the others in all but one dimension, so that the trade­
off for this one dimension from the others was all 
that was finally required.
If uncertainty exists, this procedure could also 
be used with certainty equivalents. If uncertain 
alternatives are ranked in terms of simple preference
K
for each dimension, then this implies that the certainty 
equivalents are in that preference order. Careful 
discussion of the uncertainty involved in alternatives
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is required to assure that the decision maker is 
aware of risk and that his attitude to this is 
incorporated in the ranking. This ranking of certainty 
equivalents would be easier than specifying the 
utilities of the x^s. Of course, the certainty 
equivalents could be derived from utility functions and 
probability distributions, if they exist. Indeed, Keeney 
remarks that the certainty equivalents calculated from 
the probability distributions and utility functions elicited 
in the first, static, part of his analysis were "a 
particularly useful feature*1. They permitted "an 
analysis of dominance and (gave) insight into how much' 
of attribute x^ it would be necessary to trade-off 
for a specified amount of attribute x. for any alternative 
to be preferred to another." (159, p.511). In the 
truck investment case study of Chapter 12, the certainty 
equivalents calculated from the probability distributions 
and utility functions ranked thus:
TABLE 16.1: TRUCK CASE STUDY CERTAINTY EQUIVALENTS
Dimension Cost Availability Mobility loadii5g
Alternative * 4 * * 7
Passenge
carrying
possibil
ity
3/4 ton * 
1 ton GS 
1 ton CL* 
2h ton GS 
2% ton CL 
5 ton GS 
5 ton CL 
8 ton GS 
8 ton CL
9
8
7
6
4
5 
2 
2 
1
5 9 5
4 7 5
6 7 5
15 1
7 5 1
2 3 3
7 3 3
2 15
7 1 5
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Of the nine alternatives, only two were dominated. The
3/4 ton truck was dominated or equalled by the 1 ton GS
truck on all dimensions, and the 1 ton CL was dominated by the 2
ton GS on all dimensions. This indicates that dominance
may not always be as useful as hoped, but that it still
may help to narrow the field a bit.
16.2 Stochastic Dominance
Stochastic dominance refers to dominance under 
uncertainty. It is especially useful if probability 
distributions for alternatives are available, but 
utility functions are not. Perhaps a researcher's model 
could have provided the first, but the actual decision 
maker is not available to provide the second. On the 
other hand, both must be available, at least implicitly, 
for certainty equivalents to be elicited. However, it 
is doubtful whether stochastic dominance will be as 
useful in multidimensional situations as it is. in the 
unidimensional situations to which it has been applied, 
for the dominance must exist over all dimensions for 
an alternative to be deleted from consideration.
There are three degrees of stochastic dominance,
first (FSD), second (SSD) and third (TSD). When
n. fx") is the ith derivative with respect to x of the lv J
utility of x; F (x) and Gq(x) are the cumulative 
distribution functions of alternatives f and g which 
are within (a, b); and Fn(R) = Fn_i (x)dx, for R 
from a to b, and analogously for Gn(R); thenvarying
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the assumptions about the utility function and the 
corresponding rules for stochastic dominance are:
FSD U1(x) > 0 F2(x) < G1 (x)
(that is, no risk aversion or preference)
SSD U^(x) > 0 F2(x) < G2(x)
U2(x) < 0
(that is, risk aversion)
TSD Ux(x) > 0 F3(x) c it*)
U2(x) < 0 F2Ch) 6 G2(b)
U3(x) > 0
(that is, decreasing risk aversion)
A complete description of these conditions, with proofs, 
is given in (9). Essentially, as more assumptions are 
made about the utility function, more and more alternatives 
will be dominated. Risk aversion is a reasonable 
assumption to make about a public investment decision 
maker, as noted in Chapter 5, so that SSD could be used. 
However, whether TSD could be used would depend on the 
decision maker, for although decreasing risk aversion is 
reasonable for a dimension of wealth, it may not be for 
the dimensions in a MDA.
The calculations of the Fn(x)s in stochastic 
dominance can be quite tiresome, and computer programs 
are required (9). However, another form of 
dominance called E-V dominance requires only the mean (E) 
and the variance (V) of the Alternatives distributions - 
f dominates g if E(f) * E(g) and V(f) < V(g) with at least 
one of the strict inequalities holding. Although E-V
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ik
dominance assumes a quadratic utility function, with
increasing risk aversion, the results of E-V dominance
and TSD are remarkably alike, at least when risk
aversion is not strong (171; 172). It seems that the
complexity of finding stochastic dominance is not worth
the extra cost, compared to E-V dominance.
The case study of truck investment was used to
test for E-V dominance. The figures derived for mean/
standard deviation were:
TABLE 16.2: TRUCK CASE STUDY E-V^ VALUES
Dimension Cost Availability Mobility*Passenger
7 'Loading carrying
Alternative possibilities
3/4 ton 76.3/6.86 2.45/0.59 2.45/0.59 9 5
1 ton GS 65.39/7.06 2.45/0.59 2.35/0.58 7 5
1 ton CL* 56.75/6.41 2.70/0.64 2.80/0.60 7 5
2h ton GS 30.0/2.20 2.30/0.64 2.20/0.60 5 1
ton CL 24.15/1.94 2.65/0.73 2.75/0.70 5 1
5 ton GS 23.62/1.56 2.25/0.63 2.15/0.58 3 3
5 ton CL 17.9/0.75 2.5/0.60 2.75/0,70 3 3
8 ton GS 17.8/1.44 2.25/0.63 2.15/0.58 1 5
8 ton CL 14.6/1.34 2.65/0.73 2.75/0.70 1 5
In each case, the lowest imean value is to be
preferred, for a cardinal scale was assumed for availability 
and mobility, and for the non-stochastic alternatives 
of cross loading and passenger-carrying possibilities the 
rank orderings are from Table 16.1 The 1 ton CL truck is
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is again dominated by the 2h ton GS truck as it was 
when certainty equivalents were ranked. But the 3/4 
ton truck is not again dominated by the 1 ton GS truck - 
f®^" instance, the 1 ton*s mean cost is lowdr but its 
standard deviation is also slightly higher than the 3/4 
ton’s, so the 1 ton is not dominant on cost. The 
difference to the situation when certainty equivalents were 
used would be due to the utility function of the decision 
maker being different to that assumed in the E-V 
analysis.
In brief, stochastic and E-V dominance is likely 
to have a limited place in MDA under uncertainty as 
compared to the place of dominance with certainty 
equivalents. It would only be useful where distribution 
functions were available, but utility functions were not.
16.3 Conclusion
dominance may be useful to a decision analyst in 
cutting down the number of alternatives to be considered.
Thus it needs to be done early in.the analysis, and 
ranking of uncertain alternatives by their intuitive 
certainty equivalents appears to be useful for this. If 
any alternttives are dominated they can be removed from 
consideration.
It has been argued (e.g. (18; 170) ) that this is 
as far as decision analysis should go, for going further 
is trying to derive a univariate figure of merit 
for a multivariate problem and makes far too many assumptions,
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e.g. about the model. Indeed, this may be so, especially 
if only two or three alternatives remain, and the 
decision between them relies only on the trade-off of 
one dimension against the others, as in the Mexico City 
airport decision analysis.
However, as shown in the truck selection case 
study, the use of dominance may leave several alternatives 
to be considered. Moreover, when a final decision is 
made, the decision maker will decide which alternative 
is "best", implying a univariate final selection.
Thus a decision analyst, attempting to aid a decision 
maker by indicating "effective strategies", would do 
well to usually continue the analysis past the test for 
dominance, especially as a decision maker’s intuitive 
steps towards a univariate solution may be suspect.
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17. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
17.1 Summary
This paper began with a review of various guides 
to public investment analysis, and found MDA to be 
worthy of study because it appeared to require fewer 
assumptions and attempted to allow for uncertainty. Then 
an investigation of the additive value model for MDA 
under certainty found that the model was acceptable and 
accurate, that it was robust to variations in the value 
functions and the weights, and that rating was a simple 
and effective method of eliciting value functions and 
weights.
Then MDA under uncertainty was addressed. The
elements of utility theory were reviewed, and the
differences between utility and value functions outlined,
and the terms used for independence relationships in
each were justified. A chapter on probability concluded
that precision in subjective distribution functions was 
./ ■specious, and the simple visual^impact method appeared 
the best way of assessing them. Then several utility 
models were outlined, with emphasis on the additive, 
the multiplicative, two quasi-additive and the R(V) models. 
Based on scattered and preliminary evidence, the results 
of all models which assume utility independence appear 
to be highly correlated. Thiis the straightforward 
additive model could be used. Moreover, because value
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functions are more easy to elicit and comprehend, and 
because value functions are similar to utility functions, 
there appeared to be a case for using value functions in 
preference to utility functions.
The few published applications of MDA under 
uncertainty were then reviewed, to find that applications 
were satisfactory even when the full, theoretically 
correct, analysis was not done, as it never was because 
of time constraints. A case study of investment in 
Army trucks corroborated the finding that time was a 
constraint on a MDA, but it also highlighted the point 
about acceptability of the results of a decision analysis - 
the most that a MDA can hope for is "to indicate effective 
strategies", rather than to find the optimum one. Given 
this limited objective and the difficulty of acceptability, 
a preliminary evaluation of MDA under uncertainty 
concluded that techniques should be simplified as much 
as possible, e.g., by using the additive value model.
Three concepts which could simplify MDA were 
then covered. First, decomposition of dimensions by 
a goal-fabric would be useful when there are many 
dimensions, and relevance matrices can aid in finding 
weights for dimensions. Second, the use of certainty 
equivalents can greatly simplify MDA under uncertainty, 
especially if probabilistic independence exists, by 
allowing the additive value model to be used, without 
any apparent loss of accuracy in measuring the decision 
maker's assessment of and attitude towards risk. Third,
<
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dominance may permit some alternative to be dropped 
early in an analysis, but stochastic dominance would 
appear to have little usefulness in multidimensional 
situations.
17.2 Conclusion
Chapter 3 outlined several approaches to public 
investment analysis. Regarding the best developed of 
these approaches, mathematical programming, it might 
be argued that if.certainty equivalents and an additive 
model are used, then MDA is little different to Haimes’ (54) 
multiple worth surrogate trade-off method of linear 
programming in its assumptions. This is undoubtedly true 
in many cases but it could not have been known until the 
research in this thesis has been done. In any case, it is 
not true if dimensions are not continuous, and it was 
suggested that in the real world all the dimensions will not 
be continuous. The other approaches of investment analysis 
investigated in Chapter 3 all remain inferior to MDA, 
even if the simplified techniques of MDA suggested are used.
That is, multidimensional decision analysis would 
appear to have some advantages over all other methods of 
public investement analysis, for it uses the decision maker’s 
own preferences, does not use the additive model without 
^eing aware of its foundations, and incorporates risk in a 
systematic fashion. Nevertheless, theoretically correct 
models have not been satisfactorily used for a full decision 
because of the time required of busy decision makers. 
Moreover, only rarely have the results of utility models 
been accepted in toto by decision makers because, we suggest,
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its approach is different to how most managers make 
decisions, and the elicitation of model parameters re­
quire answers to hypothetical questions. What seems to 
be required for MDA to be applied in public investment 
analysis is an awareness that it can only aid decisions, 
not make them, and that this will be achieved more easily 
if its techniques are simplified as much as possible. If 
this argument is accepted, the steps for a MDA would 
appear to be not those listed in Section 5.4, but rather 
a dynamic, iterative, set of explorations:
1. Discuss the decision with the decision maker(s) 
and decide on a decision matrix of alternatives 
and dimensions. This should not be more detail­
ed or precise than is necessary for the particu­
lar stage of the decision making process; for 
instance, carefully defined objectives at an 
early part of the process may be counter­
productive (Section 13.2).
2. Assess whether value and utility independence, 
monotonicity, and probabilistic independence 
exist. This should not be done tiresomely, for 
the additive model appears to be robust to all 
but major absences. Rather, the assessment 
should be done by common sense, discussion with 
the decision maker, and an occasional test ques-
K
tion, e.g. , whether certainty equivalents for 
x. change as Xt does for a test of utility in­
dependence. If the conditions do not obviously 
exist, then serious consideration should be
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given to altering the decision matrix so that 
they do. The usefulness of the additive model 
which can be used when they do exist for explor­
ing the decision space, will probably outweigh 
any loss from changing the first-cut decision 
matrix.
3. After the decision maker is fully aware of any 
uncertainty in the decision space, ask him to 
rank the alternatives on each dimension, and 
test for dominance. (With luck, the decision 
analysis may be able to be stopped at this stage, 
with only two, perhaps three, alternatives un­
dominated and easy to choose among intuitively).
4. For the undominated alternatives elicit certainty 
equivalents more carefully than was done in step 3. 
Alternatively, if the decision maker wishes to 
provide probability distributions, these could
be used with value functions to derive expected 
value certainty equivalents. The visual impact 
method should be used to elicit probability dis­
tributions and rating should be used to elicit 
value functions as these methods appear to be as 
accurate as any other and are more easy to use 
than others. Finally, the value of each alternative 
should be calculated using a weighted additive value 
model, with a R transformation if necessary. This 
model is easily understood, and apparently robust 
enough for the necessarily limited aim of MDA which 
is achieved in the next step.
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5. Use a computer to carry out sensitivity test­
ing of the results of step 4, altering the 
variables which the decision maker wants to, 
to enhance the decision maker’s understanding
6. Expect and permit the decision maker to make 
the final decision, not the model.
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